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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis considers The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest as William Shakespeare’s 
last great plays which foster re-enchantment for an age suffering spiritual disenchantment. 
 Chapter 1 identifies a critical context for studying these between theological studies of 
the arts and literary-critical studies of Shakespeare and religion. Section 1 surveys David 
Brown’s work on religious enchantment and imagination through the arts. Section 2 takes in 
literary criticism’s turn to Shakespeare and religion. Section 3 explores recent theological 
studies of theatre and Shakespeare. Section 4 revives overlooked criticism from religious 
poets of the past. 
 Chapter 2 introduces a progression of theoretical constructs that revitalize these plays 
as spiritually re-enchanting. Section 1 looks at affect theory as a means to understand the 
body-spirit relationship in the context of performance. Section 2 draws on Scott Crider’s 
reading of The Winter’s Tale as the performance of a complete ethical rhetoric demanding 
both theatrical and mythical interpretations. Section 3 expands T. G. Bishop’s study of the 
theatre of wonder as Shakespeare’s affective convergence of reason and emotion. Section 4 
builds on the preceding sections to reestablish Renaissance alchemy as the most directive 
evidence for reading these plays as spiritually re-enchanting. 
 Chapter 3 is my reading of The Winter’s Tale. I argue that a wondrous, alchemical 
reading of the play suggests Hermione dies and is bodily resurrected in the last scene. 
Paulina’s alchemical art is cryptic, but the resolution is a corporate miracle that re-enchants 
the audience through the awakening of faith. 
 Chapter 4 is my reading of The Tempest. I identify Prospero as an all-powerful and 
benevolent alchemist who, instead of imposing vengeance on everyone within his control, at 
the end relinquishes his potent art in exchange for the less certain but greater spiritual 
enchantment of redemption through the free and loving act of forgiveness.  
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A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put 
within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of your 
body, and I will give you an heart of flesh. 
 ~Ezekiel 36:26 
 
 
 
When supernatural religion disappears, art becomes either 
magic that is run by authorities through force or fraud, or 
falsehood that becomes persecuted by science. 
 ~W. H. Auden 
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above all dogmas, present their ideas to God. Their prayer 
audaciously offers a discussion. Their worship is 
questioning. This is direct religion, full of anxiety and of 
responsibility for him who would scale its walls. 
 ~Victor Hugo 
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CHAPTER 1: CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS OF SHAKESPEARE AND RELIGION 
Introduction 
 This first chapter surveys existing scholarly writings for the sake of contextualizing a 
new perspective on the religious significance of Shakespeare’s last plays. Both in theology 
and early modern studies, recent decades have seen a swell of attention to Shakespeare’s 
evident fascination with matters of religion. This is but the latest turn to the subject, which 
has been of critical interest to some degree as long as there has been critical interest in 
Shakespeare. Studies in theology have tended to prioritize drama as illustrative of theological 
considerations. Early modern studies are inclined to legitimize criticism of Shakespeare and 
religion with methodologies detached from Christian faith and practice. Four hundred years 
later, Shakespeare’s art continues to evoke highest praise for perception and creativity.1 I 
wish to explore the possibility that William Shakespeare had a creative and sincere religious 
imagination worthy of consideration in its own right, and this religious imagination climaxes 
in The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest. I propose that in his final works Shakespeare offers a 
dramatic enchantment of awakening faith, and that in order to best appreciate religion in his 
plays we should be open to the possibility that these plays may affect their audiences 
spiritually. 
 Criticism into the twentieth century at times approached religion in literature with 
deference to this kind of awakened faith. The current disregard for such a perspective in 
secular criticism might be identified as a kind of critical disenchantment. Despite all the 
recent attention to Shakespeare and religion, there remains opportunity between literature and 
theology for a study of the romances as what they appear to be: works of spiritual re-
                                                
1 Harold Bloom’s apotheosis of Shakespeare is neither the first nor the greatest. Samuel Johnson finds 
Shakespeare next unto Homer in excitement and inventiveness, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge compares 
Shakespeare to Dante and Milton. See: Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (New York: 
Riverhead, 1998); Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Coleridge on Shakespeare: The Text of the Lectures of 1811-12, 
ed. R. A. Foakes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2008), 110; Samuel Johnson, Preface to The Plays of 
William Shakespeare (1765), in Samuel Johnson, Selected Writings, ed. Peter Martin (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 371, 376. 
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enchantment for a disenchanted age. Such a study may be situated between the two poles of 
criticism already identified: The first pole is theological consideration of the arts nascent in 
recent decades, which has engaged theatre generally and Shakespeare specifically. The 
second pole is critical attention to Shakespeare and religion in early modern and literary 
studies, which tends toward secular and sceptical methods and inferences. The first 
perspective takes Shakespeare’s spiritual significance seriously, but such studies tend to treat 
Shakespeare as material for ulterior considerations more than as theologically creative in his 
own right. The second perspective takes Shakespeare’s artistic and creative significance 
seriously, but tends to treat religion in secular terms and assume in some way that 
Shakespeare must have done the same. Between these perspectives is a balance of the two: 
Shakespeare was one of the greatest artists ever to reflect on religion, and his art embodies 
original creative expression of enduring spiritual significance. This first chapter situates this 
third perspective. 
 Initially, I briefly address the matter of Shakespeare’s late writing, which affects why 
his final plays are suitable for such a study. In the first major section of this chapter I survey 
the work of David Brown, whose theological writings have broadly refocused attention to the 
vitality of the arts for Christian thought and practice. Relying on Brown’s work, I suggest 
Shakespeare is an ideal subject for continuation of such study, since the playwright remains 
an artist of the highest caliber as well as one attentive to the very concerns Brown identifies. 
In the second section I turn to the literary critical study of Shakespeare and religion. After 
considering what should be retained from those critics sceptical about Shakespeare and 
religion, I transition to an extended exposition of the work of Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti 
as well as those who have followed their lead in identifying new methodologies of criticism 
with the decline of New Historicism. Jackson and Marotti find that as attention to 
Shakespeare and religion has waxed, this need has continued. Finally I give considerable 
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attention to Sarah Beckwith’s Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness as a literary-
critical close reading of religion in Shakespeare’s late plays. Beckwith’s thoughtful reading 
indicates great possibilities for the plays as spiritually affective, but ultimately her own 
conclusions are limited, finding the bonds of religion too human, too functional, and too frail. 
In the third section of this chapter I turn back to theological studies of drama and of 
Shakespeare. I consider eschatological readings in the work of Paul Fiddes, Christopher 
Hodgkins, and Judith Wolfe, then turn to essays by Ben Quash, Ivan Khovacs, and Malcolm 
Guite, whose careful theorizing of theatre and poetry bear on my own efforts to gain insight 
into the religious significance of the late plays. The last section returns to criticism from poet-
critics who have taken questions of Shakespeare and religion seriously in order to recover 
what may have been overlooked. Included are Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s lectures on 
Shakespeare, Charles Williams’ The English Poetic Mind, and the poetry and criticism of W. 
H. Auden. Having situated my own study in light of these thinkers, the second chapter picks 
up with what may yet be added in the development of a new perspective on Shakespeare and 
religion. 
Late Writing 
 A word is desirable about the critical justification of focusing on the religious 
significance of Shakespeare’s late works. Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and The 
Tempest are the four plays generally considered together as the final movement of 
Shakespeare’s creative output. These plays obfuscate category and nomenclature, variously 
identified as problem plays, post-tragedies, tragi-comedies, romances, last plays, or late 
plays. My own use of terms is merely-descriptive and according to context.2 Until recently 
                                                
2 For further consideration of terms, see Charles Moseley, ‘Literary and Dramatic Contexts of the Last Plays’, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare’s Last Plays, ed. Catherine M. S. Alexander (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47-51. 
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scholars have tended to favor the histories and tragedies in attempting to understand 
Shakespeare’s religion. Why now the increased attention to problem/romance/late plays? 
 Lytton Strachey set the stage for 20th century criticism of the late plays when, in 1906, 
he famously decried them as the absurd result of a bored poet slouching towards retirement.3 
The tentative order in which Shakespeare had written his plays was still newly-enough 
established in Strachey’s time to foreground questions about their overarching development 
as well as Shakespeare’s state of mind in writing them. To Strachey, the great tragedies were 
the apex of realism in character and action. Shakespeare subsequently turned from greatness 
to write dull plays, not even making a pretence at realism (though Strachey conceded the 
poetry was sublime). The Tempest was the greatest offender.4 Strachey’s name has endured in 
this context for his derision, though his objections have long ceased to merit serious response. 
Nevertheless he was instrumental in the revision of critical attitudes about late plays and late 
writing. 
 W. H. Auden suggested more positively that Shakespeare’s late works have the 
identifiable hallmarks of a genre in which authors end their writing careers with a chosen 
difference. Auden contends late writing is indifferent to popular and critical acclaim. 
Whereas an author’s early works may be obscure because his artistic vision is unfamiliar, late 
writing focuses on particular artistic problems that the author finally makes a point of 
working out for their own sake because he cares particularly about that difficult perspective.5 
Such late writing indicates a project of personal importance, and if it is unfamiliar it should 
be considered more carefully rather than less. 
 More recently, Gordon McMullan has been sceptical about late writing as a genre at 
all, let alone one in which Shakespeare wrote. He claims that if late writing as a conscious 
                                                
3 Lytton Strachey, ‘Shakespeare’s Final Period’, in Books and Characters (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), 
64. 
4 Ibid., 61-62, 65-69. 
5 W. H. Auden, ‘Pericles and Cymbeline’, in Lectures on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Kirsch (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 271. 
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endeavour is a legitimate phenomenon, it is at the earliest a Romantic phenomenon, and for 
Shakespeare would have been anachronistic. McMullan sees the late works of authors as 
varied in their creativity, and late writing is a critical construct, not a given reality.6 Late 
writing is usually a redemptive fantasy of rejuvenation or a self-conscious effort by the author 
to fulfill the criteria of late style.7 McMullan may have a point about the formalization of late 
writing as a critical construct, and perhaps about authors’ subsequently posturing in this 
genre, but he is too negative in his scepticism about Shakespeare, whose work is arguably 
more significant than the genre being ascribed to it. Auden’s theory of late writing seems 
reasonably developed out of his study of Shakespeare as an exemplar. 
 Andrew Power and Rory Loughnane make the biographical point that between 
starting Antony and Cleopatra and finishing Pericles, the major events in Shakespeare’s life 
were remarkable: His daughter Susanna married John Hall at Holy Trinity Church Stratford 
on 5 June 1607. His younger brother Edmund’s illegitimate son Edward was buried in 
London on 12 August 1607. That winter Edmund himself was buried at St Saviour Church 
Southwark at Shakespeare’s lavish expense. His granddaughter Elizabeth Hall was baptized 
at Holy Trinity Stratford on 21 February 1608. Finally, on 9 September 1608 Shakespeare’s 
mother Mary Arden was buried. Beyond personal life events, an unusually harsh winter, 
famine, riots, and the plague not only elevated the general level of human suffering in 
London, they also closed the theatres for prolonged periods.8 Average lifespan was forty-
seven. In the poorer parts of London it sank as low as twenty-five, and half the population of 
the city was under twenty.9 If Shakespeare was forty-three when he started Pericles, this is 
                                                
6 Gordon McMullan, Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 16. 
7 Ibid., 275. 
8 Andrew J. Power and Rory Loughnane eds., Late Shakespeare, 1608-1613 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 1. 
9 Peter Ackroyd, Shakespeare: The Biography (New York: Nan A. Talese, 2005), 4. 
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old enough to feel circumspect about life and for every third thought to be inclined towards 
matters of enduring significance. 
 Shakespeare’s artistic vision continued to mature throughout his career, and for the 
four late plays there is a clear shift to new and experimental modes. Studies of Shakespeare 
have increasingly benefited from overcoming the latent bias against the late plays as inferior. 
That he continued to write at all through personal loss and hardship suggests possible reasons 
for the kind of changed focus Auden finds significant. He did not need the acclaim or the 
money. After the completion of the late plays Shakespeare laid down his pen.10 It is thus 
reasonable to look for religious significance—perhaps the most religious significance—in 
these final plays, and to do so with an eye towards possibilities of re-enchantment. There is a 
curious tendency in criticism of late Shakespeare to focus on The Winter’s Tale or The 
Tempest, but not to attend to both in the same project. Restrictions of scale mean the present 
project limits itself to these two plays, but I propose it is ideal to consider them together as 
the two most important movements of Shakespeare’s visionary climax. 
1.1 DAVID BROWN – THEOLOGY AND IMAGINATION 
 Some early modern scholars have pointed to the Protestant reformation as creating a 
cultural vacuum for ritual. When the cults of the saints were suppressed as inappropriate 
devotion, when music was stripped of its adornment, and when visual narratives in stained 
glass, sculpture, and paint were struck down, then the human craving for imaginative and 
aesthetic ritual was left unsatisfied by the church. The establishment of the secular theatre, 
ostensibly coincidental in timing, offered a place less-regulated by church strictures on ritual. 
The need for imaginative satisfaction of relatable narrative and shared human experience 
                                                
10 G. Blakemore Evans and J. J. M. Tobin, ‘Chronology and Sources’, in The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd edition, 
ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. J. M. Tobin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 87. I defer to Evans and Tobin 
throughout for the dating of Shakespeare’s plays. Henry VIII, the lost Cardenio, and The Two Noble Kinsmen 
all postdate The Tempest. However, these collaborations with John Fletcher, while meriting consideration as 
something of a phenomenon in their own right, postdate his active London writing career and do not belong in 
the conversation about Shakespeare’s late creative climax. 
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found its fulfilment in the liberties of the theatres.11 This was available irrespective of 
affluence, social class, or even literacy. Theatre taking the place of church is difficult to 
prove; in criticism it has been endorsed as much as a secularizing hypothesis as a religious 
one.12 The point worth retaining is that there was in the early modern period an expression of 
the continual struggle to nourish the human need for imaginative fulfilment. 
Anthropologically, the struggle has been universal irrespective of time or place, and this has 
been no less the case for Christianity. It is also a dynamic of interest to theatre, where the 
creative confluence of embodiment, imagination, and performance frequently has been in 
tension with religion. 
 David Brown is helpful in ways both scholarly and pastoral, suggesting theological 
grounds for the creation and experience of embodied meaning. The broad endeavour of 
Brown’s five-volume series published by Oxford University Press between 1999 and 2008 
was to develop a practical theology conducive to meaningful religious engagement through 
valid imaginative perception. By examining diverse expressions of art and culture, his project 
continues to reclaim for Christianity ‘a form of perception that has largely been lost in our 
utilitarian age, experiencing the natural world and human imitations of it not just as means to 
some further end but as themselves the vehicle that makes possible an encounter with God, 
discovering an enchantment, an absorption that like worship requires no further 
justification.’13 The theological concerns Brown identifies in our present day were, in their 
historical variations, recognizably present for Shakespeare to engage with from his position 
as a dramatic artist. Shakespeare is ideal for a case study informed by, but also reflective 
                                                
11 For scholarship pursuing this line of inquiry, see: Adam Max Cohen, Wonder in Shakespeare (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988); Regina Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2008). 
12 See: Anthony Dawson, ‘Shakespeare and Secular Performance’, in Shakespeare and the Cultures of 
Performance, ed. Paul Edward Yachnin and Patricia Badir (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 83-97; Dawson, 
‘Claudius at Prayer’, in Religion and Drama in Early Modern England, ed. Elizabeth Williamson and Jane 
Hwang Degenhardt (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), 235-248. 
13 David Brown, God and Enchantment of Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36. 
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upon, Brown’s broader endeavour to expand meaningful religious experience. Thus a survey 
of his work is constructive. 
 In the first volume Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change, Brown’s chief 
concern is to find a way between the inherent faults in Enlightenment reason and historicism 
on the one hand, and postmodern relativism on the other. Without qualified engagement, 
these are opposing responses to the same issue. The Enlightenment tried in its own ways to 
embrace the expanding vision of science, philosophy, history, and religion, and to reintegrate 
all of these into harmonious relation. This search for a more-elaborate but also 
comprehensible unity of cosmos and logos was not a new Christian ideal.14 However, as 
Brown points out, the difficulty newly presented was a realization brought about by the rise 
of science: that Scripture and ecclesiastical authority could no longer be easily reconciled 
with the universe as it was now understood.15 Christianity burdened the literal facts too 
greatly. The Reformed ideals of sola scriptura and the primitive church, deprived of extra-
biblical adornments and rituals that had been a part of Christian faith and practice in the 
intervening centuries, became the ‘deposit’ of faith and practice. Protestant Christianity’s 
limiting of inspiration to a fixed form and content stripped the Gospel of its imaginative 
reception, reducing it to historical facts that, as time increasingly passed, became evermore 
historically distant.16 It is worth recognizing explicitly in the context of Brown’s work that by 
the time Shakespeare was working these dynamics were present and increasingly influential. 
 Reacting in due historical course to the fallout of modernity’s Reformed Enlightened 
literal and historic fixedness, postmodernist expressions of faith have tended to posit anew 
the agency of inspiration and meaning in contemporary community. Postmodernity 
emphasizes flourishing immediacy and the relevance of present external concerns. An 
                                                
14 See C. S. Lewis, Discarded Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11. Lewis suggests the 
medieval synthesis is itself a third work equal to the Summa Theologica and the Divine Comedy. 
15 Brown, Tradition and Imagination, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14. 
16 Ibid., 135. 
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unchanging historical text could not be expected to mediate revelation in circumstances that 
would not possibly have been anticipated. While Brown is unequivocal in his expressed 
conviction that Scripture is the root of Christian revelation and needs to be held in the highest 
possible regard, he concedes it is inadequate in its ability to speak mediately to contemporary 
issues from its position of historical fixity. He concludes, ‘The Enlightenment was right to 
raise questions of historicity and objectivity, but postmodernism is also correct in noting the 
conditionedness of all thought and therefore the necessity for recognition of the role of 
community and tradition.’17 In both quarters there is an identifiable need to develop a robust 
construct for the role of imagination in Christian experience—an imaginative structure 
capable of speaking relevantly to believers who accept the obligation of venerating their 
historical and scriptural heritage on the one hand, but also recognizing that the church cannot 
return to any earlier, simpler ideal.18 
 One instructive counterexample to these forms of source tradition is myths. Myths 
have tended to function with the validity of the myth centred in its imaginative usefulness 
more than any concern about historical veracity, changeless form (which myth does not 
possess), or literal vindication. Myths function through images and narrative rather than 
esoteric reasoning, and are their own way of thinking.19 Imaginative metaphor and fiction are 
forms of discourse for which both the Enlightenment and postmodernity have too little 
capability in their theology. Myths are in their own way as capable of meaningfully 
embodying truth as literal and historical patterns of discourse. Mythological narrative and 
imagery—particularly in Ovid as a poet of myth—are deeply integral to Shakespeare’s 
imaginative and religious constructs.20 
                                                
17 Ibid., 366. 
18 Ibid., 367. 
19 Ibid., 178. 
20 The most-helpful studies are: Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and Ovid (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); A. B. 
Taylor, ed., Shakespeare’s Ovid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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 The primary media in which most early modern people experienced religion were the 
ecclesial arts of liturgy, music, and architecture.21 Even in preaching instruction is best 
communicated through narrative and how the audience is made to feel. Increases in literacy 
and education have not indicated that most people can or should function chiefly in 
propositional modes of religious engagement. The imaginative faculty is not such that it can 
be ignored or transcended, and its vitality has been too-often neglected in Christian practice.22 
What is needed is an imaginative paradigm capable of speaking mediately to believers who 
accept the burden of venerating their historical religious tradition, but who also realize that 
the circumstances of the primitive church to which Scripture was revealed do not have a one-
to-one correspondence with present circumstances. As Brown concludes his first volume: 
The imagination too needs its critics. But just as Wordsworth…corrects his 
classical religious inheritance, so we too need to acknowledge how much 
religion flourishes, and thus the revelation that God seeks to address to 
humanity, by the reader in each generation being set free to appropriate what 
the imagination can discover in the interstices of the ‘moving’ texts that are a 
religion’s story. For that to be possible truth cannot be narrowly confined to 
‘fact’; nor can the biblical text be allowed the final say. Image, text and truth 
need to work together, not in opposition.23 
 Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth expands on the role of 
the imagination for those struggling with God’s apparent metaphysical distance. Religious 
arts and forms of devotion can reflect how people perceive relationship with God in practice. 
Medieval iconography, Renaissance art, and legends of the saints represent in their respective 
ways how God is perceived as immanently near or transcendently distant. Medieval theology 
had so emphasized God’s transcendence that even the incarnate Christ was felt to be 
unapproachable. Eucharistic rites, through foreign Latin and limited access, kept the masses 
largely distanced from what was taking place. Imaginative hagiographies compensated as a 
medium of immanence for the God who was perceived as distant. Cults of relics and miracles 
                                                
21 Brown, Tradition and Imagination, 322-23. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 376. 
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functioned imaginatively and concretely as immanent contact points to divine 
transcendence.24 Brown suggests that the imaginative legends grew, regardless of veracity, 
‘precisely because they were a way of working out what Christ-like sanctity might be like in 
what had hitherto been uncharted waters, under conditions of life quite different from Jesus’ 
own.’25 Brown writes with reference to medieval circumstance, but the struggle to balance 
this dynamic is historically common. Christianity has struggled, sometimes emphasizing 
immanence at the expense of transcendence, sometimes vice versa. The human spiritual need 
is evident: an imaginative connection to God’s relevant and active presence. The relationship 
of immanence and transcendence is another common thread between religion, literary 
criticism, poetics, theatricality, and Shakespeare’s plays. About this subject I and others shall 
have much more to say. 
 God and Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience begins a progression 
in David Brown’s last three volumes towards studies of enchantment, sacramentalism, and 
experience. Brown is concerned that in contemporary culture a habituation of instrumental 
rationality pervades the church. The church does not disvalue the arts per se, but it is inclined 
to value them insofar as they have utility for ulterior purposes such as evangelism.26 
Christianity has lost a step by letting ethics and politics dominate its focus. The instrumental 
forms and practices of the church cannot be dismissed, but neither are they sufficient, and 
cannot be a substitute for non-instrumental spiritual necessities that are less pragmatic and 
more affective. Here Brown is identifying from a theological and pastoral perspective a trait 
in contemporary religious culture that has made it the strange bedfellow of literary criticism. 
As shall be seen in the next section, religion has been made derivative of—or instrumentally 
subject to—external pragmatic considerations. 
                                                
24 Brown, Discipleship and Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73. 
25 Ibid., 82. 
26 Brown, God and Enchantment of Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 22. 
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 Brown defines enchantment as ‘…the discovery of God under such [non-instrumental] 
forms, whether or not any further practical consequences follow.’27 Enchantment is attained 
through sacramental experience: God mediated through material forms. Where Brown 
‘rebels’ against traditional sacramental theology is by contending sacramentality is not 
mediated exclusively through the traditional dominical and ecclesial sacraments.28 Where the 
church has yet to recover from instrumental approaches to the outward forms of piety and 
worship, there is need for enchanted spiritual fulfilment that may allow Christians to 
experience God more directly and personally, even—perhaps for some especially—outside 
established forms of the sacraments contained to limited ecclesial contexts. Art, nature, and 
music are contexts in which many people graciously experience God as present, beautiful, 
and familiar. While sacramental traditionalists may find this unsettling, Brown recognizes the 
felt need of contemporary religious experience as well as the significance of Romantic 
thought to religion. What are needed in light of Brown’s work are not only theologians, but 
also artists who are thoughtful about both the power of their creativity and its limits. 
Shakespeare is perhaps the paradigmatic artist reflecting on the limits of his art. In the last 
section of this chapter I also acknowledge the work of critics who should be taken seriously 
because they are themselves artists. 
 God and Enchantment of Place returns to the subject of God’s immanence and 
transcendence to redress the historical difficulty of balancing these in proper perspective. 
Brown offers by way of extended illustration the different emphases of iconography and 
Renaissance art. Enlightenment and Reformation modes of thought could be accused of 
corrupting God’s immanence by collapsing it too much under the weight of his unchangeable 
transcendence. The postmodern error is to corrupt God’s transcendence by collapsing into it 
his apparently malleable immanence for the sake of relatability. Just as Brown sought a 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 410. 
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middle way between the habituated critical faults of the Enlightenment and postmodernity, a 
present spiritual need is a balanced emphasis of immanence and transcendence, by which we 
might more mediately approach God and the sacred. Brown laments that churches no longer 
sufficiently evoke immediate or intuitive responses to the divine. He suggests that we have 
lost touch with how people experience God, and there is need for a re-enchantment, along the 
careful lines he has proposed, for the church to become the place of ‘…a God present and 
actively concerned throughout his world, a world in which experience of the divine was once 
the norm and not the exception, and can be so again.’ 29 
 This is worth pressing towards Shakespeare. Brown’s methodology is both theoretical 
and pastoral. An academic study need not be directed towards such pastoral concerns per se, 
but Brown is identifying pastoral considerations regarding immanence and transcendence 
that, as we shall see, have bearing on the limitations of secular literary criticism (identified by 
Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti) and Shakespeare’s own creative interest (identified best for 
my purposes by Malcolm Guite). If a proper theoretical perspective on Shakespeare’s 
religious artistry is salubrious for us both in our scholarship and in our religious experience, 
then this would be a pastoral working out of the subject in question—the pastoral of course 
being not only a matter of theology but a genre of art. In The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest 
Shakespeare embraces the pastoral, and we should not be surprised if a pastoral perspective 
both artistic and religious is helpful to experiencing these plays as more than thought 
experiments. Both Shakespeare’s era and our own could be described as enlightened but 
disenchanted. For an age lacking enchantment—per Brown, God’s revelation under non-
instrumental forms—it is worthwhile to consider the response of an artist like Shakespeare 
and whether his creative re-enchantment is mere escapism (as it is often considered) or a 
more substantial renewal in light of perceived spiritual need. 
                                                
29 Ibid., 413. 
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 In the concluding volume God and Mystery in Words: Experience through Metaphor 
and Drama, Brown picks right up exploring ‘…how language can sometimes be said to 
function sacramentally, in conveying experiences of divine presence.’30 Brown reiterates that 
Christianity’s historic movement towards linguistic containment and determinism—driven in 
part by the desire to fix the formula and validity of sacraments—to be a development with 
tragic consequences. Verbal denotation made the sacraments of the medieval period too 
wooden as formula prevailed to the detriment of imaginative profundity.31 Though the 
endeavour was no doubt well-intentioned, it ignored the wider way that words were 
themselves a means of divine mediation.32 The emphasis on surety and limit neglected the 
metaphorical dimension of language. Brown argues that the unfolding expression of the 
divine is inescapably linguistic. 
 Poets, by nature of their art, have more sensitivity than theologians and liturgists to 
apprehend words’ seemingly-inexhaustible capacity to present what is other and divine. Good 
poets’ function is to unify experience through association of apparent unlikenesses in a reality 
that on theological principle must ultimately stem from the same creative source.33 In the 
poet’s mind, disparate likenesses form new relational wholes by means of metaphor, 
constructing in the tension between unlikes the full power of imaginative association. Single 
metaphors are potent; extended combinations of metaphors accumulate imaginative 
complexity.34 Theatre, so often identified as a complex metaphor for the world, resides next 
                                                
30 Brown, God and Mystery in Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17. The fourth volume God and 
Grace of Body: Sacrament in Ordinary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) makes broad consideration 
of the grace that may attend sex, dance, food and drink, classical music, pop music, the Blues, musicals and 
opera, and the eucharistic body. While insightful into those respective expressions of art and meaning, God 
and Grace of Body primarily examines these in their own right insofar as they might be considered ordinary 
experiences with sacramental significance. Because my study is specific to Shakespeare and his dramatic 
form, the bearing of God and Grace of Body on the present study is tangential; where there is constructive 
bearing it is sufficiently expressed in the preceding or succeeding volumes to mitigate particular 
consideration. 
31 Brown, Mystery in Words, 56. 
32 Ibid., 23. 
33 Ibid., 43. 
34 Ibid., 54. 
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unto the drama of ecclesial liturgy at the apex of metaphorical significance. At the highest 
level, the Incarnation was itself a poesis of the Incarnate Word in a multiplicity of metaphors 
that language has always struggled to fully articulate: ‘The words, like the flesh itself, 
function sacramentally in both pointing to a divine reality beyond themselves, while at the 
same time mediating, however inadequately, something of that reality.’35 Attempts to 
propositionalize or collapse Christ’s irreducibly metaphorical action flatten the incongruity of 
what Christ actually did, and they likewise weaken the necessary imaginative struggle to 
think and wonder about it. Appreciation and comprehension are more variegated to a poet 
who has recourse to more than a single familiar perspective. Poems and great texts—and the 
Bible itself is the superlative example—reward repetitive readings because they cannot be 
resolved into a single perspective. Shakespeare of course mastered this form in drama. The 
Winter’s Tale and The Tempest are as fascinating as any of his plays because of the perhaps-
unprecedented extent to which they obfuscate reduction to any single interpretive perspective. 
 Words, poetically, communicate an experience rather than serve as mere commodities 
for didactic transfer. Poetry is powerful by nature of its sense of something present within and 
beyond itself, and this metaphoric experience is in so many ways strangely familiar to the 
eucharistic experience.36 This sacramental construct has obvious affinity with the theatrical 
construct.37 The vitality of metaphorical comparison exists in the tensed middle between 
unlikes. Either image in its own right may be seen as complete. Metaphorically considered in 
light of the other, their comparison points to deeper meaning beyond either, the higher source 
of truth pervading all incomplete representations.38 
                                                
35 Ibid., 55. 
36 Ibid., 66-67. 
37 See Marilyn McCord Adams, ‘Eucharistic Drama: Rehearsal for a Revolution’, in Theatrical Theology, ed. 
Wesley Vander Lugt and Trevor Hart (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 204, 208-09. 
38 For an historically relevant literary study of the same dynamic, see Kimberly Johnson, Made Flesh: 
Sacrament and Poetics in Post-Reformation England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
Johnson argues the diversification of eucharistic theology regarding sign and substance affected the poetry of 
Herbert, Taylor, Donne, Crashaw, etc. Rather than the texts of their religious lyrics substituting for a sign and 
thereby promulgating a view of the eucharist, their verse reflects the confusion inherent in eucharistic 
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 Contemporary drama is for Brown too much set in dark, acoustically muted, 
elongated theatres where spectators are palpably separated from the stage and their fellow 
attendees.39 This hearkens to bad liturgy, set in bad architectural space, where the mysteries 
front and centre may be as remote and unfamiliar as the mumbled eucharistic rite of an 
ignorant celebrant in a dark age. The result is an isolated, passive experience of drama (or 
liturgy) that dampens the metaphoric tension between distant stage and torturous comfy 
chairs. Such affective distance was impossible in a crowded stone amphitheatre or early 
modern performance space. The historically similar experience at the reconstructed Globe 
Theatre recreates what the vibrant interactions between the players and a rowdy audience can 
be in such a space. Like good ecclesial liturgy, play-going defies reduction to an intellectual 
exercise. Properly put on, the metaphoric tension with which performance fills a live theatre 
activates the liturgia of the play in an experience most-comparable to music—a dynamic to 
which Shakespeare consciously draws attention with music itself, plays within plays, and also 
the music of poetic language. 
 The conclusion of God and Mystery in Words returns to the opening request of 
Tradition and Imagination with an appeal for the recovery of natural and revealed theology 
by attending to the cultural embeddedness of both, as well as the role of imagination in all 
things. Nature and the arts are not exclusive—nor the most important—means of 
experiencing God, but as increasing numbers of people find no correspondence between 
attending church and their belief in God, Christian theology must admit the need to re-place 
its own relationship with these instead of depending on ‘an intellectual system…that now 
                                                                                                                                                  
semiotics. Their ‘antiabsorbative’ eucharistic poetic was one of immanence, emphasizing the sign even to the 
neglect of the substance. The poetic mindset was imposed on the theological one—the verse itself preeminent 
over whatever the meaning behind it. 
39 Brown, Mystery in Words, 157. 
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hangs free of the once universally shared assumptions on which it was based: the divine 
reality available everywhere to be encountered.’40 
 In the context of Shakespeare studies, Brown takes religion and art seriously with a 
perspective from which literary and early modern criticism might benefit. From the counter 
perspective of literature and art, Brown suggests Shakespeare’s religious significance is more 
robust than traditional theology as a critical discipline has allowed until recently. This 
perspective opens the possibility of hearing Shakespeare in a way that is imaginative but also 
affirming in its consideration of faith. 
1.2 LITERARY CRITICISM AND THE TURN TO RELIGION 
 In balance with David Brown’s theology of imagination and the arts, it is important to 
recognize complimentary literary criticisms that have recently afforded further opportunities 
to reconsider the same subject. Delineating categories for studying Shakespeare and religion 
can become its own critical endeavour. John Cox, having surveyed the documentary evidence 
for Shakespeare’s personal convictions and, owing to a lack thereof, the interminable debate 
that follows, suggests four categories of criticism based Shakespeare’s written record: 1) 
traditional faith, 2) reformed faith, 3) faith with no recognizable position, 4) no faith.41 The 
first category has evolved a branch of ‘decoding’ Shakespeare’s cryptic Catholicism, 
however Cox points out not only the inconclusiveness of these studies but also that the 
method can result in alternate conclusions like Stephen Greenblatt’s that Shakespeare was an 
ardent secularist.42 In the fourth category Cox identifies those with a functional view of 
religion as social or political power.43 Some scholars such as Beatrice Batson have 
endeavoured to ‘pluck the heart out of Shakespeare’s mystery’ from his writings, but her 
                                                
40 Ibid., 271. 
41 John Cox, ‘Was Shakespeare a Christian, and If So, What Kind of Christian Was He?’, Christianity and 
Literature 55.4 (Summer 2006): 546, 559 n.1. For ‘traditional faith’ Cox follows Eamon Duffy’s terminology 
for pre-Reformation Christianity. 
42 Ibid., 549. 
43 Ibid. On this Cox follows: Sarah Beckwith: ‘Stephen Greenblatt’s Hamlet and the Forms of Oblivion’, 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 33.2 (Spring 2003): 261-280. 
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succession of volumes lack focus and coherence.44 Three streams are expanded here: 
religious scepticism, post-historicist criticism, and Sarah Beckwith’s reading of 
Shakespeare’s ‘grammar of religion’. 
Religious Scepticism and Shakespeare 
 A strain of scholarship on Shakespeare and religion sees the integration of these in a 
negative light. Shakespeare was perhaps more capable than anyone of representing scepticism 
in his work, and this includes scepticism about religious matters. Though it most likely 
climaxes in the great tragedies, such scepticism is represented right through the late plays. 
Negative readings need brief acknowledgement, but sceptical readings have their place in 
proper context. 
 Few scholars are as strident as Eric Mallin in Godless Shakespeare, who makes an 
atheist critique that despite the panoply of religious language, imagery, and biblical 
references, God is absent from the plays and Shakespeare is hostile towards him. Apparently 
only a Cartesian degree of certainty would satisfy Mallin that Shakespeare took any person or 
attribute of religion as more than a plaything.45 Alison Shell more carefully identifies 
Shakespeare as ‘one whose language is saturated in religious discourse and whose 
dramaturgy is highly attentive to religious precedent, but whose invariable practice is to 
subordinate religious matter to the particular aesthetic demands of the work in hand.’46 More 
than for his contemporaries, Christianity was to Shakespeare a subordinate narrative. 
Apparently-religious language and ritual are used to empower secular theatre, and the world 
dramatized is not precisely Christian.47 Shell’s conception of what Christianity must have 
been is primarily as an adapted source narrative. Not seeing Christianity represented without 
blemish in Shakespeare, she concludes he was no sympathizer. Shell does not consider 
                                                
44 Cox, ‘Was Shakespeare a Christian’, 556. 
45 Eric Mallin, Godless Shakespeare (London: Continuum, 2007). 
46 Alison Shell, Shakespeare and Religion (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2015), 3. 
47 Ibid., 205. 
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Christianity in early modern culture as something credibly prevalent, on which Shakespeare 
might have been creatively reflecting. 
 Richard McCoy’s Faith in Shakespeare is an entire monograph dedicated to 
dissolving faith into poetic faith. Faith in Shakespeare was ‘more theatrical and poetic than 
spiritual. The credibility of his characters and stories derives from no higher power than 
literature.’48 The paradox is that we are moved by apparently religious scripts even as we are 
meant to see through them.49 For McCoy, faith in Shakespeare may be rational and humane, 
but this amounts to enjoyable food for thought, not hope for salvation.50 McCoy sides with 
Deborah Shuger that the Renaissance division of visible form from spiritual substance led to 
spiritual fragmentation and wide scale secularization.51 He concurs with Stephen Greenblatt’s 
suggestion that Protestant anti-theatricalism exposed the fraudulence of ritual and drama, 
killing the credibility of the supernatural.52 He dismisses with scant consideration Regina 
Schwartz’s Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism and Sarah Beckwith’s 
Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness as instances of ‘“spilt religion,” swamping all 
distinction between religious and poetic faith.’53 
 For McCoy, the Romances only operate at the human level, aiming to elicit merely 
poetic faith: ‘These purely human achievements are the true basis of faith in Shakespeare, 
and the imagination, rather than the gods or spirits or magic, sustains this poetic faith.’54 
McCoy dedicates an entire chapter to a sceptical reading of The Winter’s Tale, culminating in 
the conclusion that the faith required at the end is poetic faith and the willing suspension of 
disbelief in the face of illusion. This is the case for the characters in the play as well as the 
                                                
48 Richard McCoy, Faith in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ix. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 7. 
51 Ibid., 9; Debora Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 37, 67. 
52 McCoy, Faith in Shakespeare, 9; Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 109, 113. 
53 McCoy, Faith in Shakespeare, 12. 
54 Ibid., 116. 
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theatre audience.55 In The Tempest, magic within the plot is stagecraft only meant to be seen 
through. Prospero’s Epilogue is akin to the Wizard of Oz stepping out from behind the screen 
to humanize his imperfect character in a bid for pity.56 The paradox of faith in Shakespeare is 
that we are tempted to believe in illusions even as we see through them.57 This disenchanting 
view of faith may be sceptical, but for McCoy it is a necessary realism in which heaven and 
earth are reflections of ourselves. Such cosmic egoism is myopic. More-robust religious 
imaginations are represented in the work of David Brown, in Malcolm Guite’s articulation of 
the Shakespearean poetic imagination in section 1.3 of this chapter, and in Thomas Bishop’s 
theory of wonder to which I appeal in the second chapter. 
 There are any number of publications that may not self-identify with scepticism but 
construe Shakespeare’s religion predominantly as a plaything. Sean Benson’s Shakespearean 
Resurrection: The Art of Almost Raising the Dead makes a thorough catalogue of 
Shakespeare’s plays looking for language or appearances of resurrection. From these we are 
supposed to glean the effects of resurrection ideas, all the while seeing through the plays as 
illusions.58 Arguing for the seriousness of resurrection while identifying it merely as 
salubrious theatrical deception is not entirely satisfying. Other attempts to address 
Shakespeare’s private or performed religion have weakened the success of their efforts 
through equivocation. Joan Hartwig’s less-recent Shakespeare’s Tragicomic Vision sets up 
idealized expectation of the transcendent in Shakespeare’s late plays, but her readings under-
deliver on interpretations of lasting significance.59 Jean-Christophe Mayer’s Shakespeare’s 
Hybrid Faith tries to avoid a one-sided view of Shakespeare’s religion by acknowledging 
where necessary when criticism crosses into speculation about any private or performed 
                                                
55 Ibid., 141, 145. 
56 Ibid., 149. 
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58 Sean Benson, Shakespearean Resurrection (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2009). 
59 Joan Hartwig, Shakespeare’s Tragicomic Vision (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1972). 
 21 
religious convictions.60 This is a historically-oriented study focused on the history plays. 
Mayer offers sympathetic yet careful speculation about Shakespeare’s Catholicism. However, 
as John Cox comments, Mayer prioritizes historical and political readings over moral and 
religious readings.61 Historical criticism of Shakespeare and religion has been prevalent 
enough that it is the subject of the following section. 
 John Cox has himself more constructively split distinctions of Shakespeare, religion, 
and scepticism. Seeming Knowledge: Shakespeare and Skeptical Faith identifies in 
Shakespeare a kind of critical scepticism in the vein of Desiderius Erasmus and Thomas 
More: 
Skepticism for these two did not supplant their faith; rather, skepticism and 
faith complemented one another as essential aspects of the same vision of the 
human situation. They were skeptical of the human pretension to rational 
knowledge, because they regarded human beings as too fallible to achieve 
anything certain, perfect, or complete on their own, and this view of human 
incapacity derived not from reason itself but from scripture and ecclesiastical 
tradition—in other words, from faith.62 
Cox reads Shakespeare as appealing with thoughtful geniality to the widespread religious 
belief of his community—especially the elements that would have been held in common 
regardless of Christian division.63 These included an accepted rule of morality, a suspicion of 
human nature, a sense of Christian aspiration to virtue despite frailty, and remedy through 
‘grace, mercy, charity, and forgiveness’.64 Piety and virtue may increase even if perfection is 
not possible this side of the eschaton. In my own reading, this sets up possibilities for greater 
eschatological perfectibility in the late plays. 
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 The balance Cox identifies between scepticism and faith avoids the disenchantedness 
of critics who find either unmitigated scepticism or vapid faith. These are neither particularly 
poetic nor faithful by any robust construct.65 The hard-line scepticism by which Shakespeare 
is sometimes read lacks nuance and is arguably anachronistic. It is, however, important to 
consider in detail the historicist movement of some such criticisms. 
Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti – The Literary Critical Turn to Religion 
 In the early twenty-first century, most European and American 
Shakespeare scholars are probably agnostic, atheistic, or religiously 
indifferent—hostile to confessional apologetics, as well as resistant to 
criticism that mystifies real-world economic, political, and social relations by 
accepting early modern religious languages and religious points of view as 
intellectual frameworks adequate to understanding the culture and the 
literature of a time distant from our own. Living in religiously pluralist or 
secular societies with intellectual elites that are rightly antagonistic to any 
manifestation of religious fundamentalism, but also uncomfortable with 
religion in general, they find it hard to take a fresh look at manifestations of 
the religious in the work of a dramatist whose openness to interpretation has 
facilitated modern secular understandings of his plays. If they deal with 
religious subject matter, they prefer to analyze it historically as just one 
feature of the cultural context of Shakespearean drama. The problem with this 
approach is that it does not allow us to take seriously the religious thought, 
beliefs, or crises that both energized and disturbed Shakespeare when he 
wrote and that, in transformed shapes, still manifest themselves in our world. 
In the wake of the current ‘turn to religion’ in literary studies, however, and in 
response to the writings of postmodern theologians and philosophers, 
including Jacques Derrida in the final phase of his career, Shakespeare 
scholars have been more sympathetically responsive to the presence of the 
religious in that author’s work, if they have not also used it to think through 
perennial philosophical and religious issues of which we have become more 
aware. As the essays in this collection demonstrate, there are serious religious 
stakes for Shakespeare in his plays and for us in our scholarship.66 
 The purpose of this section is to identify the strengths and limitations of literary 
critical studies of Shakespeare that have turned to religion in light of the decline of New 
Historicist criticisms. Studies of Shakespeare and religion have been ongoing both in their 
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readings and their development of criticism, but they have remained largely secular and 
focused on theory. The above summation of criticism on Shakespeare and religion was made 
by Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti in 2011 in the introduction to their collection of essays 
Shakespeare and Religion: Early Modern and Postmodern Perspectives. Jackson and Marotti 
have been at the forefront of this vein of criticism since the publication of their 2004 article 
‘The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies’. More than a decade later this 
publication has proven to be a critical turning point in early modern studies of religion, 
contributing particularly to the dismissal of New Historicist criticism. Jackson and Marotti 
have sought with like-minded scholars to fashion methodologies of criticism that adequately 
sympathize with the presence of religion in Shakespeare’s work—religious thought which 
remains capable of energizing or disrupting the present age. Jackson’s and Marotti’s account 
of New Historicism’s movement bears summarizing at length since current criticism has not 
entirely escaped the lingering implications of its critical methodology. Ultimately I concur 
with their perception that despite increased sympathy to the presence of religion in 
Shakespeare’s work, there remains opportunity with such content to consider matters of 
religious significance relevant then and now. 
Jackson and Marotti contend early modern studies have always been interested in 
religion. The difference for New Historicism is that even in the ostensible turn to religion, its 
critical methodologies have chiefly addressed topics other than religion. To the extent 
religion was considered it was transferred into social, economic, or political methodologies as 
‘scholars who have discussed religious material in political analysis…approach religion and 
politics as religion as politics.’67 Adopting the stance of analytic observers decoding religious 
language and ideas, these New Historians and literary scholars approached religion as a 
falsely-conscious mystification of economic, political, and social structures. Paradigms of 
                                                
67 Jackson, and Marotti, ‘The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies’, Criticism 46.1 (2004): 168. 
 24 
religion more acceptable to late twentieth century cultural assumptions were used to translate 
the ‘otherness’ of early modern religion into something more palatable. This ‘presentism’ 
was often relentless in imposing present-day constructs anachronistic in their relation to the 
period under scrutiny, thereby misconstruing both the objects of study and their significance 
to the present day, which was in effect predetermined by the starting construct.68 Stephen 
Greenblatt’s hypothesis secularizing the church’s traditional religious mystification into 
enculturated phenomenological magic in a theatre detached from religious disputes is a 
typical example. In subsequent criticism there has been something of a re-turning towards the 
theatre as a place of vibrant religious expression and experience, but this too has often proven 
to be a turn more in name than substance, more interested in the effects of religious beliefs 
than religious beliefs themselves.69 
The turn to religion by New Historicist critics provided opportunities to examine their 
familiar concerns with ethnographic curiosities that are a subset of a larger cultural text and 
shed light on modes of representation.70 But with the turn to religion, this central respect for 
otherness in marginalized cultural and historical groups resulted in a productive irony for 
New Historicism’s methodology: 
…the dominant anthropological ‘self’ of New Historicism tends to render 
religion an alien other or makes that other over in its own image. … 
Illuminating this process of othering—creating a version of difference 
between oneself and other beings or cultures that benefits only the self/same—
thus became the methodology of early modern studies. As this methodology 
has been employed, however, its limited engagement with its philosophical 
roots gradually became more visible. Indeed, we would suggest the turn to 
religion in early modern literary studies and New Historicism is prefigured by 
a turn to religion in the French Continental philosophy that informs it.71 
The productive irony derives from religion having a significant role in the origins of 
the methodology that has turned its criticism towards it. Continental philosophy has since 
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recognized this discrepancy and sought to redress it, but New Historicism persisted in its 
methodologies without incorporating the subsequent correction in the philosophy that 
undergirds them. The problem is dense and technical, hanging between the works of Edmund 
Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas, Søren Kierkegaard, Jacques Derrida, and Alain Badiou, and 
involving phenomenology, epistemology, ethics, and theology. Passing through Jackson’s 
and Marotti’s extensive articulation of the problem, the pertinent conclusion is that, however 
much early modern studies may have resisted it, this very ethical/religious strain underpinned 
the secular critical interest in alterity. Despite Derrida’s address of the philosophical problem 
by his own turn to religion in the 1990’s, most early modern scholars remained ignorant or 
indifferent to this subsequent wrestling with the aporia between self and other, continuing to 
rely on under-theorized grounds for alterity criticism.72 The turn to religion in New 
Historicist criticism is what allowed the gradual recognition of the non-viability of such 
critical methodologies. As Renaissance religion proved resistant to alterity criticism and 
revealed the epistemological problems encoded in New Historicism, ‘the methodology that 
sought to respect the difference of a distant past actually reveals our proximity to the early 
modern world, narrowing the gap between the secular and the sacred.’73 The turn to religion 
then may ultimately reveal even the most secular critical methodology to have been more 
religious than it desired. 
 Summarized another way, New Historicism’s ‘othering’ of religion was prone to 
alienate religion or remake it in a self-reflective image, thereby misconstruing what religion 
might have actually been. Ironically, the methodologies of othering were themselves based on 
an epistemological problem that troubled criticism with the very religion it purported to 
critique. There was thus a need to revise methodology, refocus criticism in the warp and woof 
of religion’s enculturation and absolute otherness, and re-examine the early modern period 
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both through its familiarities and its strangenesses. 
— 
 It is worthwhile to consider some of the positive responses to Jackson’s and Marotti’s 
2004 article that culminated in Shakespeare and Religion. The evident pattern of these 
scholars was to embrace New Historicism’s fall and revise methodologies of criticism that 
could readdress the turn to religion. The result was fine scholarship, yet the confluence of 
Shakespeare and religion has continued to increase in complexity as a subject of critical 
study. 
In the spring of 2006 Julia Reinhard Lupton, Ken Jackson, Graham Hammill, and 
Philip Lorenz published a cluster of essays in English Language Notes addressing the 
advancement of the question of literary history and the turn to religion. 
Reinhard Lupton’s ‘The Religious Turn (to Theory) in Shakespeare Studies’ suggests 
the ‘religious turn’,74 in reflecting religion’s affiliation with philosophical thought and claims 
to universal instead of local cultural validity, represents ‘the chance for a return to theory, to 
concepts, concerns, and modes of reading that found worlds and cross contexts, born out of 
specific historical situations, traumas, and debates, but not reducible to them.’75 Reinhard 
Lupton prescribes three original maxims for new work on religion: First, religion is not 
identical with culture. Nor is it an aspect of culture, but accommodates culture in order to 
survive.76 Second, religion is a testing ground for struggles between the universal and the 
particular. In its ‘universality’ religion disengages from ‘routines of reality through…acts of 
creative critique….’77 Third, religion is a form of thinking. Religion should be re-affiliated 
with formal disciplines and common rumination, singular in its capacity to speculate away 
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from culture ‘in the momentary suspension of acculturated embodiment that occurs when the 
mind lets itself go….’78 We are to intellectually and subjectively read texts and their readers 
as agents of thought.79 This is, by Reinhard Lupton’s titular admission, primarily a turn to 
theory. 
Ken Jackson’s ‘“More Other than you Desire” in The Merchant of Venice’ rephrases 
New Historicism’s philosophical weakness: absolute respect for ‘the other’ would require 
suspension of ethical judgements to access such otherness. New Historicism thinks it has the 
ethical ability to access the absolute other, yet this is impossible merely by assertion of will. 
Per Derrida, religious duties are prescribed by an absolute law that is other. Accessing a 
relative or self-selected other becomes objectively impossible when confronted with an 
otherness that is absolute. This is a critical paradox of New Historicism: it is reduced to 
subjectivism when confronted with an otherness that is absolute. 
Graham Hammill’s ‘The Religious Turn: Exegesis against the Theological Imaginary’ 
considers Machiavelli’s and Spinoza’s pitting of exegesis and theological imagination against 
one another. The arcana imperii (‘mystery of state’) became an early modern conflation of 
politics and religion—a strategy for the sovereign to control power through violence but also 
theatric pretence of deference to their subjects. Machiavelli and Spinoza both address this 
imaginative theatricizing conceit as theology for the sake of politics with the sovereign 
relying on the construction of a self-serving ‘theological imaginary’ at the core of public 
collective life.80 Both turn exegesis of scripture against the theological imaginary to examine 
religion as political thought.81 For Hammill, the context for a religious turn in criticism is 
political theology. Theology and the imagination as construed in my project bears little 
resemblance to Hammill’s deployment of the ‘theological imaginary’. 
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Philip Lorenz’s ‘Notes on the “Religious Turn”: Mystery, Metaphor, Medium’ 
explores Renaissance religious language and its own turns (‘the tropes of theology that screen 
and animate’) and the relation between metaphor and Francisco Suárez’s ‘mystery’. Mystery 
marks a border where a certain kind of knowledge ends and another of faith begins. To relate 
mystery to early modern drama, Lorenz turns between Pierre Legendre’s psychoanalysis, 
Jacques Derrida’s enigma, Samuel Weber’s actualization of theatre, and Ernst Kantorowicz’ 
political theology.82 While the subject is familiar, such criteria are more difficult to closely 
relate to Shakespeare’s own religious imagination. 
Later in 2006, Hammill and Reinhard Lupton co-edited Religion & Literature’s 
dedicated volume on ‘Sovereigns, Citizens, and Saints: Political Theology and Renaissance 
Literature’. Introducing the collected essays, they summarized and reiterated the tenets of 
preceding articles. Religion is not reducible to culture. Religion is:  
…a reservoir of foundational stories, tropes, and exegetical habits that 
structure and give shape to political institutions and literary forms in ways that 
occur in culture—in specific spatio-temporal moments—while also 
manifesting a shaping power not fully reflective of the historical settings in 
which they are exercised.83 
 
Religion also ‘instantiates discourses of value that aim to transcend culture, by creating trans-
group alliances and affiliations around shared narratives, commandments, and principles.’84 
Religions, like ‘ghosts or viruses’ leap groups and epochs, accommodating cultures in order 
to outlast them; what distinguishes religion from culture is ‘absurd insistence and persistence 
beyond the local habitations of custom and habit, practice and power.’85 Religion here is 
considered ‘in its constitutive dialogue with forms of political organization in the early 
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modern West.’86 The aim of the volume was ‘to use the motifs of political theology—the 
iconographies and typologies of sovereignty, sanctity, and citizenship—in order to orient the 
study of religion and Renaissance literature historically, but without going the way of 
historicism.’87 
In 2009 Reinhard Lupton published ‘Renaissance Profanations: Religion and 
Literature in the Age of Agamben’ in Religion and Literature. She remarks that with ‘the rise 
of anthropological and materialist approaches to religion, scholars are more likely to engage a 
range of media, performance practices, and ritual objects in the search to variegate our picture 
of religious life and thought as well as the different shapes and possibilities for secularization 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.’88 She continues that, in addition to historicism, 
the ‘religious turn’ in critical theory has incorporated modern and postmodern theorists of 
language, politics, and philosophy in pursuit of questions on, among other things, religious 
expression, confessional conflict, and post-religious forms of life that take their points of 
departure from the early modern period. Giorgio Agamben is an example of such a 
philosopher whose work has diverse implications in multiple fields of criticism including 
studies of Renaissance religion. Reinhard Lupton highlights Profanations and its articulation 
of ‘the reclaiming for common use of sacred spaces and sacred times, a process he 
distinguishes from secularization.’89 Because of his attention to a plurality of influences 
ranging from Classics and the New Testament to postmodern philosophy, Agamben’s work 
has been of increasing interest to scholars working in related fields. Reinhard Lupton 
concludes her brief article, having surveyed the turn to religion in light of Agamben’s 
profanation with, ‘What I am calling the Renaissance profane sets aside a zone for literature 
distinct from religion, yet at once richer and more creative, as well as more haunted and more 
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transitional, than the word “secular” can adequately communicate.’90 While Reinhard 
Lupton’s scholarship is not in question, her deference in matters of religion to literary 
criticism rather than theology is evident. 
While acknowledging that religion must be something more than culture, the turn to 
theory has struggled to construe religion as something most adherents of religion could 
recognize. Jackson and Marotti press this issue in both directions: 
 …at its most profound, Shakespeare’s dramatic religious questioning 
presses against what we normally tend to think of as constituting religion—its 
dogmas, institutions, beliefs, and practices—to the point where one is asked to 
question what, if anything, ‘religion’ can mean. The lines between secular and 
sacred, transcendent and immanent blur so continuously that we begin to 
doubt our own vocabulary and historical paradigms in our attempts to 
describe the strange otherness of Shakespeare’s religion, the way in which he 
can, again, deliberately and systematically strip away the layers of religion 
until nothing is left—nothing except the desire for something more or better 
that cannot be fully disentangled from religion.91 
This is a critical description of Shakespeare’s performed religion, but it is also a renewed 
assertion that Shakespeare’s resistance to critical theory indicates its ongoing limitations. 
Early modern criticism has subsequently needed to broaden its search for constructs that will 
thicken historical perception and contemporary relatability. This framework remains secular, 
political, and in the shadow of historicism. 
 There is opportunity for a revised perspective on early modern religion where it might 
be more recognizable to traditional adherents of that religion then or now. I will argue that 
Shakespeare’s work in general, and his late plays particularly, indicate sympathetic 
possibilities for vexing religious questions. A perspective from which to consider questions 
about Shakespeare and religion might be one which accepts the religion in question under its 
own ideal terms, and allows that there may have been ways in which Shakespeare did so as 
well. 
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Sarah Beckwith – Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness 
  As the title of her 2011 monograph alludes, Sarah Beckwith’s interest is the English 
Reformation’s revisions to the ritual language of penitence, or ‘grammar of forgiveness’. As 
a medievalist and linguist Beckwith is particularly sensitive to historical changes of religious 
language and their influence. In proximity to Jackson and Marotti, Beckwith’s work is not 
only timely and perceptive, it also has an ethical bent. Of the scholarship surveyed in this 
chapter, Beckwith’s work is so far the most predicated on primary reading. Her close 
readings of the late plays realign the critical questions of theatre and religion through a 
method focused primarily on Shakespeare’s own creative hermeneutic. As such, extended 
consideration of Beckwith’s work is constructive. 
 Beckwith recognizes the astonishing experimental nature of the late plays and the 
influence in them of the grammar of forgiveness.92 Transformation in languages of penitence 
proved influential to changes in speaking and relating. The Book of Common Prayer altered 
the procedures of reconciliation, and by extension destabilized the figure of authority as well 
as the effects of reconciliation. The theatre, Beckwith argues, traces the trajectory of the 
changed work of language that follows a change of language itself.93 With the voiding of 
sacerdotal authority in penitential speech acts, authority is looked for in revision of the 
speech acts themselves.94 She provisionally concludes, ‘So Shakespeare’s theater is a search 
for community, a community neither given nor possessed but in constant formation and 
deformation. This puts him in powerful continuity, of course, with a theater he is often 
thought to have entirely superseded and overturned.’95 
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 Beckwith looks especially to the ‘post-tragedies’, because these plays work through 
and past tragedies’ failures at the act of acknowledgement. The romances look for recovery in 
renewed ideas of mutual acknowledgement: 
Acknowledgment is the ground of our relation to other minds, which 
skepticism intellectualizes as metaphysical lack. It is always particular; it is 
always of someone for something; it is not so much what we choose to do as 
what we cannot avoid doing. It is not a substitute for knowledge, for it 
includes and assumes knowledge, but it is a medium through which both 
response and responsibility are unendingly exacted through the commitments 
of human speech and action. It might include—it usually does include—self-
knowledge and the ways we avoid it, recognition and the ways we avoid it, 
responsiveness and responsibility, and the ways we evade and avoid them. I 
am proposing here that the history of acknowledgment and therefore its 
fortunes in Shakespearean tragedy and post-tragedy can be best told in relation 
to the sacrament of penance and its complex afterlives.96 
Beckwith’s concern is a spiritual problem. Like David Brown’s appeals for the pastoral and 
ethical desirability of imagination in theology, Beckwith is partly motivated by the 
applicability of her research. Her first chapter explores Hamlet as the picture of a mind in 
exile from its own body and soul. Under such a condition self knowledge is impossible, 
therefore knowledge of others is impossible, and such a self loses all touch with itself and 
others, ruining identity and by extension community. Beckwith is unstinting in her critique: 
‘It is my belief that much contemporary criticism inhabits this very split, and so the 
therapeutic and diagnostic power of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy is unavailable to it.’97 
 From the perspective of theology this is appealing. Beckwith’s study is for the reader 
interested in Shakespeare who also wants to practice the difficult act of forgiveness, and it is 
a self-conscious attempt ‘to enact a critical practice that engages with the ethical and aesthetic 
as much as the historical and political dimensions that have been the preoccupation and the 
doxa of recent criticism.’98 Shakespeare was genuinely concerned about the bonds of charity, 
and worked to evolve the movement of his theatre to restore ‘the art of our shared 
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embodiment’.99 This transformation is not a mode of content but a form of participation 
fragilely existent in the conversation of the theatre.100 
 Beckwith describes Shakespeare’s diagnosis of the English Reformation as leaving its 
adherents bereft of a way to reconcile inner thought and outward behaviour. His capacity for 
language gave him unparalleled ability to adapt the range and precision of language as a sole 
means of human relation. Yet, when human bonds depend only on fragile mutual 
intelligibility, how can they be remade stronger through conversation? This spills out in the 
great tragic characterizations of Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, King Lear, etc. Disconnecting 
interior identity from outward expression denigrates culture, but it also violates fundamental 
engagement in the theatre. Reconciling inner thought and outward behavior would be ‘the 
miracle in an age where all miracles are past.’101 Shakespeare’s response is to develop 
theatrical forms centred on reconciliation.102 He rejects a popish characterization of language 
as some kind of hocus pocus efficacious ex opere operato—beyond the agency of the 
speaker. He also rejects the countervailing Protestant attempt to remove all human mediation 
of God’s direct action because it would contaminate divine sovereignty.103 Between the 
tension of these two views of language, Shakespeare offers human speech as the effective 
source of bonds between people. 
 Beckwith acknowledges the criticism of scholars like Anthony Dawson, Jeffrey 
Knapp, and Regina Schwartz who have identified the theatre as filling a eucharistic or 
sacramental vacuum around the Reformation. She finds Thomas Bishop (whose theory of 
wonder is integral to my second chapter) persuasive in his articulation of Shakespeare’s 
theatrical meaning being inextricably related to sacramental embodiment.104 What such 
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scholars lack is consensus on sacramental theology by which to produce a unified, coherent 
idiom of theatre as sacrament.105 Beckwith proposes as a corrective the inextricable 
connection between the sacraments of eucharist and reconciliation as the balance of morality 
and justice, ‘For the eucharist is the entire forgiven community.’106 There is a connection 
between the removal of confession as a sacrament and the subsequent search for certainty of 
knowledge about identity, justification, and absolution. Shakespeare works through this 
connection in his late plays. 
 In Pericles, which is the first of these, the play’s turning point is the moment of 
recognition between Pericles and Marina when, rather than the romance convention of 
recognition by tokens, they recognize one another by the telling of a story that belongs to 
both of them: 
 In working the recognitions through the fundamental act of speaking 
rather than through the tokens or signs that ratify social identity, Shakespeare 
is making the form of romance into something new. In this play, with its 
extraordinary focus on the fact of utterance itself, Shakespeare finds the 
recovery of self and community all at once, and this becomes central to the 
grammar of forgiveness as it is explored in the subsequent three plays….107 
When at the end of Pericles the protagonist hears the music of the spheres (V.iii.229), 
Beckwith attributes this to a harmony between divine and human agency established through 
human voice.108 Marina’s voice breaks through Pericles’ rejection of the world and points to 
a more graced world. ‘It is a grace that works through nature in a felt wonder, a pattern of 
slow recognition that is utterly marvelous, yet utterly natural.’109 Life can be felt as a miracle, 
and grace can be felt in (re)generation. This is ordinary miracle.110 
 Cymbeline is a play that ends with a community that has embodied forgiveness, 
imagining restoration for each individual uniquely, but also intimately and inextricably within 
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the restored community.111 Beckwith describes this as a eucharistic community because it has 
embodied forgiveness. She draws attention to five progressive confessions that allow the 
detoxification of the community, catalyzed by the queen’s deathbed confession.112 
Cymbeline’s sudden and extreme reversals of trust indicate the fragility of human bonds that 
rest on understanding and good faith. Deceit can destroy faithfulness more effectively than 
unfaithfulness can. In Cymbeline, the re-placement of signs and their true meaning allow the 
restitution of trust through spoken truth.113 The last scene is about the redemption of language 
itself.114 By the collective telling of their respective stories, all those present are placed in 
their restored communal context.115 
So language returns as gift through the offerings of truthful speech, speech 
animated by the realizations, the making real of each to each in remorse. This 
is Shakespeare’s real presence, his remembrance which finds its own complex 
fidelity, and its own peace, with a discarded and vilified past, a past whose 
rejection seems structural to the thought of so many of his contemporaries.116 
In the next section I consider Malcolm Guite’s reading of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
which recognizes in the earlier comedy a non-sacramental theology of unity through 
imagination and recognition. Guite and Beckwith do not allude to each other’s work, but the 
romance’s story of minds transfigured so together into something of great constancy is an 
evident return to the earlier theme. 
 Turning to The Winter’s Tale, Beckwith explores how rites of reconciliation and 
eucharist are integral to the spirituality of the play. The Winter’s Tale ‘consciously replaces 
the memory theater of the ghost world with the memory theater of a new theatrico-religious 
paradigm of resurrection.’117 These returns from apparent death offer transformation that 
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takes up and redeems past error.118 ‘Resurrection’ in Beckwith’s context means reappearance 
and complex encounter with past offenders.119 The Winter’s Tale is not a special case, and 
what may have actually happened to Hermione is unimportant in light of the fact that she has 
survived.120 The paradigm for interpreting these encounters as forgiveness narratives is the 
Gospel resurrection narratives, mediated through the eucharistic liturgy and the medieval 
Corpus Christi theater.121 Truth will exist as story in these enactments of memory because of 
the narrative condition of faith. And, ‘This new grammar of theater will seek not so much to 
communicate new ideas as to construct shared possibilities to which the understanding of 
grace as forgiveness will be central.’122 
 In The Winter’s Tale’s final scene, religious and artistic agency embody the 
destructive effects of time as well as possibilities for reconciliation.123 Liturgical discourse is 
integral to understanding the possibility of reconciliation. Per Beckwith’s central theological 
distinction, the body of Christ is liturgically enacted as a fellowship, and ‘precisely not the 
wafer held between the hands of the priest, whether understood as the transubstantiated 
elements of bread and wine, or as a memorial enactment of Christ’s redemption.’124 Hence, 
reconciliation of believers to the body is essential for such an enacted body.125 Despite 
Leontes’ protracted penitence, he cannot secure a state of forgiveness. Forgiveness, like 
grace, must come through religious theatrical enactment.126 His remorse has made him aware 
of who Hermione really was, but without mutuality, acknowledgement remains incomplete. 
According to Beckwith, in confrontation his shame and repentance become ‘the very 
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substance of the grace’ he receives.127 In risking confrontation, Leontes and Hermione are 
restored from illusion into reality. A ‘new presence’ is made possible.128 This is sacramental 
theatre: 
For in it “how we present ourselves to each other (the classical domain of 
theater) and how we are present to each other (the domain of the sacrament)” 
have once again become both theological and theatrical resources, and the 
Pauline tropes of mortification and vivification are both figurative and 
actual.129 
Just as Shakespeare has rejected any instrumental or institutional embodiment of grace, 
Beckwith suggests, he equally rejects the eradication of human embodiment or agency in 
reformed articulations of grace.130 This is a suggestion of Shakespeare doing theology in 
theatre through the language of liturgy. 
 In her conclusion about The Winter’s Tale, Beckwith returns to her suggestion of the 
internal incoherence of cognitivist models that inform academic discourse on religion. Such 
discourse identifies belief as about people or propositions, not belief in these.131 The statue 
scene does not require that we believe any precepts about it, only that we believe in it, 
trusting Paulina’s authority for the reward of the result, as ‘credibility of the resurrection is 
bound to the credence of believers.’132 The awakening of faith is a tautological attunement of 
attitude; the condition of wonder is a matter of commitment, not opinion or understanding.133 
Leontes needs epistemologically to have as little foundation for his faith as he had for his 
doubt.134 In short: 
The Winter’s Tale has been called a miracle play. But the miracle is only 
ordinary just as another human life is both miraculous and ordinary. It is as if 
theater requires the resources of both art and religion because credit and trust 
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have come to seem not so much the ground of our intelligibility to each other, 
as phenomena that require nothing short of a miracle.135 
 In The Tempest, Beckwith suggests that Prospero, despite relinquishing his magic, 
continues to theatricalize his identity.136 Only Miranda is capable of compassion and wonder 
because of her innocence. A hopeful future depends on innocence. Beckwith asks, ‘Can 
wonder and pity survive experience, betrayal, irreparable loss, powerlessness?’137 Her 
question is rhetorical. Prospero, in putting back on his old self, has relinquished any fantasy 
of self fashioning.138 The world is only brave and new for Miranda; for Prospero it turns out 
to be neither brave nor new. Beckwith says this is the sadness that overhangs the conclusion 
of the play. Rather than the sadness of the author’s adieu to the stage, the sadness is one of 
universal human disappointment. Having glimpsed the fantasy beyond human horizons, we 
like Prospero are unable to permanently escape, and must be dragged back to the human 
constraints of desire, expression, and redemption. 
The conclusion of this great play is, it turns out, the unsurpassable horizon of 
our mutual response to others. … Nothing underwrites this community, or can 
act as its guarantor; it can come to no final resolution, but only commit itself 
to future conversations that cannot supersede the horizons of our agreements 
in language. … Pardon comes not from a sovereign will but is granted from 
sinner to sinner in mutual acknowledgment, forgiving as we are forgiven. 
Only in this way, without enforcement, without enchantment, can art yield its 
good works.139 
 Beckwith does not think The Tempest speaks to any realistic hope of redemption and 
renewal, just as she saw The Winter’s Tale’s grounds for hope as fragile. Without some 
guarantee of the possibility of forgiveness, the ending would seem futile. Prospero having 
emptied himself of his enchantments, Beckwith thinks the play lacks a sovereign will to enact 
pardon, and only by non-coercive disenchantment can art yield its good works. This is to see 
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Shakespeare as relinquishing the affectiveness of theatre in the most self-consciously 
theatrical conclusion of this most self-consciously theatrical play. 
 Here is where a continuation of this line of inquiry may find it helpful to make a 
nuanced appeal to Shakespeare’s own self-conscious role, and to a creative hierarchy of art 
and nature. Just as Prospero has made the kenotic gesture of opening himself to scrutiny or 
abuse, Shakespeare can reasonably be allowed a kenotic gesture towards his art being freely 
judged in its outworking. But the very gesture of kenosis implies a power laid down, not an 
illusion of power disabused. (Beckwith thinks that Prospero costumes himself as Milan to 
disguise the vulnerability his enemies have reduced him to on the island.140) Through its 
disabusing of lesser images of theatricality within a greater theatrical dramaturgy, the play 
offers a non-ironic, self-conscious appeal to meta-theatrical authority. Shakespeare, standing 
in the place of that authority, is capable of writing this play as the climax of his creative 
vision without inherent cynicism. The island where the play ends remains a place of 
enchantment, not escapism. It is not utopia or Eden despite Gonzalo’s protestations, but it is a 
tabula rasa return to nature without institutionalized mechanisms of government or religion, 
and Prospero is master of it by art, not illusion. 
 Beckwith’s reading of Shakespeare is commendable for its basis in the text, and for 
the way it contextualizes theological and cultural issues swirling in the fallout of the English 
Reformation. As her readings progress they move even closer not only to the language of 
acknowledgement and forgiveness but to its grammar as well. Beckwith exemplifies 
profitable reading of Shakespeare down to the level of grammatical construction. Despite 
locating the restoration of Shakespeare’s theatrical community in the language and action of 
confession, that restoration is merely a ‘real presence’ between those in the fellowship. 
Religion regresses into functionality as the divine fades away. 
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1.3 THEOLOGY AND THEATRE 
 Turning again to the discipline of theology, at this point it is helpful to consider work 
of the last decade or so pertinent to theatre. In addition to David Brown, scholars such as 
Jeremy Begbie and Trevor Hart have renewed critical interest in the relationship between 
theology and the arts. Theatre is only one area of consideration in this expanding field, but it 
has proven itself to be an important one, with conference proceedings and monographs 
appearing steadily. Many projects relate appropriately to the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
or Kevin Vanhoozer. The general value of such studies is to those that consider theatre for the 
purpose of theological insight with respect to post-Enlightenment theology.141 
 My present effort is a study of William Shakespeare’s dramatic art for its ongoing 
religious significance. If theatre is profound in its connection to other aspects of life, we do 
well to carefully consider the image, the reflection, and the relationship between them. 
Theatre is not merely an embodied metaphor for other constructs, and no artist or theorist 
worked more carefully than Shakespeare to explore the significance of theatre to all aspects 
of life. It is evident Shakespeare’s creative imagination embraced religion both to draw from 
it and reflect upon it. How he did so, and towards what possible ends, are the subjects upon 
which both theology and literary criticism strive to elaborate. From a theological perspective, 
a benefit of literary criticisms’ turn to religion and Shakespeare has been the expansion of our 
understanding of Shakespeare’s relationship to religion as well as the limitations of that 
understanding. Rather than another attempt to reconcile Shakespeare’s religion to any of the 
categories it has resisted for the last 400 years, what might now be said? In this section I look 
at Shakespeare and eschatology in the work of Paul Fiddes, Christopher Hodgkins, and Judith 
Wolfe, then turn to a second trio of essays by Ben Quash, Ivan Khovacs, and Malcolm Guite. 
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Eschatology and Shakespeare 
 In a theological context, The Tempest particularly attracts eschatological readings, and 
the work of three scholars is helpful in situating the present project: Paul Fiddes, Christopher 
Hodgkins, and Judith Wolfe. 
 Paul Fiddes has written of his interest in Shakespeare’s reticence to offer traditional 
Christian images of the afterlife—what we might consider Shakespeare’s eschatology. More 
than once Shakespeare suggests immortality through art, as evidenced by the sonnets and 
tragedies.142 In tragedies the hero makes death her or his servant by dying in a way that 
summons the ideals by which she or he tried unsuccessfully to live.143 However, Shakespeare 
will go on to disrupt the consolation of immortality in art in The Tempest. Fiddes reads the 
ending of The Tempest with Prospero in the Epilogue having already broken his staff and 
drowned his book.144 The surprise of the Epilogue is that, contrary to theatrical convention, 
Prospero remains in character. Instead of the actor craving indulgence for inadequacies of 
performance as an indirect appeal for commendation, the character bids for release from 
imprisonment by means of applause, and the ‘gentle breath’ of vocal response to fill his sails 
back to Milan. The audience’s applause must express willingness to be merciful, as Prospero 
has been merciful. Art is crossing over into life. By forgiving the character, the audience 
participates in the human act of forgiveness: ‘We are being invited to participate in the next 
stage of the story, in the uncertainty of life beyond the charmed island. The drama has not 
finished after all, and we feel that it never will be.’145 The future is unpredictable and 
eschatologically anxious. 
                                                
142 Paul Fiddes, ‘Patterns of Hope and Images of Eternity: Listening to Shakespeare, Blake and T. S. Eliot’, in 
Art, Imagination and Christian Hope, ed. Trevor Hart, Gavin Hopps, and Jeremy Begbie (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2012), 32. Fiddes commends Sonnet 65: ‘That in black ink my love may still shine bright.’ Sonnet 55 
expresses the same sentiment in its final line: ‘You live in this, and dwell in lovers’ eyes.’ 
143 Fiddes, 35. 
144 Ibid., 38. 
145 Ibid. 
 42 
 For Fiddes, the reference points of Prospero’s great speech about the ending of revels 
are five-fold: to the wedding masque, to Prospero’s larger dramaturgy on the island, to The 
Tempest the play itself, to the end of human life, and to the dissolution of the whole world at 
the last judgement.146 Time and eternity are open in the future. Prospero’s concerns are not 
the subplots of treachery, but conflicts to come from nature and human evil. His arts are 
limited to this life, not triumph over death. The play opens up the possibility of the threat of 
evil being overturned by the power of forgiveness, which cannot be controlled by art. 
Prospero forgives, then begs the indulgence of forgiveness, the act of which remains on our 
hearts as we leave the theatre.147 In Shakespeare generally, the uncertainty of the future is 
held in tension with enduring artistic representation. Fear and hope abide together. What is 
helpful about Fiddes’ reading is that it capitalizes on hope and forgiveness as 
characterizations of redeeming virtue. Human hearts will be healed, but not by human arts. 
— 
In 2010, Christopher Hodgkins contributed ‘Prospero’s Apocalypse’ to Beatrice 
Batson’s final collection of essays on Shakespeare. Hodgkins recognizes the extent to which 
Shakespeare drew from St John’s revelation for the imagery and themes of The Tempest. He 
concludes that Prospero, in his final movement towards humane reconciliation seems 
profoundly Christian, while his secular gesture is remarkably focused on the afterlife. He 
writes, ‘To pray for human mercy, pity, peace and love, for justice and forgiveness to 
embrace, is to pray for Kingdom Come, and for a true Apocalypse. And it is also to admit 
that we are still in Middle Earth and that the Kingdom has not yet come.’148 Prospero the 
prophet of the apocalypse defeats Prospero the spirit of Antichrist. These are the central 
competing spiritual forces of the play working themselves out in Prospero’s struggle to 
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divorce them. Prospero’s struggle is the human one that is not won until the Kingdom of 
Heaven comes once and for all.149 The play, in the spirit of true apocalypse, tempers justice 
with mercy as wrath gives way to paradise.150 Yet redemption is possible for unlikely 
candidates (Caliban) but not universally forced on those who will not embrace it (Antonio).151 
 Prospero’s identification with the spirit of Antichrist is more complex. Hodgkins 
identifies Prospero with the image of John Dee as blasphemous conflator of sorcery, 
Reformed theology, and colonial empire.152 Such a magus would use metaphysical power, 
raising himself above his human status, to regain political power. This profanation is the crux 
of our polarizing reaction to Prospero. He seems to be good, but the power he wields is 
corrupting him.153 Hodgkins suggests a parallel with Tolkien’s One Ring which the bearer 
cannot use without being consumed. Both metaphysical and political power are God’s to 
give, and Prospero’s repentance at the end is of usurping divine right. By extension, 
presuming The Tempest is Shakespeare’s apology to—not for—the theatre, Prospero-
Shakespeare’s epilogue performs an act of repentance not only for metaphysical and political 
transgression, but also for the reality of ‘theatrical spectacle which many in Shakespeare’s 
day saw as forwarding the work of Antichrist by (supposedly) competing with the spiritually 
transformative rites, ceremonies, and preaching of the church.’154 The associations of 
witchcraft, stagecraft, and statecraft (readily identified by so many scholars) in this context 
are infernal, and Shakespeare’s apology is for the art he mastered as well as Prospero’s.155 
Prospero ends in a troubled state; his only hope having abjured his rough magic is to redeem 
himself after the play concludes. 
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 Hodgkins rejects the frequent interpretation of the conclusion as the fundamentally 
secular disavowal of anything like a true apocalypse. Prospero, like Shakespeare, turns from 
imperialism, enchantment, and performed spectacle. His rejection of godhood is an 
acknowledgement of God rather than a refusal. By returning to his proper place in the order 
of divine hierarchy, he revivifies his greatest opportunity for redemption.156 Genuine love and 
forgiveness of his enemies is, if not the end of all things, an anticipation of the culmination of 
God’s divine purpose. Shakespeare’s Christianity in The Tempest is then performed 
repentance and an implied anticipation of the fullness of the Kingdom of Heaven that is to 
come. 
 While Hodgkins’ reading is sympathetic it has limitations. If Shakespeare is abjuring 
his own art, it would take explaining that he does so within the medium, and Prospero’s 
epilogue does not self-consciously disavow the theatrical construct nor even evidently break 
character. It would take further explanation how to understand the play as self-abjuring in 
anticipation of the fulfilment of all things. It is at least rhetorically confusing. The play, as 
imperfect image, would have to be reconciled with the world it represents but also anticipates 
as God’s full purpose. Hodgkins takes Shakespeare’s treatment of the metaphysical seriously. 
Yet, Hodgkins sees Prospero as a well-intentioned character corrupted by his spiritual 
prowess. He assumes such spiritual power must be corrosive. We cannot easily assume 
Shakespeare shared this perspective. We also may not be able to so easily conclude 
Shakespeare would reject his own art by means of that art. Despite attention to eschatology, 
Hodgkins’ treatment itself leaves more anticipation than fulfilment. 
— 
 A more helpful study of the eschatological Tempest is one Hodgkins overlooks: Judith 
Wolfe’s ‘“Like this Insubstantial Pageant Faded”: Eschatology and Theatricality in The 
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Tempest’. Her premise is complex but largely sympathetic. The essay is also an example of 
deference to Shakespeare’s performed religion. In the seventeenth century St John’s 
apocalypse was perceived as a drama.157 The spectacle before the throne of God bears enough 
resemblances in form to the ceremonies of the Roman imperial court that some scholars have 
supposed a connection,158 and further supposed an association with Jacobean court 
masques.159 Wolfe rejects a similarity of function despite a similarity of form. Court masques 
emphasize the authority and strength of the monarch in the here and now, whereas 
apocalypse reveals ‘a transcendent reality that is yet to come, and therefore effects in readers 
not complacent celebration, but eros or longing.’160 
Prospero imposes both a masque and an apocalyptic vision in the self-conscious 
drama that he meticulously enacts, desiring to affect not only his present political authority 
but also a climax of judgement and reconciliation.161 By conflating these he intends to usher 
in something of his own millennial order.162 The plan goes awry, as at the betrothal masque 
he forgets the subplot of Caliban’s treachery, and disorder ensues. Wolfe reads the failure of 
this masque as Shakespeare’s exposition of the inadequacy of Prospero’s theatre (and by 
extension James’ court masques) to conflate the present and the eschaton into one dramatic 
framework that validates the regent.163 
 A major current of Christian criticism of drama emphasizes this ‘claim of complete 
elucidation’ in the correspondence of theatre and world. Wolfe recognizes that Shakespeare is 
aware of its limitation, and at the climax of Prospero’s power, in a play that is arguably the 
climax of his own opus, he breaks off that power to broach ‘the possibility of a different form 
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of drama, which does not aim to contain, but acknowledge the uncontrollability of both time 
and other people.’164 Wolfe proposes as an alternate model for understanding The Tempest’s 
ending the Roman eucharistic liturgy.165 The eucharist was instituted by Christ, unifies nature 
and super-nature by its celebration in the present, and will be fulfilled—and done away 
with—in the eschaton. Real presence is achieved in the fullness of time’s movement, unlike a 
masque’s attempt to freeze the moment of fullness in tableau.166 This acknowledgement of 
incompleteness allows for vulnerability and therefore genuine interaction with God and 
fellow believers.167 The liturgy dissolves into ordinary life as not merely an anticipation of 
redemption but also the participation in redemption until its ultimate fulfilment.168 
 Wolfe proposes to read The Tempest’s threat of disintegration according to this 
model. Prospero interrupts his triumphal masque to give the ‘revels’ speech, just before the 
final dance that in conventional masque would have integrated masquers and spectators.169 
He recognizes the real world and the masque are unified by the necessity of their dissolution, 
not their mutual artifice of stability.170 Wolfe suggests Prospero is moved towards the 
ordinary, but despite endeavouring to abjure his magic, cannot extricate himself from the 
theatrical fiction he has performed, and must await his own final dissolution with the ending 
of the play. According to the liturgical model, worshippers participate in the re-enactment of 
the sacrament of their redemption in order to hasten its proximate and final 
consummations.171 
 In his epilogue, Prospero self-consciously acknowledges his theatricality, placing 
himself within the performance, unable even to authenticate his own existence. The 
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audience’s applause affirms his worthiness as well as his fictionality, and he dissolves in the 
process of validation.172 The audience is involved in a similar renunciation. By 
acknowledging the play’s dissolution they dissolve the medium through which the characters 
are present, thus surrendering control of others’ presence. In so doing they also have to 
confront as Prospero does their own transience, mortality, and tendency towards dissolution:  
This shared confession and ‘indulgence’…makes possible a true encounter 
between Prospero and the audience at the threshold of the play—an encounter 
that images, prepares, and stirs desire for a greater encounter at the threshold 
of time, without usurping that final event.173 
 This is all theatrically and theologically helpful, but I wonder what happens when the 
play ends. It seems necessary to identify Prospero with the eucharistic priest in persona 
Christi, which would figure into Shakespeare’s convergence of eucharist and eschatology. 
Liturgically, the priest’s eucharistic role ends, but his ontological character continues. How 
should we consider the character, the actor, the text, and the dramatist when the applause 
ends? Does the theatrical conceit end? The Tempest ends in dissolution as it began, which 
apparently is not an ending but the beginning of a greater salubrious work. Apparently 
Shakespeare has within the play destroyed the illusory work of revels, had his thaumaturgist 
both exhibit and then relinquish his unparalleled power, distinguish it from illusion, and then 
turn, as the sacraments do, away from any perception of hocus pocus and towards the active 
Christian graces of faith, hope, and love through which we participate in the redemption of 
the world now. The relationship to the world to come is more complex. The turn to grace 
suggests another perspective on Shakespeare and penitence. 
Ben Quash, Ivan Khovacs, and Malcolm Guite – Theatre and Theology 
 Last in the succession of theological considerations of theatre, it is worthwhile to 
consider a trio of essays from the 2007 collection Faithful Performances: Enacting Christian 
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Tradition: Ben Quash’s ‘Real Enactment: The Role of Drama in the Theology of Hans Urs 
von Balthasar’, Ivan Khovacs’ ‘A Cautionary Note on the Use of Theatre for Theology’, and 
Malcolm Guite’s work on A Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest. 174 Quash 
advocates the theological value of a polyphonic, unfinalizable, dialogical theatricality. 
Khovacs emphasizes that drama’s theologically-promising artistry is activated by 
performance. Guite adds a third perspective that takes from Shakespeare’s own art a 
theologically-significant relation of poetry and imagination.  
 From von Balthasar, Quash develops two theological priorities with respect to the 
‘dramatic field of metaphor’: First, the linearity of time and that how we live in time has 
genuine stakes. Second, the Christian life has a ‘polyphonic character’ that is attested to by 
Scripture and the Church.175 Though Quash makes only passing reference to Shakespeare, 
both themes are integral to Shakespeare’s creative purpose in The Winter’s Tale and The 
Tempest and it is advantageous to consider Quash’s analysis. In contrast to most early 
modern criticism on Shakespeare and religion, Quash follows von Balthasar as a helpful 
source for consideration of theology and drama, who contends the truth of Christian 
revelation is not fully possible without commitment to the implications of committed action. 
Moreover, ‘Theology is done not outside or above the drama of Christian living, it is itself 
part of the drama.’176 If Shakespeare is a Christian dramatist, it is plausible a Christian would 
have an easier time appreciating the significance of his religion. 
 The significance of action in time ties thematically to Christ’s death and resurrection 
as the turning point of human history. Christ’s incarnate—embodied—and enacted mystery 
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does not allow for esoteric or metaphysical understanding or response. A tidy solution is not 
sufficient, and the mess of resolution in the wake of what looks like tragedy ensues.177 
Christ’s atoning work does not supersede the drama of continued existence, but rather in the 
eschatological scheme of things the stakes are raised to the highest extent. As time progresses 
the engaged response is not a passive one: 
 That said, tragedy is not despair, and for von Balthasar most certainly, 
the emphasis on the momentousness and irreversibility of historical action in 
the theo-drama (both Christ’s and ours) should certainly not issue in 
resignation, nor in a negative evaluation of our finitude. On the contrary, it 
should positively enhance our sense of the significance of each moment of 
time, and of the action of human agents in time.178 
Quash draws attention to twentieth-century Theatre of the Absurd, where nothing is decided 
or conclusive, and time is without purpose or direction. In contrast, Greek and Shakespearean 
tragedy are super-charged with momentous significance. In such extreme compression of 
time it is possible to make sense of life and death, and greatness is possible. Von Balthasar 
insists the Christian view of time is not the modern indifference: 
To take up discipleship of Christ – to agree to be led by God – is to have time 
recharged with intense significance again, to know oneself summoned to a sort 
of destiny, though not a solitary and self-aggrandising one but rather a social 
one in which people and cities and the creation are made new. It is to see one’s 
time as given for the purpose of witness and transformation. It is to be called 
to performance. The time of the Christian is therefore more nearly like the 
time of fierce plenitude – that fullness of meaning – to which Shakespeare and 
the tragedians testify; at its heart there stands the urgency of the divine call 
which addresses the whole person – everything he or she is – and asks that 
person to make something of his or her life.179 
Finally, the compression of significance does not reduce the quality and variety of roles but 
instead expands them. The action of each person in response to this dramatization of time is 
not one of withdrawal, but embracing one’s unique calling and becoming more distinctively 
oneself. The saints are extreme in their examples of obedience to this calling.180 This 
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proliferation of roles leads to a polyphony of voices, and thus the dramatic field of metaphor 
is apropos for considerations of theology. Unlike monologues or prose, where the finished 
product may have all intervening stages of consideration evened out, drama is less 
instrumental in communicating a situation in its entirety with a progressive plurality of 
feelings and perspectives.181 
 Quash at this point turns to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theorizations of the novel because they 
add to von Balthasar’s case for the value of drama. Further, Quash argues Bakhtin’s theory is 
best fulfilled in the dramatic form, which Bakhtin overlooks for the sake of the novel. For 
Bakhtin novels have three merits: First, novels affirm everyday speech for its aesthetic value. 
Everyday speech sustains vigour and creativity. Contrary to ‘monologism’ which unifies 
under one explanatory theory, ‘The multiple meanings generated in the movement and 
interpenetration of people’s everyday communicative activity…cannot be exhaustively 
mapped.’182 Second, novels reflect ‘unfinalizability’, which like real life is the character of 
multiple possibilities at any moment in time. Unfinalizability protects realistic creativity and 
freedom as events unfold. Human agency may contribute to shaping history as it develops.183 
Third, novels are dialogical. Life is essentially dialogical, with questions, responses, 
arguments, etc., forming the basis of human interaction. The plurality of voices form a world 
of polyphonic abundance where, ‘All the participants supplement each other, each having the 
richness of a unique field of vision, but each profiting from the bounty of the vision of those 
around her, which is necessarily additional to her own, and helps to fulfill (though never to 
finalize) her on sense of herself.’184 Even good characterizations are not dogmatic and final, 
lending forward movement beyond the conclusion or reconsideration of the stories heard.185 
Possibly because of inadequate access to the right plays, Bakhtin overlooked drama as the 
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obvious fulfillment of his theory. He sought to vindicate the novel in these respects, and 
ultimately struggled to find much more than some works of Dostoevsky that lived up to his 
idealization. Bakhtin even provisionally considered the Church as a place for such 
polyphonic unity before rejecting it as too static and closed into unity that became 
detrimental.186 
 Where Bakhtin is negative about prospects within the Church, von Balthasar hopes 
for possibilities to ‘open up the inner structure of God’s self-disclosure to the world, and to 
show that this structure has the character of address, response, and counter-response in an 
ongoing, ramifying series of articulations of truth, goodness and beauty, all born out of the 
mutual interaction of God and his free creatures.’187 This would be ‘a genuinely Christian 
embodiment of that polyphonic, unfinalizable and dialogical ideal in the form of the 
Church.’188 Preachers and theologians should embrace this possibility, and theology should 
encourage dialogue with voices outside the Church as well. Truth, for von Balthasar, is 
dramatic, and dramatic tension—representative of reality—may be deepened by a greater 
plurality of voices.189 Quash’s final exhortation is for the Church to exercise such dialogical 
polyphony. The conclusion is a return to the case of the church. This is appropriate, but it also 
leaves open the possibility of a return to drama to further reconsider plays or artists for their 
theological merits in light of these. 
 While there are qualifications for how Bakhtin’s work applies to Shakespeare’s 
specifically,190 the playwright continues to present old opportunities through which to 
consider new theological perspectives such as that which Quash proposes. I will argue 
Shakespeare’s work is more than ideal—its culmination deliberately engaging these 
dynamics for the sake of reconsidering and remaking them. The Winter’s Tale and The 
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Tempest are the best possible case studies of a dramatist doing theology in a way to which the 
church should listen. 
— 
 Published in the same volume as Quash’s essay, Ivan Khovacs’ ‘A Cautionary Note 
on the Use of Theatre for Theology’ also follows von Balthasar’s premise of ‘drama as an 
analogue for describing God’s incarnate action in the world.’191 However, Khovacs adds the 
caution that the exchange between theology and theatre is still in an emerging stage of 
development, and ‘merely exploiting drama to enrich the language of theology frustrates 
what could otherwise be a real commitment to a theological-theatrical exchange.’192 Such 
commitment would require theologians to learn and respect theatre’s artistry as ‘a three-
dimensional, performative event,’ and take into account not just selective abstracts from 
dramatic literature but also ‘the rich particularities of performance interpretation.’193 This 
leads Khovacs past von Balthasar’s work which, despite its monumental significance, favors 
abstraction of formal theological categories from dramatic literature, but disregards 
performance as the medium which activates drama.194 
 To balance von Balthasar’s adoption of dramatic style and form but not content, 
Khovacs appeals to Kevin Vanhoozer and Shannon Craigo-Snell who are sensitive to the 
significance of ‘interpreting text through an embodied performance.’195 For Vanhoozer the 
word of God is something to be performed as an aspect of faith.196 Scripture is God’s active 
role in the world revealed as story. Revelation is ‘God’s communicative initiative’ to which 
believers must respond through action in order to comprehend.197 Khovacs sees this as a 
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helpful progression, but also in danger of slipping towards a form of speech-act theory which 
privileges the text and its communication as the primary objective, with the performance as 
the playwright’s vehicle for didactic transfer, and this is not sufficient to appreciate what is 
taking place in the embodiment of text through performance.198 As Khovacs writes: 
For the dramatist, the playscript as a communicative act fraught with meaning 
goes without saying, as does the fact that not only the text but also the actions 
implied ‘between the lines’ mean [sic]. So it is not merely that playwrights 
have something to say (that plays ‘mean’) but that they want to say it in a 
certain way – that plays mean through performance. Performance, moreover, 
happens as an interpretive process when playwrights put ink to paper, directors 
elicit truthful emotions, as designers manipulate space, light and sound in 
service of dramatic action. The actor, for her part, takes up the playscript and 
commits body and voice to performance under the conviction that the author’s 
communicative act demands an incarnate equal.199 
Additionally, the non-verbal characterizations are what is integral to theatre—dramatic action 
that Peter Brook famously identified as the ‘spaces between the words’.200 These are not a 
matter of the text but of the performance. Vanhoozer privileges cognition for the sake of 
interpreting what has been communicated by the performance, and this reduces the 
experience too much to propositions at the expense of drama’s particular eloquence.201 We 
cannot ignore an audience’s interpretation ‘in the aesthetics of live-action.’202 
 Khovacs suggests interpretation is closer to what happens in the process of 
production, as everyone involved in preparing for a performance works through just how it 
will be put on.203 Following Shannon Craigo-Snell, rehearsal is where the process of 
discovery that leads to interpretation takes place, not in a performative speech act. Spiritually, 
the Christian life in relation to scripture is a preparation in anticipation of an eschatological 
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performance that is to come. We act now, we embody performance, for the sake of the show 
at the final curtain.204 
 Khovacs helpfully recognizes that the theatre von Balthasar, Vanhoozer, and Craigo-
Snell are thinking of is that of the last century, and he like Quash recognizes this theatre as 
largely godless. The same cannot be dismissively said of classical and early modern theatre. 
From the perspective of theology, Khovacs’ cautionary note is helpfully made that the 
relationship between theology and theatre is nascent. Ultimately, his expressed interest also 
remains the embellishment of theology through consideration of theatre. With respect to my 
own project, one of the opportunities provided by early modern criticisms’ attention to theatre 
and Shakespeare and religion is that it has opened up a vast field for consideration from 
careful theological perspectives. All the dynamics Khovacs identifies as theologically 
significant are dramatically significant to Shakespeare, not only as aspects of performance 
but also as objects for scrutiny through the medium of theatre. Shakespeare is the ideal case 
study of play, theatre, and performance for their religious significance, and how they may in 
turn shed light on questions pressing to theologians today. 
— 
 The third pertinent publication is Malcolm Guite’s close primary reading of A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest. Looking as David Brown and others have done 
to contribute to theology’s continued recovery from ‘an atomizing, reductive, 
demythologizing period’, Guite’s purpose is to consider the role of poetry as a medium of 
imagination, and imagination as a truth-bearing faculty related to reason rather than in 
opposition to it.205 Guite traces the presumed opposition back to early moderns who sought to 
bifurcate reason and imagination (such as they understood them); art and faith were caught in 
the middle. Working just before this bifurcation took hold, and retaining the idealism of the 
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past in the face of the future, Shakespeare is the paragon of an artist who embraced 
storytelling for the sake of exploring truth. Shakespeare retains his relevance today as both 
science and theology continue to reposition the relationship between reason and 
imagination.206 With respect to A Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest, Shakespeare 
is in the line of strong theological tradition ‘that saw dreams as giving potential glimpses of a 
Heavenly Realm that both transcends and undergirds our own.’207 At stake are truths 
apprehensible only through story and image, and ‘Shakespeare enjoyed a cultural freedom to 
play with language, to play with stories and dreams, to play in the end with even the most 
sacred things, and yet through that very playfulness to restate the great themes of 
Transfiguration, Death and Resurrection in a new and wonderfully life-enhancing way.’208  
 A Midsummer Night’s Dream (written tentatively in 1595-96) is an early play among 
those given most weight for matters of imagination and poetry, 209 but Guite is a helpful guide 
as to how this play fits into Shakespeare’s corpus. His reading focuses on the pivotal 
exchange between Theseus and Hippolyta at the beginning of Act V. The lovers, having 
returned from the forest properly re-matched and happy, relate their story uncertain whether it 
is more than just a dream. The king and queen quarrel over believing them, and it is a 
disagreement of substance between the king embodying reason and the queen embodying 
imagination.210 Here is their complete exchange: 
 Hippolyta ‘Tis strange, my Theseus, that these lovers speak of. 
 Theseus More strange than true. I never may believe 
These antic fables, nor these fairy toys. 
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, 
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
More than cool reason ever comprehends. 
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
Are of imagination all compact. 
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold; 
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That is the madman. The lover, all as frantic, 
Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt. 
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, 
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to aery nothing 
A local habitation and a name. 
Such tricks hath strong imagination, 
That if it would but apprehend some joy, 
It comprehends some bringer of that joy; 
Or in the night, imagining some fear, 
How easy is a bush suppos’d a bear! 
 Hippolyta But all the story of the night told over, 
And all their minds transfigur’d so together, 
More witnesseth than fancy’s images, 
And grows to something of great constancy; 
But howsoever, strange and admirable. (V.i.1-27) 
 
In the name of reason, Theseus denies the veracity of the lovers’ stories as the workings of 
overwrought imagination. The irony is that he undercuts his own scepticism. He does so first 
with a robust articulation of the poetic imagination’s faculty for apprehension that Hippolyta 
will dignify in reply. Second, Theseus forgets that he himself exists only in imagination 
through ‘antique fables’: ‘Here is Theseus remade in the imagination of Shakespeare, and 
engendered or embodied in us by the power of Shakespeare’s poetry, telling us, in the very 
medium of that poetry, “…well of course you all know there’s nothing in poetry”.’211 The 
interpretive significance of this is pivotal: ‘The very fact that imagination is able to discern a 
form that bodies it forth and find a name for it may suggest that it not only has its own mode 
of existence but that its existence is able to impinge on and to have effects on, to operate as a 
cause within, the realm of things that reason can in fact comprehend.’212 Imagination is the 
only means by which we enjoy apprehension, but even more its playfulness is a bridge 
between reason and apprehension which can concretize abstractions and allow for sustained 
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reflection and comprehension.213 Guite recognizes the greatest expression of this is itself a 
meta-image: a glass that is all at once a created object, a means of reflection, and a window 
through which to comprehend what the poet has apprehended.214 
 The meta-image of the glass is profoundly Shakespearean if not uniquely 
Shakespearean. Other poets have meditated on the same image, though it has perhaps been 
impossible to do so irrespective of Shakespeare at least since Hamlet spoke of the end of 
playing as ‘to hold as ‘twere the mirror up to nature’ (III.ii.21-22). Guite deftly points to 
Herbert’s use in ‘The Elixir’: 
 
  A man that looks on glass, 
  On it may stay his eye; 
   Or if he pleaseth, through it pass, 
  And then the heav’n espy.215 
 
If Herbert’s 1633 poem is intended reflection on Shakespeare’s imaginative use it is a muted 
reflection. What is also of significance is that in the full poem Herbert is cognizant of the 
alchemical unity between heaven and earth that is represented in the glass. In the second 
chapter I argue alchemy is an overlooked resource for questions of Shakespeare and religion. 
The image of the glass is one to which I shall also return in consideration of the theatre of 
wonder. 
 Years before Shakespeare gave Hamlet utterance on philosophy’s failure to dream of 
all the things in heaven and earth, Theseus speaks with the same impulse for reason and 
comprehension. Yet, as mentioned, Theseus also represents the poet as the one actually 
capable of giving comprehensible shape to meaningful abstractions. The poet bodies forth the 
forms of things unknown including apprehensions of the heavenly in comprehensible earthly 
shapes.216 Theseus calls this a trick, but especially as we see in light of Hippolyta’s reply that 
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ennobles the better angels of his nature, the theological implications go as far up as thinking 
about the Incarnation as God’s transcendent poiesis. Made in his image, our imagination is 
enabled ‘to create symbols which are energized between the poles of immanence and 
transcendence.’217 As David Brown identified, art has the ability not just to alleviate 
theological burdens but to directly offer solutions. Guite’s reading as a poet-theologian-critic 
is evidence, and indicate why the readings in the next section are also important. 
 Hippolyta’s rejoinder to Theseus not only translates his critique into a defense of 
imagination, it adds an apology for the corporate imaginative experience of the theatre. The 
lovers’ story told together ‘grows to something of great constancy’. More than just a unified 
account that must be true by corroboration, here also is an expression of how imagination and 
poetry should be judged: 
The achievement of art is the transfiguring of minds, by means of imagination, 
so that we see both what the artist sees and what they see through the things 
they see. There is a corporate transfiguration, a corporate entering into the 
world of the poet’s imagination and a corporate seeing through it, of the truth 
he intends. In the case of the playwright’s art it is the transfiguring of our 
minds together. …we are seeing into the heart of language itself, into the very 
forge and generative place of poetry, as Shakespeare celebrates the mystery of 
his art.218 
Guite suggests the imaginative growth to great constancy is indicative of an organic unity that 
takes on its own identity beyond being merely the work of its author.219 That imagination 
might be capable of such transfiguration may seem re-enchanting to us, but Guite very 
helpfully draws attention to History in English Words, where Owen Barfield demonstrates 
that in Hippolyta’s speech Shakespeare transfigures our very conception of imagination from 
something like fancy into a prototypical idea of the concept no one before Coleridge fully 
appreciated.220 A Midsummer Night’s Dream works out such organic, imaginative meaning in 
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its own structure. Theseus’ and Hippolyta’s exchange treats everything that has gone before 
as a preface to their marital union. The play, which begins or restores four unions in marriage 
is about ‘the fruitful conjunction of opposites at every level, the bringing together of 
contraries that seem to quarrel, but in whose conjunction is not only harmony but a kind of 
overspill of creative energy into fruitfulness and blessing.’221 Hippolyta as a character sets up 
this dynamic in response to the stories told, and in anticipation of the Rude Mechanicals 
failure to bring this to bear in the utterly disenchanted play shortly to be within the play. This 
becomes a meta-theatrical moment when the audience of A Midsummer Night’s Dream may 
identify that it has collectively given its imagination over to the performance, self-
consciously recognizing that this is not only submission to artifice but also an experience of 
transformation into the mystery of the art and the truth it embodies. As Guite summarizes, 
‘The success of Shakespeare’s play depends on a kind of invited feigning, on a mutual 
consent that our minds should be transfigured together. In some sense we have agreed to be 
deceived in order to reach a truth.’222  
 I have deferred until the fourth chapter some of Guite’s helpful reading of The 
Tempest. However it is worth noting here the conclusion of his rare converging of theology, 
literary criticism, and primary reading. The Tempest is Shakespeare’s other play that employs 
magical characters to create reflections of the relationship between appearance and reality, 
between inner and outer natures. This is not escapism but fantasy as the supreme imaginative 
context in which to explore resolution of the darkest themes of tragedy.223 In light of this play 
also self-consciously enacting meta-theatrical reflection, and arguably because of 
Shakespeare’s deliberate laying-down of his own artistic mantle, this play is the climax of art, 
performance, and reflection. Until the end of Act IV The Tempest builds as a revenge 
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tragedy.224 Prospero, having thoroughly prepared and taken advantage of auspicious 
circumstances, meticulously orchestrates every detail of plot and interplay through to the 
final revealing encounter with himself. Through the betrothal masque that he puts on and 
through its interruption, Prospero comes into a final confrontation with himself culminating 
in the ‘Our revels now are ended’ speech. Perhaps it is not until this recognition that he 
himself knows he will desire mercy rather than sacrifice, but it is in his post-masque 
reflection that we see the revenge arc will finally break down.225 In its place, the counter-
theme of unexpected mercy and restoration running concurrently throughout the play finally 
eclipses the vengeance an unknowing audience expects, and sets the stage for Act V.226 
 How Shakespeare works out Prospero’s choice of mercy as well as the dissolution of 
the world into the play is difficult and wondrous. Guite also recognizes the significance of an 
eschatological reading—the dissolution of the pageant leads to an encounter of judgement 
that turns out to be one of forgiveness and reconciliation. The final interpretive context is a 
heavy one: 
But if…the ‘insubstantial pageant’ is not only the play within the play but the 
whole world and all of us in it, then the strong implication is that when, at the 
cosmic level, …we ourselves will step from the seemings of this world, from 
the theatre of the great globe, not into the nothingness of Macbeth’s alienation, 
but into an encounter as potentially fraught, but also as potentially fruitful, as 
that which occupies Act V of The Tempest.227 
What this could mean is inevitably uncertain to some degree. Shakespeare has exploded so 
many layers of metaphor and reflection that the ending of The Tempest is frequently read as 
one of despair. But if there is an edge of despair, Guite helpfully sees that The Tempest 
revives the magical engine of A Midsummer Night’s Dream and that the final anticipation of 
all things might be a heavy one, but it retains a weight of glory: 
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 Throughout this play, as throughout all his works, Shakespeare has 
been playing with ideas about truth and feigning, appearance and reality, the 
relation between the nature to which his art holds a mirror and that other 
nature, beyond or behind the nature Reason measures, from which so much 
light shines through the window of his art. In this final epilogue he throws out 
a bridge from the reality of the play, through the reality of the 
actor/playwright, to the reality of the audience’s own lives; and the keystone 
of that whole bridge, binding all these realities together and allowing them to 
communicate with one another, is the over-arching presence and mercy of One 
who is present to every level of reality and who is to be apprehended by 
imagination, and engaged and pierced by prayer.228 
— 
 My own project finds itself situated between these three engagements of the 
theological-theatrical exchange and facing forward. Ben Quash has commented on theatre as 
a paradigmatic model for dialog that is polyphonic and unfinalizable with respect to profound 
matters of truth. Ivan Khovacs has suggested that in the careful working out of the newly-
appreciated interplay between theatre and theology, performance must be related to the 
careful deliberative process of production, and that interpretation must consider the embodied 
meaning in performance where the non-textual elements of meaning come into play. 
Malcolm Guite turns appropriately to A Midsummer Night’s Dream, where he finds 
Shakespeare creating in the play a meta-theatrical suggestion of how an audience, reflecting 
imaginatively together, may be transfigured collectively towards a unifying revelation of 
truth. The Tempest returns to the same plane with explicit consideration of mercy, 
forgiveness, and hope activated by prayer. There is benefit in further considering 
Shakespeare’s work not only for the sake of theology, but as itself creative theological 
reflection. 
1.4 PAST CRITICISM FROM RELIGIOUS POETS 
 In this section I glance across 300-plus years of criticism, landing briefly on writings 
relevant to Shakespeare and religion by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Charles Williams (and 
                                                
228 Ibid., 74. 
 62 
through him William Wordsworth), and W. H. Auden. As a survey of historic criticism this 
selection is parodic, but it would also be irresponsible to suggest the subject is only recently 
credible. Since Shakespeare’s embodiment and critique of religion is itself poetic, the 
criterion for this selection is that criticism of poetry is ideally left to critics themselves 
capable of the art. As identified, David Brown makes a theological case for this, but the same 
criterion has been advanced by Alexander Pope,229 Wordsworth, Williams, 230 et al. The poets 
and critics considered are also those whose faith is awake in their thought. In advocating a 
return to awakened faith as the best means of understanding Shakespeare’s late thought, it is 
important to identify poet-critics who recognized its value. 
 In preface, two twentieth century critics of Shakespeare and religion are best 
acknowledged here: G. Wilson Knight and Roland Mushat Frye. Knight saw The Winter’s 
Tale and The Tempest as progenitors of Wordsworth’s reintegration of nature, re-creation, 
and miracles.231 In this Knight sees pantheism, with Prospero as Shakespeare, and 
Shakespeare as god. Shakespeare’s art turns with Antony and Cleopatra from tragedy into 
mysticism. Miracle and myth become the only tropes for what Shakespeare has left to say. 
Beyond this point Shakespeare’s poetic intuition is in search of immortality.232 Music 
becomes the driving symbolism of resurrection and reunion. Symbolic of pure aesthetic 
delight, music heightens the mystic nature of the performed act, anesthetizing critical 
faculties and opening the mind to the extraordinary: ‘…music, like erotic sight, raises the 
consciousness until it is in tune with a reality beyond the reach of wisdom.’233 Art is the 
creative imagination’s outward expression of the same thing which, as an inward expression, 
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Knight identifies as religion.234 Yet Christian concepts in The Winter’s Tale are subservient to 
Shakespeare’s pantheism and unorthodox despite their appeal to Christian apologists.235 
Hermione’s resurrection is a mystery Shakespeare the poet cannot clarify, because he himself 
does not know the answer.236 Knight sees Shakespeare in The Tempest, as the climax of his 
artistic vision, elevating his own self-conscious role to an unparalleled degree. Shakespeare 
traces outwardly in the play the inward image of his own soul: ‘He is now the object of his 
own search, and no other theme but that of his visionary self is now of power to call forth the 
riches of his imagination.’237 The Tempest otherwise lacks definite theology except insofar as 
wonder and magic unify nature and the miraculous.238 
 In Shakespeare and Christian Doctrine (1963) Frye takes Knight to task specifically 
for bad theology. Reading Knight almost exclusively through his disciples, Frye accuses him 
of presenting subjective religious interpretations without evidence of contemporary historical 
judgements.239 Denying any probability that Shakespeare read Luther, Calvin, or Hooker, 
Frye identifies him as a secular poet not fit to be to be compared to the religious likes of 
Milton and Bunyan. Whereas Knight finds Shakespeare’s Christianity subjugated to his own 
apotheosis, Frye finds Shakespeare’s Christianity decorative—deliberately failing to bridge 
the sixteenth-century Protestant division between literature and theology.240 In fine, 
Shakespeare and doctrine do not mix: ‘Though the view of art as a mirror was in good 
measure didactic, there is, to my knowledge, no evidence in the critical writings of the 
Elizabethan age which would lead us to interpret Shakespeare’s “mirror up to nature” in 
terms of saving grace and revealed theology.’241 It is easy enough to agree Shakespeare’s 
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artistry is not doctrinally derivative or subservient. The question is whether Shakespeare’s 
artistic vision is sympathetic to a recognizable religious form in its affects and in its effects. 
For this it is helpful to turn to poet-critics who tried to fathom the religious significance of 
Shakespeare’s art. 
 
 
Coleridge on Shakespeare 
 Shakespeare had drawn his share of literary criticism in the centuries intervening 
between his death and Coleridge’s lectures of 1811-12. Critics had run the spectrum from 
dismissive to Bardolatrous. Essays on the critical merits of Shakespeare were put forth by 
such prominent figures as John Dryden (Essay of Dramatic Poesy, 1668), Alexander Pope in 
the Preface to his 1725 edition of Shakespeare’s collected works, and Samuel Johnson, also 
in the Preface of his 1765 The Plays of William Shakespeare. While the criticism of these and 
others does much to establish the parameters of all subsequent critical work, Coleridge is the 
first major critic to draw credible attention to religious content in Shakespeare’s secular 
plays. From our present perspective, these centuries of silence are surprising. Before 
Coleridge none of these consider associating Shakespeare with religious theatre—neither 
religion in the secular theatre, nor the religious heritage of the mystery cycles. Perhaps, 
unlike for Shakespeare, the mystery plays had passed from living cultural memory. Perhaps 
their judgement was too focused by neoclassical criteria of ancient theatre.242 Perhaps, given 
the persistence of religious and dramatic controversies, one or both subjects were nearly 
always suspect. Coleridge’s own interests drew him to this religious question. And perhaps, 
to borrow his own thought, it was the perceptive distance afforded by time that allowed him 
to see anew religious significance in Shakespeare’s secular drama. Coleridge and 
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Wordsworth together present the greatest confluence of poetry, theory, theology, and 
criticism since Shakespeare’s death. Shakespearean romance is not equitable with the 
Romantic movement, but Coleridge and Wordsworth are the chronological midpoint between 
Shakespeare’s romances and our consideration of them. Coleridge’s 1811-12 lectures on 
Shakespeare give us the general idea of his thought.243 
 In his eighth lecture, Coleridge identifies religion as the ‘Poetry of all mankind’ with 
three common objects: First, generalizing our notions and broadening attention beyond 
individual circumstances to mankind as a whole. Second, casting intellectual objects of 
deepest interest beyond slavish sensual apprehension, so they must rather be apprehended by 
the imagination. Third and most importantly, both religion and poetry have as their object the 
perfecting of human nature.244 Poetry is thus the form in which divine religious truth is 
revealed—not in sectarian opinion, but in the heartfelt sentiment on which religion feeds. The 
poet is the unsubdued soul who bears the wonder and feeling of a child into the adult inquiry 
for knowledge until it reaches its limits and lapses back into wonder.245 
 Early modern theatre, owing to limitations of medium, had to appeal to imagination. 
Contrary to classical theatre which was obliged to rules of concrete representation in space 
and time, the early modern dramatist transcended these to appeal to the better angels of 
human nature rather than bind the audience to nature’s meanest part.246 In a later letter 
Coleridge would elaborate on this dynamic: Images and thoughts possess innate power 
independent of our judgement or understanding, by which we try to correlate reality to these 
images and thoughts. This is how the mind acts when dreaming. Combined with the 
voluntary suspension of disbelief, the result is the basis of stage illusion—equally distant 
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from an absolute principle of delusion as well as from Johnson’s contention that judgements 
are fully cognitive during a performance.247 As Malcolm Guite succinctly interpolates: ‘We 
are so used to the conventions of fiction, so used to engaging in what Coleridge called the 
willing suspension of disbelief, that we miss the paradox beneath our noses, that truth arises 
not from the laboring reason of the poet but from his playfulness, his freedom to invent.’248 
 Comparisons of Shakespeare to Homer—so continuous as to be cliché by Johnson’s 
time249—reveal an inclination to claim Shakespeare was already to the English imagination 
the same kind and degree of inventive genius. Without rejecting this, Coleridge laments 
neoclassical critics’ failure to see Shakespeare’s work according to his own singularities of 
circumstance and imagination.250 Critics would excessively judge Shakespeare’s perceived 
inadequacies according to criteria too formal or anachronistic to be credible.251 Coleridge’s 
critique needs reviving. 
Charles Williams – The English Poetic Mind 
 Geoffrey Hill credited Charles Williams as ‘a good theologian and, at his best, a great 
critic’, who ‘would have understood the fundamental dilemma of the poetic craft: that it is 
simultaneously an imitation of the divine fiat and an act of enormous human self-will.’252 
Williams was a poet, novelist, playwright, theologian, and critic—a rare individual in whom 
these vocations could be simultaneously present. Though his 1932 monograph The English 
Poetic Mind has been undervalued by literary critics in recent decades, Hill credits it as his 
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critical masterpiece.253 The English Poetic Mind makes a concerted effort to understand 
English poetic genius formally, then to study it in the greatest English poets. Williams defers 
to Wordsworth for theory, then makes his most prominent study on Shakespeare’s dramatic 
poetry.254 
 The English Poetic Mind was not formally concerned with religion in Shakespeare, 
but he is attuned to issues that have religious bearing, and his analysis is sympathetic. The 
conclusion of his long chapter on Shakespeare is the best place to start: 
…in the plays that concluded his working life it is something other than 
felicity which seems to return. Felicity for the characters, perhaps, but for us 
Wordsworth’s word is preferable—beatitude; they are the beatitude of poetry. 
Shakespeare himself may or may not have been happy. But there is about 
those last plays something which is at a little distance from us; they are 
difficult to fully apprehend, being clear as crystal. … There are no more 
unknown modes of being; all things are subject to poetic power. The thought 
is so impersonated that there is no division between image and vital soul. … 
No other of our poets has so wholly attained to such a final simplicity; and 
this, among so much else, is his greatness—that in him the poetic genius 
perfectly, or at least to the greatest perfection we can imagine, fulfilled 
itself.255 
As a pious literary critic, writing a non-religious critical study of poetic genius, Williams is 
an ideal figure to consult in a study of religious thought in secular dramatic poetry. 
 Wordsworth’s Prelude is the only long study in poetry of the poetic mind, and as such 
it is the best guide by which to consider poetry. The poetic spirit, according to Wordsworth, 
suggests how the sensational apprehension of completeness in one being allows the poetic 
mind to identify completeness in other separate objects. This is the power which in poetry 
afterwards comes to create ‘Composure and ennobling Harmony.’256 The mind becomes 
aware of ‘unknown modes of being’,257 and this pressure of the genius on the outer 
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consciousness is what poets uniquely strive to express in words with increasing exactitude 
and power. Great poets unite in their style the ‘discordant elements’ by the ‘inscrutable 
workmanship’ of their genius.258 Such poets foster the visionary mood wherein there is 
always more to gain; they desire their analyzing and synthesizing to reach the height of 
‘sublimity’, and they measure their achievements in the scale of the infinite.259 Great poetry 
results when all ulterior motives are eclipsed and the poet reaches the extreme moment of 
expectation where nothing but poetry matters.260 The great poet is aware of both diversity and 
unity of things; he feels—and know that he feels—the power of Imagination moving within 
him.261 Too briefly, this is Wordsworth’s model by which Williams proposes to assess poetic 
greatness. I have deferred to Williams’ exposition of Wordsworth because he derives from 
Wordsworth a great poet’s model for interpreting great poetry, and the model advances 
questions of Shakespeare and religion. 
 Williams hastens through nearly all of the plays to draw out a progressive arc in 
Shakespeare’s poetic genius. A gloss of highlights and the culmination of his thought must 
suffice here. The undergirding theme of Macbeth is thought and action separating themselves 
from the natural order. Whereas Othello is ruined by distraction, Macbeth chooses, and 
instead of being ruined his mind is greater at the end than at the beginning. But Macbeth’s 
separation is one of rebellion against nature that ends in dissolution.262 Antony and Cleopatra 
is a union of intense opposites—‘this is the progression of the poetic mind discovering fresh 
powers of knowledge in itself’.263 In the climax even love and death are inextricably mingled. 
Death ceases to be an unknown mode of being, becoming known as far as anything can be 
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known through poetry.264 This discovery is for Shakespeare progress beyond tragedy to a 
concern not with death but with life.265 Ultimately: 
Cleopatra’s poetry is a thing which reconciles and unites [the world which 
cannot be and is, and the world which is and cannot be]. It is not that she feels 
herself triumphant; that is not the thing which, for poetry, matters. The 
supreme thing in that scene is the consummation of the poetic mind which 
here manages to know those two worlds as one: discovering that knowledge by 
expressing it.266 
Williams passes by imagination in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, but to offer continuity with 
Malcolm Guite’s reading of the earlier play, in Antony and Cleopatra—perhaps the latest of 
the great tragedies267—Shakespeare revives the discovery of knowledge through expression. 
This is comprehension through apprehension, except in Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare 
progresses across the horizon of death to suggest the possibility of comprehending what is 
beyond it. This, for Williams, is the point at which Shakespeare becomes the greatest English 
poet, who is at times able to render by his art the undivided expression of actions and words, 
the essential unity of thought and nature. This is participation in the work of redemption that 
renders not death but life. 
 Having made an extensive interpretive survey for the purpose of elevating the late 
plays, Williams gives them surprisingly short shrift. He does not attempt to draw any 
conclusions about the implications for religion (though this is outside the scope of the stated 
project). He recognizes the alchemical tropes deeply embedded in these plays but does not 
make more than passing reference to them, which is surprising since Williams knew alchemy 
as one of the greatest expressions of unity in thought, poetry, and religion.268 Williams’ 
summary conclusions are generally terse: The late plays all end with pardon. Also 
preconceptions about characters must vanish. Further, nothing was precluded from 
                                                
264 Ibid., 94. 
265 Ibid., 90-96. 
266 Ibid., 98, emphasis added. 
267 Evans and Tobin, 86. 
268 Alchemy is the thematic centre of Many Dimensions, the novel Williams published a year before The English 
Poetic Mind. 
 70 
Shakespeare’s genius. Williams does not imagine that Shakespeare was bored or had gone 
soft, but he does think Shakespeare was concerned with the subjects of the plays and not their 
dramatic arrangement. He thinks Hermione’s seclusion and statue are silly, and that The 
Tempest resorts to magic. The last act of Cymbeline is comically wild.269 But, Cymbeline is 
less a play than the person of Imogen, who is a single union of directness of action and 
directness in words—an image so close to fact there is no disjunction. Imogen symbolizes a 
world of sheer experience. Miranda too is not a way of thinking about love, she simply is the 
pure experience of wondrous love to Ferdinand. There is no comment implicit in her words, 
nor can comment be made about them; she is love itself just being.270 
 Poetically, Pericles hears the music of the spheres, but that is indirect. Ariel is an even 
further extension of this ontological simplicity, suggesting what is beyond man. Mortals, both 
characters in the play and the play’s auditors, are enchanted by the elemental purity of Ariel’s 
songs: ‘A little more, and all our human world would undergo that almost terrifying alchemy, 
our joys would be pearls, our griefs coral.’271 Shakespeare’s poetry is on the verge, Williams 
intimates, of veritable transmutation of spiritual realities into material realities. This hints at 
the significance of Prospero’s ‘insubstantial pageant’: 
But that significance is not primarily a human but a poetic significance. Our 
awareness of the baseless fabric of a vision is aroused, of the dissolution of all 
the actors, and opposed to that is the music of Ariel. With all kinds and classes 
of men, with the great globe itself and all which it inherit, poetry has done 
what it can. The elemental simplicities of the last plays, the facts of being 
arresting their essential nature, alone remain.272 
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 Possibly Williams was swept away by the poetry, and did not look as hard as he could 
have into the religious themes outlined. I am unsure why he has stopped short of reading The 
Winter’s Tale as a story of spiritual reality transmuting material elements through the power 
of music into a redeemed unity of thought and matter. The Tempest is a difficult play, but in 
the context of criticism that poetically finds so much transcendence in the lyric, hearing the 
play’s conclusion as Shakespeare’s melancholy swan song would be a clash of poetry and 
theme. For whatever reason, this work has been left to lesser imitators. 
W. H. Auden 
 W. H. Auden was a gifted poet and a renowned essayist. Auden was personally close 
to Charles Williams, though his relationship with Christianity was troubled yet cherished. 
These works merit attention: his essays of literary criticism in The Dyer’s Hand, his poem 
‘The Sea and the Mirror: A Commentary on Shakespeare’s The Tempest’, and his lectures on 
Shakespeare. Auden’s interests were vast, but Shakespeare, and The Tempest particularly, 
were of enduring influence on his imagination. 
 Auden identifies himself as a critic while gesturing that, owing to the nature of human 
egoism, good critics are more rare than good poets or novelists.273 If he is only slightly more 
optimistic about critics than Coleridge, he at least practices his craft with a refreshing degree 
of irony. Auden famously and insightfully observes in a later essay that Shakespeare critics 
reveal more about themselves than Shakespeare, but he is also perceptive enough to suggest 
that self-revelation should be the final effect of Shakespeare on each auditor.274 While this is 
good advice for any critic, I suggest Auden ultimately falls prey to his own criticism, seeing 
in Shakespeare a pessimism that is the critic’s reflection rather than the image through the 
glass. It is also perhaps telling that Auden should be gloomy about The Tempest—the play 
that was by all accounts his enduring favourite. While a student at Gresham’s School, in 1925 
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he auditioned successfully for the part of Caliban in the school production of The Tempest. A 
blurry photo of Auden in character exists on the internet, and it is perhaps as revealing as any 
image could be of Auden’s mind at work. Caliban had captured his imagination before this, 
and would do so continuously.275 
 ‘The Sea and the Mirror: A Commentary on The Tempest’ (originally published 1944) 
is a critical engagement with the play in the form of poetry. In other words, it is the kind of 
criticism through poetry for which Charles Williams identified the need. The poem devotes 
half of its thirty pages to Part III: Caliban to the Audience, where Caliban comprehensively 
disenchants the audience after the conclusion of Shakespeare’s play. Caliban is the only 
character in Auden’s poem to speak prose instead of poetry. We might expect that none of 
Caliban’s words would be pretty, but it is telling that he should remain for Auden the 
character ‘who will always loom thus wretchedly into your confused picture.’276 Caliban is 
sympathetic, and perhaps tragic. Auden is not much more hopeful about the other characters, 
nor the role of the audience for that matter. 
 Auden’s lectures on Shakespeare were given in New York in 1946-47, but were only 
published (from the notes of people present) in 2000. In his lecture on The Tempest, Auden 
recognizes three interpretive points that bear foregrounding for Shakespeare’s work as a 
whole. First, the magician’s art should be paralleled with the dramatist’s art. This is well-
established, but Auden elaborated that by intervening with illusions the magician leads 
characters to disillusion and self-knowledge. Yet, magic as an art cannot dictate what use 
people make of an experience that it gives them. Prospero can manipulate men but not 
transform their character.277 Second, there are few, if any, tidy divisions of good or bad 
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characters, just as there are few tidy divisions between tragedy and comedy.278 Third, Auden 
recognizes that Shakespeare, like all of his contemporaries, inherits a Christian psychology: 
Men are equal in their possession of a will capable of choice, and we are all subject to 
temptation and suffering, but character is not determined by fate, and through repentance 
suffering can be a means to unearned redemption. It is profoundly un-Christian to assume 
that divine justice must be retributive, that success equals virtue, and that forgiveness and pity 
are a form of weakness.279 All of this is insightful. 
 The Dyer’s Hand was first published in 1962 as a deliberately-arranged collection of 
previously-published essays.280 The cumulative result is Auden’s critical sensibilities to 
poetic and religious dynamics in literature. While Auden’s criticism cannot be followed 
systematically, a few key ideas merit recognition. In ‘Balaam and His Ass’, Auden states the 
imagination is beyond good and evil, neither corrupt (because it cannot be) nor restrained 
(because it should not be). Imagination is not conscience nor desire; it only sees what is 
imaginatively possible. Having become by imagination who he or she should be, one should 
free the imagination to play without limitations. This is the relationship of Ariel to Prospero, 
who is freed at the end of the play.281 In ‘Robert Frost’, Auden states that poetry should be 
beautiful—a verbal expression of earthly paradise and unadulterated play—that contrasts the 
travail of human experience. Auden attributes this characteristic to Ariel. (We might 
reasonably see this as a form of enchantment.) Poetry should also be true, proffering 
revelation that sets us free from deception or self-enchantment, and this makes poetry harsher 
in its realism. This attribute Auden identified with the character of Prospero. (We might 
reasonably see this as a form of disenchantment.) Most poetry is dominated by the one or the 
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other, the balance of beauty and truth is rare.282 ‘Music in Shakespeare’ is the essay of 
climactic prominence in The Dyer’s Hand, and the essay itself ends with further reflections 
on The Tempest. Auden describes The Tempest as full of all kinds of music, yet not as a play 
in which, symbolically, harmony and concord overcome disorder. Whereas the preceding 
three plays end triumphantly, the last note of The Tempest is a sour one. Justice prevails 
through force as a matter of duty rather than as a result either of joy on Prospero’s part or of a 
harmonious finale. Prospero anticipates silence and isolation with his ‘Every third thought 
shall be my grave.’283 
 In The Dyer’s Hand’s concluding ‘Postscript: Christianity and Art’, Auden offers 
three thoughts that add complexity to his earlier pessimism about the conclusion of The 
Tempest. First, the godlike Christian is not a hero of extraordinary action but a saintly doer of 
good deeds. A good Christian must be discrete, silently drawing attention not to the doer but 
to God. ‘This means that art, which by its nature can only deal with what can and should be 
manifested, cannot portray a saint.’284 If Auden is right about this, we must not always look 
for embodied spirituality immediately in what is depicted but in the tangential, affective 
spirituality of an experience. Shakespeare does not need to give us straight religion for the 
experience of his plays to have religious significance. Second, penitential poetry unsettles 
Auden even more. Good poetry by its nature desires to be an object of admiration, but it is 
idiosyncratic for poets such as Donne or Hopkins to make such a performance out of private 
feelings of guilt and penitence.285 Shakespeare’s self-abasement in The Tempest, which is 
only implied, indicates he also sees the idiosyncrasy. Third, activities of sacred importance 
are governed by notions of orthodoxy. When art becomes secular, the artist has freedom of 
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expression for whatever subject sparks his imagination.286 Thus, Shakespeare had religious 
freedom in the secular theatre, and through it embodies orthodoxy to a remarkable degree. 
 In light of the above, the poetic relationship identified between beauty and truth in 
‘Balaam and His Ass’ suggests a connection to Charles Williams’ assertion that Shakespeare 
finds in the late plays the capacity for pure poetic expression of an image that is the thing 
itself existing without interpretation. Auden identifies this theological dynamic as reason and 
imagination being fused through the incarnation of the Word made Flesh. But rather than 
embrace the possibility of such poetic fusion, Auden ultimately retreats to poetry always 
needing a tension between reason and imagination.287 In his lecture on The Tempest, Auden 
had stated that Shakespeare’s basic assumptions change little but his verse continually 
develops.288 Further, he had stated that in Shakespeare’s plays there is a continual process of 
simplification as Shakespeare holds a clearer and clearer mirror up to nature.289 Where 
Williams sees expanding potential for the poesis of undivided experience, Auden in the end 
does not bear up under the weight of his earlier convictions. The ready explanation is the 
divergence of their opinions on The Tempest as Shakespeare’s culminating creative effort. 
Auden the poet seems to have lacked faith in the end to see theologically what Williams the 
lay theologian saw poetically. It would be unfair to condemn Auden for inconsistency 
between critical essays published separately on different topics, yet it is curious that Auden of 
all critics does not imagine Prospero as a figure in this nexus between portrayed sainthood, 
performed good deeds, penitential poetry, and artistic liberty. Auden’s perspective on his 
favourite play is relatively gloomy. His thought on the relationship of art, imagination, and 
theology somehow does not filter down to The Tempest which is, I think, strikingly 
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illuminated by the better angels of his criticism. As a critic Auden thinks first like a poet, and 
his initial sensibilities are valuable even when his conclusions seem less so. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have attempted to open a position for a new perspective on 
Shakespeare and religion in his final plays. Between literary criticism, theological studies of 
the arts, and relevant historic criticism, such a survey is inevitably short shrift. Yet, David 
Brown has offered a way to reconsider the necessity of recovering the arts in general and 
theatre in particular for human and spiritual flourishing. Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti 
have shown literary criticism’s turn to religion is both justified and in need of revitalization in 
its methodology. Sarah Beckwith’s study suggested just how carefully we may read 
Shakespeare’s employment of religion even though her conclusions find said employment to 
be human and fragile. Paul Fiddes, Christopher Hodgkins, and Judith Wolfe have 
demonstrated that Shakespeare was keenly attuned to eschatology and made expansive 
sympathetic use of it. Ben Quash, Ivan Khovacs, and Malcolm Guite have given strong 
readings that demonstrate the significance of theology to studies of Shakespeare and religion. 
Finally, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Charles Williams, W. H. Auden, et al. endure as examples 
of why we do well to privilege those whose poetry and spirituality precede their criticism. 
The second chapter moves now to the incorporation of rhetoric, wonder, and alchemy. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EARLY MODERN TURN TO RHETORIC, WONDER, AND SPIRITUAL 
ALCHEMY 
Introduction 
 Having situated the present study between theological and literary-critical studies of 
Shakespeare and religion, the current chapter continues to attempt difficult maneuvering 
between introducing thematic correctives, attending to extant criticism, and readings of 
Shakespeare. All of these are necessary, given the complexity of the endeavour, to turn in the 
last two chapters to readings of The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest. Between literary and 
theological studies, there is a crack in the door for reading these plays as works of profound 
spiritual enchantment. This chapter seeks wedges to widen the gap. 
 The first section looks at the Affect Theory as a recent movement through which 
critics have sought to consider holistic, embodied dynamics of exchange that do not rely on 
singly-determinative models of significance. Drawing attention to the limitations of 
materialist Affect Theory, I appeal for theological correctives to C. S. Lewis and Graham 
Ward. In light of these I turn to scholarship on affect and Shakespeare, relying chiefly on The 
Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries 
edited by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan. 
 The second section turns to rhetoric and myth in Scott Crider’s reading of The 
Winter’s Tale. Crider argues that The Winter’s Tale must be read mythically as well as 
theatrically, but these two readings are impossible to fully reconcile, and between them 
Shakespeare has created a gap that can only be spanned by faith. To understand these two 
readings Crider appeals to the Orpheus cycle in Ovid’s Metamorphoses and the Pauline 
exhortation to unity in I Corinthians. Crider argues that the play is a complete ethical rhetoric 
that moves its audience through words towards the ideal response. 
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 The third section moves from ethical rhetoric to wonder as the convergence of 
thought and feeling in the reflective atmosphere of the theatre. I primarily appeal to T. G. 
Bishop’s Shakespeare and the Theater of Wonder and his poetics of incarnation. Bishop 
carefully theorizes wonder in the context of classical poetics and medieval theology before 
turning to readings in The Comedy of Errors and The Winter’s Tale. Bishop too appeals to 
Ovid, reading Perdita’s self-identification with Proserpina as a corrective. The conclusion of 
the play is the greatest dramatic risk a playwright has attempted, yet The Winter’s Tale 
succeeds because in the collision of thought and feeling wonder becomes the reflection in 
which everyone sees themselves and through which they see what might be by faith. 
 The fourth section moves from wonder as the threshold of supernatural experience to 
alchemy as a model for thinking about the confluence of matter, spirit, and art. Charles 
Nicholl has written in The Chemical Theatre of three alchemical manuscripts that were in 
print in the 1590’s, to which Shakespeare must have been exposed, how they allow us to see 
his profoundly active alchemical imagination at work. Having surveyed these, I glean what I 
can from other scholarship on alchemy and Shakespeare. Finally I offer a study of the 
alchemical significance of the grave and how Shakespeare used this image consistently 
throughout his career for the conjunction of death and rebirth. Cumulatively we see alchemy 
as a profound and sanctifying theme, as alive in Shakespeare’s imagination, and as conducive 
to greater religious possibilities within his last two plays. 
2.1 THE TURN TO AFFECT THEORY 
 Both in the sciences and across the humanities, in recent years there has been a critical 
mass of theorists in whose work we witness a ‘turn to affect’.1 What is of present interest for 
a study of religion and drama is a turn away from both text-determinant and purely-cognitive 
models interpretation, and a turn towards approaches that embrace more holistic, embodied 
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modeling of significance between author, text, performers, and audience. The forms of 
criticism that have maintained dominance in early modern studies and theology over the last 
decades have increasingly shown limitations, and affect theory has been considered as a 
methodology for rebalancing critical perspective. For this project Affect Theory is a 
constructive diagnosis of critical and thematic issues, offering a pivot to reconsideration of 
Shakespeare and religion in light of overlooked ideas. 
Secular Criticism and Affect 
 Although theories of affect have existed at least since Aristotle, and Spinoza is 
generally credited with the modern construct, the recent turn to affect is its own iteration of 
theory and must be spoken of, at least initially, in its own terms. Affect is a process of 
modulation or transformation outside of conscious awareness that is distinct from feeling and 
emotion despite its intimate connection to these. There is no single origin of the current 
expressions of Affect Theory, but Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle identify two prominent 
trajectories in the humanities from articles published in 1995. The first is from Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s and Adam Frank’s ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins’, 
which hearkens back to the work of this psychologist and philosopher who studied neuro-
physiological response mechanisms evolved to function without conscious engagement. The 
second is from Brian Massumi’s ‘The Autonomy of Affect’, which traces its origins back to 
Spinoza (though it does so on its own terms and through the heavily-elaborative philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari). In principle, current Affect Theorists hearken back to a 
pure philosophical notion of affect. In practice, many studies of Affect Theory quickly reveal 
that current theories and their criticisms are diverse, incongruous, and prone to obscurity 
through jargon.2 
                                                
2 Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle, Sound, Music, Affect (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 6. 
 80 
 Affect Theorists’ interest in affect is persistently for what it does, and often how, more 
than for what it might mean.3 Affect is the extension of states of relation and the passage of 
forces or intensities between ‘bodies’. Consensus is that bodies can affect other bodies 
without cognitive intervention.4 Massumi considers affect to be the excluded middle: a third 
state between activity and passivity, or what happens in the gap between content and effect.5 
Stimuli between these, though not cognitively comprehended, are nevertheless in play as 
bodies affect one another. Affect Theorists fault established forms of criticism for a tendency 
to foreground the locus of affect in one body. An example would be literary criticism where 
questions of agency attend predominantly to the author, the text, the audience, or the 
interpretive method. Such methodologies are considered too narrow. Understanding of 
affective exchanges, the critique goes, are inescapably limited where one locus of agency 
predominates. Affect Theorists insist that the tensed interplay of bodies is integral to 
behavior, and therefore to any consequent consideration of significance. 
 Indeed, questions about whether these interactions transcend physiological 
phenomena or impose upon conscious apprehension would be considered by many theorists 
as of secondary significance. Where the varying strains of Affect Theory differ is where the 
lines between affect, feeling, and emotion are drawn, and how these would be differentiated.6 
Though Affect Theorists study the intangible and uncertain dynamics between bodies, and 
such theories are themselves sometimes imprecise, proponents nevertheless point to apparent 
instabilities as indications of affect’s importance.7 Affect Theory does not oppose the 
proliferation of interpretations—for which varying forms of criticism are desirable—rather it 
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opposes the insufficient consideration of the fundamental dynamic of transfer between 
bodies. Affective models of behavior may be integral to interpretation, but they must not be 
confused as themselves critical models of interpretation. Affect Theory, then, is a proposed 
corrective for static models of behavior and biased models of interpretation. 
 There are obvious implications for studies of the theatre as a complex dynamic space, 
especially for a playwright intent on dramatic affective exchange. Such studies should not 
avoid the affective transfer between theatrical bodies of author, text, performers, audience, 
and theatrical space. This seems especially true for a study of Shakespeare and religion that 
suggests the playwright wrote for the performed embodiment of enchantment and wonder. 
Affect is most helpful in light of a constructive critique that brings together present 
theological perspectives and older scholarship ripe for renewal. 
 In 2011 historian of science Ruth Leys published ‘The Turn to Affect: A Critique’ as 
well as a reply to a critical response, identifying a deep and problematic affinity in Affect 
Theory, which is a mistaken commitment to a presumed separation between affect systems 
and meaning.8 Affect Theorists hold that philosophers and critics have excessively valued 
reason, reducing human agency to dispassionate adjudication while ignoring subliminal and 
affective intensities that can influence belief and behavior. These affects, such theorists 
contend, are visceral and pre-subjective, affecting thought and judgement but separate from 
cognition.9 Such affections would have developed through evolution, and conscious 
comprehension would eventually have arisen out of these. Kosofsky Sedgwick and her 
adherents embraced biology through Affect Theory as a way of providing an account of 
emotions independent of intention for their validity. She intended to avoid crude reduction to 
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either genetic determinism (whereby behavior is derivative and therefore amoral) or rational 
intentionalism (whereby behavior is subjective and therefore amoral) by appealing to 
dynamic, non-determinative terms that would have emancipatory qualities.10 By embracing 
behavior as pre-cognitive and pre-cultural yet corporeally meaningful, Kosofsky Sedgwick 
sought to venerate cultural minority reports as signs of dynamism, evolution, and liberation 
rather than causes for shame and moral culpability. 
 As part of her response, Leys offers an extensive critique of the theoretical and 
experimental scientific evidence that Tomkins relied on, little of which was widely accepted, 
and all of which was outdated by the time Kosofsky Sedgwick turned to Tomkins’ work 
decades later. Beyond this, Leys objects to the shared commitment of Affect Theorists to 
anti-intentionalism. Her critique is that if autonomic responses below the threshold of 
consciousness separate cognition from intention, thinking comes too late to have any 
generative capacity for meaning.11 Sub-comprehensive responses would be indifferent to 
ideas and beliefs and would have regard for the content of argument. While endeavouring to 
avoid a mind-body dualism by making affect primary, these theorists commit to an idealized 
metaphysical dualism of cognitive mind divorced from body and brain, and arguments thus 
become meaningless or inconsequential.12 The radical separation between affect and reason 
thus makes comparative analysis of individuals or cultures indifferent to ideological 
dialogue.13 Affect Theory’s naturalist anti-intentionalism thus renders it meaningless in the 
context of criticism or comparative thought. Leys’ evident purpose is the dismissal of 
inadequate theory rather than its constructive replacement. 
 
Theology and Affect 
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 In the context of Leys’ critique there is opportunity for theology to contribute to the 
reconsideration of Affect Theory. One corrective has existed since C. S. Lewis wrote the 
essay ‘Transposition’. Lewis is attempting to understand the relationship between emotion 
and physical sensation, including how spiritual experiences might manifest physically. In 
contradistinction to the secular stream of Affect Theory, Lewis takes the emotional life to be 
higher than physical sensations in their richness, subtlety, and variety (though not morally 
higher).14 Because emotional life is too varied and complex for each to have a corresponding 
physical experience, affections may have overlapping corporeal manifestations that make 
their sensations difficult to distinguish despite the plenitude of infused sensation. Lewis 
describes this as like writing a language that has more sounds than alphabet characters, or like 
transposing an orchestral piece for performance on the piano.15 Emotion likewise transposes 
as it descends into the body, where it infuses sensation with ‘transubstantiated’ significance.16 
Imagining that the spiritual is derived from the natural is a mistake only a sceptic who does 
not understand the lower order of things would make.17 One trying to understand only from 
the lower medium may see facts but he cannot see meaning (a view easily identified with 
disenchantment).18 Any search for meaning must be oriented towards what is above, seeking 
to apprehend the spiritual in order that it may be transposed and in some limited way 
comprehended (a view easily identified with re-enchantment). Lewis ties this presciently to 
the problem of materialism which Affect Theory must seek a way through: 
As long as this deliberate refusal to understand things from above, even where 
such understanding is possible, continues, it is idle to talk of any final victory 
over materialism. The critique of every experience from below, the voluntary 
ignoring of meaning and concentration on fact, will always have the same 
plausibility. There will always be evidence, and every month fresh evidence, 
to show that religion is only psychological, justice only self-protection, 
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politics only economics, love only lust, and thought itself only cerebral 
biochemistry.19 
 More recently other scholars of religion have turned to Affect Theory. It might be fair 
to apply Lewis’ categories to such efforts as those attempted from below and those attempted 
from above. Religious Studies as an academic field has, like nearly every other, taken some 
interest in Affect Theory. The American Academy of Religion announced in 2013 a five-year 
initiative on religion, affect, and emotion. This particular turn follows the course of Affect 
Theorists taking interest in religion as emergent from determinative relationships between 
affective bodies.20 This turn to affect in religion is only nominally distinguishable from many 
non-religious studies, and may be a disenchanted project subject to Lewis’ criticism of all 
facts without meaning. 
 Graham Ward is a theologian seeking to gain from Affect Theory what is useful for 
understanding meaning from above. His 2012 article ‘Affect: Towards a Theology of 
Experience’ merits detailed consideration. Ward’s purpose is an engaged systematic theology 
concerned with the interrelated issues of the sanctification and formation of the soul—‘its 
sentient life, its inner reflective life’—and secondly the soul’s environment, because 
embodied souls continually undergo interactions with the world that fashion change.21 
Ward’s concern is for the soul’s mutability through interaction rather than some mechanistic 
visceral response of activated bodies. His interest is our non-conscious engagements prior to 
the will to act. These are not momentary conversions, nor biologically ingrained reactions, 
but changes accomplished through a lifetime of attunement. Affections are connected to 
emotional life, which is intimately connected with physiology, so the question is how these 
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integrate.22 Ward’s engagement of Affect Theory in terms of the active, dynamic, mutable 
soul, like Leys’ critique and Lewis’ turn to what is above, signal a way in which matters of 
interest to Affect Theory point to its potential significance. 
 Ward suggests emotions are always embodied. Cognitive science’s research into 
affect enables an understanding of the vulnerability of the self with respect to immersion in 
the world. Coming to terms with such immersion involves somatic and cognitive processing 
to understand and manage our responses. The emotional processes for these responses are 
much more complex than the rational processes. The grace of God is what keeps this process 
from being impossibly overwhelming. These are not abstract engagements but embodied and 
contextual engagements that eclipse neither body nor context.23 This unavoidable immersion 
would be unbearable alone, but our immersion is a participation in Christ’s immersion in the 
world.24  
 The soul is conscious and preconscious, operating in cognitive, somatic, and spiritual 
fields. Spirit is the life within given to us as a gift and the life of God operating in and 
through Christ in creation.25 Learning the way of a love which has no fear of death, no 
defensiveness, and no self-protective reaction is an undoing of evolutionary biology that 
adapted to ensure the survival of the species. Such learning would engender a biological 
transformation at the level of instinct, a part of our emotional memory to which we have no 
conscious access without revelation through prayer.26 Ethical life begins in the heart’s 
orientation towards fully loving God (heart knowledge), rather than obedience to civil rules 
or religious codes which are a matter of mind (head knowledge). Knowing in the heart may 
acknowledge rules as guides, but following God fully is a matter of the heart’s orientation as 
much as obedience, and following is affective and corporeal, and thus it matters for the soul 
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and spirit.27 This is a form of prayer that is thinking with the material world in which God 
operates, in Christ, by the power of the Holy Spirit. Prayer is obedience and service that is 
active as well as receptive; duty but also free response. Patient endeavor is the way by which 
to transform mental assent and dutiful obedience into free spiritual cooperation with grace 
and nature.28 The kind of renewal David Brown is advocating in theology and the arts is 
conducive to religious practice that thinks and creates with the material world. 
 Balanced with ‘Transposition’, Ward’s articulation of the soul as the link between 
conscious and preconscious engagement with God and the material world, as illuminated by 
prayer, for the purpose of human transformation, synchronizes helpfully into a starting point 
from which to reflect further upon religion and enchantment in a theatrical context. Affective 
exchange, such as might take place in the theatre, is not merely the arrival at propositional 
conclusions but includes the descent of the higher into the lower for the sake of 
transformation through experience. This is not clinical, nor is the experience the same for all 
participants; rather the transformation is as personal as it is actual. If such transformation is 
difficult, it is at least possible, and affective to some degree, by which we can infer some 
importance of traditional spirituality as well as engagement that transcends functionality for 
the sake of imaginative reflection. The task at hand is to consider how creative works may 
affect their audiences with religious experience, orient the audience towards the divine, and 
perhaps even mediate grace. 
Early Modern Affect 
 Shakespeare’s dramatic use of affect language is as intriguing as it is obfuscating. 
‘Affect’ and fourteen derivative variations appear in all but four plays. Affect language 
appears in the first scene of eighteen plays. There are five speeches where language of affect 
is deliberately repeated. Venus and Mars are common referents for Shakespeare, but only 
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appear together in the same speech three times, and affect language is present in two of 
them.29 Affections are vividly imagined as wrestling or being wrestled three times: 
 Lewis A noble temper dost thou show in this, 
And great affections wrastling in thy bosom 
Doth make an earthquake of nobility.’ 
     (King John, V.ii.40-42) 
 
 Hero They did entreat me to acquaint her of it, 
But I persuaded them, if they lov’d Benedick, 
To wish him wrastle with affection, 
And never to let Beatrice know of it.’ 
     (Much Ado About Nothing, III.i.40-43) 
 
 Celia Come, come, wrastle with thy affections. 
 Rosalind O, they take the part of a better wrastler than myself! 
     (As You Like It, I.iii.21) 
 
 Shakespeare’s awareness of Aristotle is occluded, but both speeches that mention him 
by name include affect language. Tranio’s use in The Taming of the Shrew (I.i.25-40) is 
comical, but Hector’s speech in Troilus and Cressida is so politically, rhetorically, and 
theoretically high-minded as to warrant quotation in full:  
Paris and Troilus, you have both said well, 
And on the cause and question now in hand 
Have gloz’d, but superficially, not much 
Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought 
Unfit to hear moral philosophy. 
The reasons you allege do more conduce 
To the hot passion of distemp’red blood 
Than to make up a free determination 
‘Twixt right and wrong; for pleasure and revenge 
Have ears more deaf than adders to the voice 
Of any true decision. Nature craves 
All dues be rend’red to their owners: now, 
What nearer debt in all humanity 
Than wife is to the husband? If this law 
Of nature be corrupted through affection, 
And that great minds, of partial indulgence 
To their benumbed wills, resist the same 
There is a law in each well-order’d nation 
To curb those raging appetites that are 
Most disobedient and refractory. (II.iii.163-82) 
                                                
29 Antony and Cleopatra, I.v.15-18; Troilus and Cressida, IV.v.177-80. If ‘The Passionate Pilgrim’ is authentic 
it also is an exception. 
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Leontes’ in the first act of The Winter’s Tale is perhaps the most provocative: 
Affection! thy intention stabs the center. 
Thou dost make possible things not so held, 
Communicat’st with dreams (how can this be?), 
With what’s unreal thou co-active art, 
And fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent 
Thou mayst co-join with something, and thou dost 
(And that beyond commission), and I find it 
(And that to the infection of my brains 
And hard’ning of my brows.) (I.ii.138-46) 
 
And Prospero’s use describing Ferdinand and Miranda’s betrothal is also striking: 
      Fair encounter 
Of two more rare affections! Heavens rain grace 
On that which breeds between ‘em!’ (III.i.74-76) 
 
As we might expect, Shakespeare’s use is varied and creative, but more evidently expressive 
of his own creative purposes than theory. How carefully might he have incorporated such 
language? 
 Happily, there have been a company of scholars who have looked through the turn to 
affect for contact points with early modern thought and culture. Some studies, like Donald 
Hedrick’s ‘Advantage, Affect, History, Henry V’ are a turn to affect mostly in name. Drew 
Daniel’s The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and Epistemology in the English Renaissance is 
a focused study of physiological melancholy.30 Historical Affects and the Early Modern 
Theater is a collection focused on political, economic, historicist, and materialist studies of 
the period in question but through a secular post-new historicist lens.31  
 The most pertinent advance is Richard Meek’s and Erin Sullivan’s 2015 collection 
The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries. 
Their contributors turn between recent historicizing of emotion and Affect Theory towards 
Renaissance ideas of emotions, passions, and affects to see how these studies might be 
                                                
30 Drew Daniel, The Melancholy Assemblage (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). 
31 Ronda Arab, Michelle M. Dowd, and Adam Zucker, eds. Historical Affects and the Early Modern Theater 
(New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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mutually informative. Most studies of emotion have tended towards physiological 
determinism and the body as the passive subject of feeling.32 Such studies have benefitted our 
understanding of a major current of historical phenomenology with respect to humoralism, 
however they have also obscured other present theories and practices.33  
Meek and Sullivan advocate reconsideration of ‘what we believe to be three of the most 
important areas of influence: religious and philosophical belief, linguistic and literary form, 
and political and dramaturgical performance.’34 Shakespeare particularly is exceptional in the 
extent to which medical-humoral theory does not account for his character’s emotional states 
and ripe for reconsideration in light of these areas of influence.35  
 In 2004 Gail Kern Paster, author of the prominent Humoring the Body: Emotions and 
the Shakespearean Stage offered a provocative critique: 
 One reason that we have preferred to talk about the body rather than 
the soul is that most of us as secular humanists no longer believe literally in 
the soul but have no choice but to believe literally in the body. I would argue 
1) that we cannot recover the early modern body without its soul; and 2) that 
we are still far from doing all that needs to be done on the ensouled body.36 
Meek and Sullivan have assembled one of the first major responses to this assessment. The 
volume’s Afterword questions the prospect of human value and liberty in a world wholly 
subject to materialism: ‘If we aren’t distinct, but simply subject to the same laws matter is 
(matter conceived as without might or soul) it is hard to find a place for agency, freedom.’37 
Whereas humoral psychology downplays human agency, there were Renaissance thinkers 
who imagined human life as capable of emotional freedom, and Shakespeare ascribed 
especial power to feelings as capable of engaging higher cognitive power and revealing some 
things in their truest form. Religion, art, and philosophy are the likely places to turn in 
                                                
32 Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan, eds., The Renaissance of Emotion (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2015), 3. 
33 Ibid., 5. 
34 Ibid., 6. 
35 Ibid., 7. 
36 Mary Floyd-Wilson, Matthew Greenfield, Gail Kern Paster, et al, ‘Shakespeare and Embodiment: an E-
Conversation, in Literature Compass 2 (2005): 3. 
37 Peter Holbrook, Afterword to Renaissance of Emotion, 266. 
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looking for further revelation about how Shakespeare might have considered such matters, 
and where we might find insight into our own continued reflection on human value and 
agency.38 
 I am obliged to Sullivan for her reading of Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the 
Minde in Generall, which has been under-read in focusing on physical humours to the neglect 
of Wright’s philosophical and religious emphases. Published in 1601, The Passions is 
chronologically present to Shakespeare and thus indicative of contemporary treatment of the 
passions. As Sullivan explains, the affective relationship of body and soul was complex and 
views were not homogenous. Wright’s theorizing is not a directive on how works like 
Shakespeare’s must be interpreted, but there is latitude within which to read such works as 
giving serious account to spiritual thought. 
 The Passions identifies affective experience as ‘part of a larger intellectual project 
addressing the complex relationship between the physical and the spiritual, the body and the 
soul, in both the private and public domains.’39 According to Thomas Dixon, ‘affection’, 
while experientially similar to ‘passion’, had been more associated by Augustine and Aquinas 
with divine rather than worldly affectivity.40 Wright, as a Jesuit Englishman, follows 
medieval philosophy in supposing faculties of reason and will in the non-corporeal, 
intellectual element of the soul.41 Just as the mind could derive knowledge from the physical 
senses, the will could take up passionate sensation and become rational feeling. Hence: 
‘…embodied passion may apprehend something not only useful, but also 
otherwise unattainable by, the disembodied will, promoting the creation of a 
kind of affection that is essentially a form of reason. In this sense, passion, 
affection and reason are part of the same virtuous project, bound by an 
                                                
38 Ibid., 265, 270. 
39 Erin Sullivan, ‘The Passions of Thomas Wright: Renaissance Emotion across Body and Soul’, in The 
Renaissance of Emotion, 26. 
40 Ibid., 33-34, 38; cf. Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological 
Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
41 Sullivan, 37. 
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integrated and holistic psycho-physiology that none the less retains scope for 
more dualistic and delimited forms of phenomenological experience.’42 
 The theories and terminology involved were complex, and their use was often 
dependent on immediate context, but affectivity was thought capable of altering not only the 
body as it intermingled with mind and soul—especially in connection with the divine 
yearnings of the intellective soul.43 In light of C. S. Lewis’ articulation of higher emotions 
transposing into physical manifestations, and Graham Ward’s consideration of affect as a 
form of prayer that thinks with the material world to orient the heart towards God, Meek and 
Sullivan provide a gate to thinking about the same matters as they were present to 
Shakespeare. The places to look deeper are religion and philosophy, linguistic and literary 
form, and political and dramaturgical performance. In the remaining sections of this chapter I 
take the preceding work and pivot towards a deeper connection to the closely-related subjects 
of rhetoric, wonder, and spiritual alchemy as integral to reading Shakespearean affect in The 
Winter’s Tale and The Tempest. The final two chapters seek to draw all of these together in 
readings of this great couplet of plays. 
2.2 RHETORIC AND MYTH IN THE WINTER’S TALE 
 Erin Sullivan acknowledges that in her treatment of Thomas Wright she did not 
include his persistent emphasis on rhetoric as a means of affective persuasion.44 Such a study 
does at least exist on the literary questions of rhetoric and myth in The Winter’s Tale. Philip 
Lorenz has commented that early modern criticism’s turn to religion would have to negotiate 
how religious and rhetorical readings were related, ‘if only as a preliminary movement on the 
way to reconstituting the rhetoricity of the religious trope.’45 Lorenz’s purpose for such an 
outcome has been considered, but rhetoric is an important subject for religion and for 
                                                
42 Ibid., 39. 
43 Ibid., 40. 
44 Ibid. 
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Shakespeare. The most successful conjunction of these three is Scott Crider’s 2009 
monograph With What Persuasion: An Essay on Shakespeare and the Ethics of Rhetoric. For 
reasons of scope I have been forced to leave aside the majority of Crider’s fine rhetorical 
theory and focus on two points of significance: First, there are two ways of reading The 
Winter’s Tale, and for an interpretation to have integrity it must attend to a mythical reading 
as well as a theatrical reading. The theatrical reading is the only one to have received 
consideration in the majority of criticism, and this is an oversight. The second point is that in 
The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare performs a complete ethical rhetoric, which compels the 
audience to embrace the narrative reality in which it is participating, and the uncertainty of 
which affects wonder and religious feeling. 
 In the last decades of criticism on Shakespeare and religion, no scene has been more 
scrutinized than the statue scene in The Winter’s Tale, but these readings seldom recognize 
what Crider identifies as the mythical reading of the play. In contrast Crider explains why, 
according to play’s intrinsic rhetoric, it is inadequate to ignore this interpretation. Crider’s 
analysis is sympathetic to David Brown’s assessment that myths are their own way of 
thinking. The play’s ambiguity denies the exclusivity of either a theatrical or a mythical 
reading, ‘enacting a tension between the two which is itself mythic, demanding as it does that 
the audience experience the moment as simultaneously both.’46 Crider cites Jean-Pierre 
Vernant’s explanation: ‘…myth brings into operation a form of logic that we may describe, in 
contrast to the logic of non-contradiction of the philosophers, as a logic of the ambiguous, the 
equivocal, a logic of polarity.’47 
 The mythical reading of The Winter’s Tale is contingent on Ovid’s Metamorphoses. 
Pygmalion is readily recognized as a source for The Winter’s Tale, but Crider expands the 
Ovidian focus by remembering it is Orpheus who tells the tale. The Orphic frame is of a wife 
                                                
46 Scott Crider, With What Persuasion (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 163. 
47 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 
260. 
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dead but able to be resurrected through art. She is not, but only because Orpheus doubts. The 
death of Eurydice is contrasted by the animation of Pygmalion’s statue—a romance Orpheus 
tells to understand his own tragedy and rhetorically enact his ‘desire for a mimesis which can 
transform the real.’48 Orpheus’ own story is a pagan mystery where death is absolute because 
his musical art is adequate for resurrection, but his faith and love are not.49 Pygmalion has the 
inverse of Orpheus’ virtues. His art is necessary but not sufficient to give life; yet his love for 
his beloved and his faith in the gods are unmitigated. Orpheus’ telling of this tale is a 
comment on his failures of faith and/or love that makes his own tragic error intelligible, 
suggesting he is capable of educating himself.50 For Orpheus this romance is unrealized 
idealism. The story he tells comes too late to be enacted. Shakespeare is perceptive enough to 
connect tale with frame, and close the gap in the pagan mystery. 
 The perfection of faith and love implicit in Ovid is explicit in 1 Corinthians. Crider 
focuses on the intertextual moments of faith, hope, and love in 13:13 and resurrection in 
chapter 15. The frame of 1 Corinthians is also important, and itself deliberately rhetorical. St 
Paul, the penultimate Christian rhetor, purposes to reconcile a community divided by 
dissension and immorality.51 Chapter 13 is the great Pauline paean to love, culminating in 
verse 13: ‘And now abideth faith, hope & love, even these three: but the chiefest of these is 
love.’ The 1560 Geneva Bible marginal commentary on love in 13:13 reads, ‘Because it 
serveth both here & in the life to come: but faith and hope aperteine only to this life.’ Crider 
draws attention to the commentary for 13:2 where faith is ‘the gift of doing miracles’.52 The 
central miracle is resurrection, and faith is a gift of doing, rather than merely bearing witness 
to, an activity that exceeds nature’s capacity. Where faith assumes that the body can be 
                                                
48 Crider, 164. 
49 Ibid., 
50 Ibid., 167. 
51 Ibid., 173. 
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redeemed, hope desires it. Crider tidily summarizes his interpretation: ‘If hope is a desire for 
redemption, and faith an assumption of its possibility, then love is its achievement.’53 
 In chapter 15, Christ’s resurrection is a sign of love that graciously fulfils his 
obedience unto death. Crider interprets 15:12-13 to mean that Christ’s bodily resurrection is 
possible because bodily resurrection is possible: ‘Now if it be preached, that Christ is risen 
from the dead, how say some among you, that there is no resurrection of the dead? For if 
there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen.’54 Shakespeare does not limit his 
art to Christological resurrection, and can work it out in The Winter’s Tale as the uncertain 
conjunction of Ovid’s return from death to this life (that fails for lack of faith), and the 
Pauline triumph of faith over death that emphasizes the life to come. The earthly body dies 
because of sin, but is raised through human participation in divine grace that is expressed as 
faith, hope, and love.55 
 Shakespeare, again, has not only appropriated his sources but metamorphosed them. 
The statue scene is an interrogation of the relationship of art to nature, an interrogation of 
what it means for mimesis to become reality.56 This interrogation takes place, thanks to the 
Orphic frame, animated by the romantic desire to conquer death.57 The potential for 
resurrection through art is activated by Christian virtues’ completion of classical virtues. The 
mimetic world of the play opens a mythopoesis between the Ovidian and the Pauline, 
wherein Hermione dies, then is a statue, then becomes a woman.58 This is the mythical 
reading of The Winter’s Tale. 
 The theatrical reading assumes narratively that Hermione never died. Having been 
cloistered, in the last scene she pretends to be a statue, performing the animation from stone 
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55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 168. 
57 Ibid., 170. 
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to person and awakening faith through imitation of resurrection. In live performance this is 
exactly what happens. The potential narrative doubling of performed realism is, as so many 
critics recognize, itself imaginatively compelling, especially for those who take a sceptical 
view of enchantment as illusion. But Crider rejects this exclusive interpretation because it 
cuts against the narrative grain of the play. Crider identifies seven points in the play that have 
bearing on the question of Hermione’s resurrection. Each can be interpreted theatrically or 
mythically, but neither mode can offer the best account of more than five of them. 59 It is 
helpful to see these in comparison for the sake of their effects: 
1. Paulina declares Hermione is dead. Theatrical Mythical 
2. Antigonus recounts the visitation of Hermione’s ghost. — Mythical 
3. Paulina suggests Leontes remarry when Hermione again lives. Theatrical Mythical 
4. The Third Gentleman tells of the statue’s existence. Theatrical Mythical 
5. The Second Gentleman says Paulina visits the chapel daily. Theatrical — 
6. Hermione explains the events in the chapel. Theatrical — 
7. Leontes states he saw Hermione dead. — Mythical 
 
The theatrical interpretation can only account for the visitation of Hermione’s ghost to 
Antigonus as his imagination. We also have to believe that when Leontes says he saw his 
wife dead (5.3.140) he was mistaken. Mythically, assuming Hermione has died, we struggle 
to understand why, according to the Second Gentleman’s indirect account, Paulina would 
daily visit the chapel where Hermione is entombed. Even more puzzling is Hermione’s 
explanation of events in the last scene, that she has preserved herself to see the issue. 
 Shakespeare has constructed a plot that cannot be reconciled to itself, and the 
intricacies of interpretation are even more complex than Crider indicates, for he does not 
make Hermione’s wrinkles a point needing reconciliation. The disenchanted fallback is that 
the theatrical interpretation must be correct despite its shortcomings, since any performed 
meaning will be effected theatrically.60 This disregards the central ambiguity Shakespeare 
designed to make it impossible for any performance to be fully persuasive one way or the 
other. The main point is that the mythical logic of the play cannot be ignored, and can only be 
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experienced on its own terms. Crider suggests Shakespeare has created a play where the 
theatrical and the mythical readings have to be taken equally into account, and within the 
mythical reading the pagan and Christian influences are equally subverted to Shakespeare’s 
larger creative purpose that does not privilege either. As Crider asks, ‘Can we awaken our 
faith in the presence of death?’61 He sees Shakespeare’s logic as polar in its mysticism. But if 
awakened faith, like resurrection, is possible, it seems worth further considering if it be 
predicated on more than such a disjunction. 
 The second main point from With What Persuasion is the rhetorical fulfilment of the 
first: The Winter’s Tale is Shakespeare’s performance of a complete ethical rhetoric, which 
compels the audience to embrace the narrative reality in which it is participating, and the 
uncertainty of which affects wonder and religious feeling. Shakespeare’s education at the 
King’s New School, suited as it was to the training of clerics, lawyers, and soldiers, included 
extensive practice in the art of rhetoric. His teachers being Ciceronian humanists, the lessons 
were more than rhetorical techne: 
The rhetor fashions the souls of his or her audience to be disposed toward the 
subject at hand and to act upon that disposition, and in the selection of means 
to end, one sees a standard of ethical rhetoric: The good sought must be 
shared; the means must be legitimate and effective.62 
Rhetoric, in order to be complete and ethical, must be virtuous in its means and its ends. The 
rhetor leads souls through words.63 The Winter’s Tale is Shakespeare’s best example of this 
complete ethic of the rhetor leading and the auditors being led. Rhetoric is introduced 
thematically into The Winter’s Tale through Shakespeare’s combined use of Metamorphoses 
and I Corinthians. The two ultimate rhetors, Orpheus and Christ, represent the highest 
potential of both classical and Christian rhetoric, which in the play suggest ‘the power to 
animate the subject matter of speech, the power finally…to raise the dead, an act that both the 
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classical and the Christian rhetorical traditions imagine as fulfilling the art of ethical 
rhetoric.’64 Rhetoric is introduced theatrically through Paulina as the idealized rhetor. It is her 
agency that leads the souls of the characters and audience to ethical rejuvenation through 
wonder. 
 Shakespeare’s use of enthymeme to draw together the effect of The Winter’s Tale is 
his highest creative rhetorical art: ‘An enthymeme is an elliptical syllogism composed of 
probable premises, as opposed to a fully articulated syllogism made of either certain ones (as 
in a scientific syllogism) or probable ones (as in a dialectical one).’65 The successful rhetor 
knows to leave unsaid the proof that the audience already believes.66 This is, according to 
Aristotle, the very ‘substance of rhetorical persuasion,’67 and the body of rhetoric which must 
be interpreted.68 Crider argues the enthymeme encompasses logos, ethos, and pathos, and the 
soul that corresponds to the body of rhetoric is ‘the human association of rhetor and audience: 
the enthymeme is the discursive body of community.’69 Shakespeare becomes fascinated in 
the late plays with this triangle of influence between rhetor, audience, and subject, and he 
starts to discover beyond rhetorical formulae an art of ethical persuasion that exceeds 
political speech.70 The Winter’s Tale is boldest and most successful in representing an ethical 
rhetoric with the power to animate the subject matter. The play literally depicts the discourse 
of rhetor, subject, and audience in Paulina, the statue, and the gathered characters. Crider 
goes a step further to contend that in Paulina’s rhetorical enterprise we see Shakespeare’s 
understanding of his own ethical rhetoric, with the above associations representing his 
understood roles for himself, the image of the play, and the audience.71 Much ink has been 
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poured out on Shakespeare’s ostensible self-identification with Prospero. Crider’s reasonable 
extrapolation of Shakespeare’s self-conscious yet discreet art in The Winter’s Tale broadens 
the context in which we must make such considerations. Leontes’ faith causes Hermione’s 
reanimation,72 but Paulina’s requirement that ‘You do awake your faith’ is grammatically 
ambiguous, meaning that she may be speaking to him, to the audience in the play, or, by 
now-obvious implication, the audience of the play. The play may reveal the character of the 
auditor’s faith, but rhetorically the opposite is also possible: the faith of the audience reveals 
the character of the play. Shakespeare has appealed to this, as the soul of enthymeme 
reanimates the subject of the body. Such faith is not possible without hope, and love is the 
fullness for both. Per 1 Corinthians 15, the dead shall ultimately be raised incorruptible. The 
ideal human anticipation of this telos is grace cooperating with nature to redeem the body. 
However imperfect most results may be, the ideal of leading souls through words has no 
lower aspiration than being born again. The heart of stone is made flesh after all. 
 For an age of critical scepticism such as the present, the mythical enchantment of the 
play is so dissonant it cannot be heard. For an age like Shakespeare’s own, predisposed in so 
many ways to sentiment and superstition, the jarring uncertainty of Hermione’s resurrection 
could also have been difficult. This is perhaps a reason The Winter’s Tale has at times been 
disliked, yet so few Shakespeareans can ignore it. Crider writes: 
Can the lyre of Orpheus really raise the dead? A just representation of such a 
question must be double, both theatrical and mythic simultaneously. If the 
theatrical dominates, as it now does, death overwhelms art, and a nihilistic 
version of scepticism reigns; if the mythical were to dominate, art would 
overwhelm death, and a sanguine piece of sentimentalism would do so. 
Shakespeare succeeds in holding that doubleness in so fine a tension that a 
mature performance of the play requires that those involved, on the stage and 
in the audience, must descend into the ambiguity of (im)mortality. For some, 
Hermione does not die, so she is not reanimated; for others, she dies, so she is. 
Both responses are inadequate. Ultimately, the play discloses to us the 
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character of our own faith, compelling us to live a question about ourselves: 
Can we awaken faith in the presence of death?73 
This ambiguity of (im)mortality is the serious business of romance. Awakening faith in the 
presence of death is not a subject disenchanted criticism takes seriously, and so precludes a 
full half of the interpretive possibilities of The Winter’s Tale. The mythical reading of The 
Winter’s Tale is ripe for further consideration, and I am obliged to Crider for opening 
prospects for such a study from another necessary perspective. Crider also leaves off with 
The Winter’s Tale whereas I suggest it is best understood together with The Tempest. I 
suggest Prospero’s rhetoric is powerful as his magic is powerful, and he abjures this too in 
favour of a greater freedom of the soul. 
2.3 WONDER IN SHAKESPEARE’S THEATRE: THE POETICS OF INCARNATION 
 In 2012 Adam Max Cohen’s Wonder in Shakespeare was published posthumously. 
Despite the significance of the subject, and the addition of essays from a number of his 
colleagues, the book has a disappointing lack of complexity. This is probably the unfortunate 
result of his draft manuscript being rushed to completion in the face of terminal illness. We 
can only wonder what the result might have been had a scholar of Cohen’s calibre completed 
it under normal circumstances. The subject is an important one, and for questions of religion 
it has been underutilized. From a theological perspective there seems promise in the title of 
Cecilia González-Andrieu’s 2012 monograph Bridge to Wonder: Art as a Gospel of Beauty. 
The book itself however is more generally apologetic for the role of art as revelatory: ‘Our 
desire to find and our ability to interact with revelatory symbols is one way to provide a 
positive answer to the question about the existence of God, and also to cultivate an 
experience that will effectively and affectively continue to activate the answer in the human 
person.’74 González-Andrieu’s proposal relies on systematic theology and aesthetic 
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experience, but it remains task-oriented, and wonder is a self-evident object to which we 
should endeavour to build a bridge.75 David Richman makes a cursory identification of 
wonder as an appropriate response to miraculous or surprising events as well as a response to 
poetry.76 Wonder is in many ways akin to affect: The elevated experience of ‘betweenness’ 
that signifies meaning tensed between bodies. For T. G. Bishop’s articulation of theatrical 
wonder, the tension signifies meaning beyond the performed experience, which functions in a 
manner unmistakably familiar to religion. 
 Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder has been in print for two decades, but I now 
turn back to it because Bishop’s perceptive reading of Shakespeare, despite appearing in a 
plethora of critical biographies since its publication, has been more silently acknowledged 
than recognized for its significance to questions of Shakespeare and religion. Bishop’s 
exposition of wonder is, I think, a religious study in the form of a literary one—offering 
grounds from a literary-critical perspective for imaginative engagement between religious 
experience and art. Bishop precedes Scott Crider and other more-recent scholars who have re-
formed profitable studies of Shakespeare balancing criticism through philosophy, theology, 
rhetoric, and aesthetics. These are considered in light of classical, medieval, early modern, 
and subsequent periods of theory as well as present-day criticism. Besides sympathy with 
David Brown’s theological work on the same subject, this is the kind of study called for by 
Jackson and Marotti as well as Meek and Sullivan.77 
 Like Charles Williams et al, Bishop sees in Shakespeare’s corpus a continuous 
developmental arc. Moreover, Shakespeare’s deliberate and creative incorporation of a theory 
of wonder is not a late development but already integral in so early a play as The Comedy of 
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Errors.78 The romantic turn to wonder is not a late climactic revelation but a mode of which 
Shakespeare was aware from the beginning and to which he continually returned. Bishop 
opens with Aristotle’s articulation of drama as an alternate form of knowledge to philosophy 
that also reflects on itself as a form of knowledge.79 He then moves to reading through 
Thomistic philosophy a theory of wonder sensitive to medieval influences of sacramental 
signs. Finally Bishop reads Shakespeare’s reworking of an inherited dramaturgy of wonder 
into a ‘poetics of incarnation.’80 For Shakespeare, this is a therapeutic magic with a natural 
impulse to restore a world somehow gone wrong.81 
Classical Poetics, Medieval Theology, and Wonder 
 Bishop opens from the position that theatre audiences deliberately surrender to the 
play’s control of the dramatic experience. Unlike written narrative, the tempo of the 
experience cannot be controlled, neither can it be suspended subject to receptive mood. There 
is no push-button skipping ahead or repetition. And, whereas music and film play out in a 
unity of time that the audience experiences, theatre is unique in that it moves at once in two 
‘moments’: the remote moment of the narrative in which the audience and actors acquiesce to 
the common fiction, and the performative moment of theatre in which the play is activated in 
the audience’s presence through words and gestures. It is the latter moment from which 
actors can deliberately or spontaneously appeal to the audience as well as respond to it. A 
stage actor moves between these moments, and across the footlights: ‘The deepest work of 
theatrical representation is to make spectators see and feel these two moments in mutual 
implication.’82 Short of breaking off surrender to the dramatic experience, the way for an 
audience member to affect the performance is to become an active participant. Most 
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audiences navigate across this boundary in a way both sophisticated and unreflective, and it is 
in this transfer that theatre is most strange and powerful.83 
 This ‘betweenness’ is different from other perceptions between observer and observed 
in that theatre doubles the perception: 
We see what is not in what is, a fabling link the more insistent in that so much 
of the material out of which theatrical fiction is made is demonstrably real 
material: real bodies, real objects, words really uttered. Seeing, feeling, and 
knowing are peculiarly framed and directed at themselves, and the various 
ways from sense to its objects and back are opened to exploration. Perception 
is liable at any moment to become the theater’s subject, so that theater is 
always about to suggest a theory of itself, just as at the same time it points 
beyond itself to an imagined ‘regular’ world. Again, it is in the relation 
between the two inquiries, into itself and into the world, that the theater 
performs its poetic work.84 
Wonder is an elevated experience of theatre’s betweenness. The intermediacy tenses emotion 
between performance and response, between possibility and impossibility, between belief and 
doubt, between reason and sentiment. More than the effect of spectacle, wonder is the affect 
between players and auditors—who are themselves actively seen and heard.85 
 Both Plato and Aristotle held wonder as an intermediary between poetry and 
philosophy.86 Aristotle more-particularly thought of wonder as an emotional response to 
events framed under a particular pressure towards revelation of significance.87 Perhaps unlike 
philosophy, theatre does not seek emotion to analyze it, nor as an intermediary to critical 
thought. Theatre fosters wonder that elevates subjects and objects of perception under 
extreme conditions. Wonder is a ‘switch point’ for exchanges between emotion and reason. 
This places emotion relative to understanding, so that it weighs in the significance of thought 
or action. Rather than acquiring knowledge, wonder is directed towards perception of 
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meaning.88 Wonder does this as it also holds the emotional connection between the audience 
and the performance.89 
 For Aristotle, wonder is integrated in the learning and reasoning of mimesis.90 Passing 
over Bishop’s fine exposition of Aristotle, the outcome is that the audience’s attention is 
directed to the performed fiction that is charged with significance. In the performed fiction’s 
doubled moments, the audience’s attention is also directed to the dramatic medium creating 
the fiction, akin to seeing a reflection in glass through which one simultaneously looks to see 
what is beyond. This is the same meta-image we have already seen in others’ theorizing of 
poetry and poetic faith, here applied through Aristotle to dramaturgy: the mechanism is made 
a part of the image for which it is the semiotic. The transparent but reflective mechanism is 
the looking glass to wonderland. The theatre, activated by this wonder, allegorizes itself and 
the audience’s participation in it.91 Images of theatre-as-world and world-as-theatre transcend 
mere metaphor through this dynamic. Wonder is an elevated self-reflective experience, and 
Aristotle suggests it is emotional pressure towards revealed significance. This is a poetics of 
incarnation, but Bishop does not expressly consider what might be beyond in this looking 
glass that focuses the image, the medium, and the reflection. Malcolm Guite is less reticent to 
baptize this poetics of incarnation: ‘From that window sometimes shines a more than earthly 
light that suddenly transforms, transfigures all the earthly things it falls upon.’92 
 The revival of Aristotle’s Poetics in the middle of the sixteenth century generated 
immense attention from Italian and French humanists. Bishop identifies a large movement to 
converge Aristotelian poetics with interpretations of Plato on the same subject, filter these 
through the Neo-Platonists, and contextualize the culminative result in the rhetoric of Horace 
and Cicero. While Shakespeare’s direct awareness of any Aristotelian thought or writing is 
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not demonstrable, at least two themes were consistently significant to Aristotle and 
Shakespeare: admiratio (‘wonder’) as a goal of dramatic structure, and katharsis as moral and 
social justification of poetry. While katharsis has been the subject of four-plus centuries’ 
uninterrupted critical scrutiny, admiratio had until recently dropped from critical attention 
despite Renaissance theory placing it as the primary goal of poetry.93 Though Shakespeare 
was by consensus less attentive to formal theory than contemporaries such as Ben Jonson, he 
is clearly interested in drama as a species of knowledge. Transitioning from classical theatre 
through medieval mystery plays to early modern drama, wonder becomes not a form of 
audience coercion towards prescribed effects, nor mere aesthetic pleasure, but ‘a site for the 
complex modulation of audience identification and detachment, making the “between” of the 
theoretical performance a space of semiotic and psychological experiment, through which the 
audience, like the characters, must negotiate a way.’94 This is the early modern theatricization 
of the dynamic now drawing attention from Affect Theorists. 
 Moving to medieval thought, Bishop identifies the theology of sacramental signs as a 
bridge between an individual gesture and its figurative resonance. This connection was the 
essence of the priestly performance of the mass. A sacrament is a sign of a sacred reality that 
pertains to men and provides their sanctification.95 Thomas Aquinas further articulates: 
Now it is connatural to men to arrive at a knowledge of intelligible realities 
through sensible ones, and a sign is something through which a person arrives 
at knowledge of some further thing beyond itself. Moreover the sacred 
realities signified by the sacraments are certain spiritual and intelligible goods 
by which man is sanctified. And the consequence of this fact is that the 
function of the sacrament as signifying is implemented by means of some 
sensible realities. The case here is similar to that in the holy Scriptures where, 
in order to describe spiritual realities to us, corresponding sensible realities are 
used to illustrate them.96 
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Thomas, student of Aristotle that he was, proposed understanding intelligible realities 
through sensate material realities. The cognitive activity of a church audience is oriented by 
what they see towards understanding what they cannot see.97 The sensible aspect is not 
discounted since it is the material/immanent expression of the divine/transcendent. The same 
divine order permeates both; the divine is seen through the glass of the material. 
 Dramaturgically, medieval mystery plays emphasized revelation through material 
enactments of the ultimate reality that is beyond.98 Lacking formal sacramental identity, 
drama should not have been confused with sacramental realities, but Thomas acknowledged 
signs apart from the seven sacraments which may not signify and sanctify, but do ‘signify a 
disposition to sanctity.’99 According to Bishop, the space where materials and bodies form a 
signifying correspondence with spiritual realities is the space governed by wonder as the 
elevated experience of performed betweenness. Despite their differences, medieval mystery 
cycles and Greek theatre share a dramaturgical urge to fuse voice and substance—an 
expression of the mystery underlying the sacramental order: the word was made flesh.100 
Wonder in The Comedy of Errors and The Winter’s Tale 
 Turning from classical theory and medieval theology to wonder in Shakespeare, 
Bishop first considers The Comedy of Errors at length to identify the model that Shakespeare 
developed very early for the secular theatre. Present in the narrative, poetic, and social 
dimensions of performance, Shakespeare’s dynamic of wonder turns in its climax to self-
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recognition of its own practice.101 This ‘revisionary conservatism’ is a self-conscious 
reworking of inherited sources and themes, by which he subjects said sources to critical 
analysis, remaking them in the process for their present purposed significance.102 Unlike 
others working in the same period who sought antiquated forms for legitimization of their 
own work (e.g. Gosson, Jonson), Shakespeare preferred to absorb these without polemic, 
adapting them through metaphor and metamorphosis.103 
 According to Bishop, The Comedy of Errors is technically a transformative 
contaminatio104 from romantic dramas of wandering, Plautine dramatic linearity, and Pauline 
sacramental community.105 In brief, through twin characters and oppositionally-twinned 
metanarrative emblems (chain/line : water :: law : nature :: Plautus : Paulus), Shakespeare 
creates a hybrid narrative that addresses what new kind of story might overcome death.106 
The linear narrative of time is unopposable in the Plautine-lawful-chained trajectory, but that 
trajectory dissolves in the oceanic-natural when Shakespeare completes the Pauline 
dimension. ‘Line’ has the expansive meaning not only of linearity and rope/chain—both of 
which are abundant in the imagery of Comedy of Errors as images of binding and ordering—
but also the structure of verse. Bishop traces out in detail that Shakespeare’s poetry is 
working the method of its storytelling in the structure of its line patterns.107 The doubled 
narrative lines of the play cross and re-cross without binding until the end when Shakespeare 
adds a third strand. This is the dissolution of order. However, it is not the breakdown of order 
into chaos and death but a re-ordering unto life.108 Bishop identifies that from very early on, 
‘Shakespeare’s principal point of connection to theology is not through sin but through the 
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notions of incarnation and the sacramental, where word and matter, spirit and flesh are 
explicitly confounded in the creation of communal forms of life.’109 
 Drawing together the Plautine and the Pauline, it is the latter (whose epistle to 
Ephesus seeks to heal a fragmented community) which transcends. Overcoming the 
inexorable narrative linearity of time and death, Shakespeare does something new, dividing 
and fragmenting not to dissolve into chaos but to resolve into a greater compound.110 This is 
activated by love: 
Metamorphic Eros occupies the middle ground between rope and water, 
‘error’ as fatal mistake and ‘error’ as endless deviation. The fusion of the 
erotic with the sacramental is a combination that comes to be characteristic of 
Shakespeare’s work. … The crucial importance of Paul’s letter to the play thus 
comes into clearer focus. Paul’s vision of erotic desire in marriage as a social 
counterpart to the Word-as-Flesh undergirds Shakespeare’s contamination of 
boundary with flux, a move that at once dissolves law and circumscribes 
ocean.111 
Homophonically, the play is, nearly, The Comedy of Eros.112 Eros is metamorphic, but it is 
activated by the metaphoric. Rope/chain/line is a figure of bondage and law, but as metaphor 
it highlights a contrary poetic power of language both ordered and generative.113 It is Pauline, 
but it is also Shakespeare doing something more.114 
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 This exposition needs careful religious handling. Shakespeare’s use of Pauline 
epistles is not doctrinal but rather, as Scott Crider has also demonstrated, an imaginative 
poesis of incarnation as a unifying trope. This includes unity between play and audience. 
Incarnation as the goal of poetry is a form of ‘real presence’ where language is the informing 
power. Language and dramatic experience twin in their symbiosis, offering an imaginative 
unity familiar to medieval theology in its being a sign that acts.115The theology is a natural 
theology, bound in sacramental semiosis but unbound from an ecclesial framework either 
Catholic or Reformed. Yet, in its ordering principles the theology is traditional: the material 
world images deeper spiritual realities, and these are activated through words. Shakespeare is 
neither playing God nor defying him. This is not a secularization but a re-sacralisation that 
gives vitality to flesh through language.116 Contrary to the New Historicist endeavours to 
trope religion through its alterity for some ulterior interpretive purpose, Bishop presents a 
model sympathetic to sincere, lived spiritual vitality. This adds to the means by which 
Shakespeare and religion may be read together sympathetically. 
 For The Comedy of Errors the proof is in the conclusion. The amelioration of the 
narrative concludes in the figure of Aemilia, who is motherhood and matrimony. She is 
earthly mother to the Dromios. As abbess she is also spiritual mother. She is Egeon’s earthly 
wife, but also the bride in whom the living body of the community is restored by her spiritual 
labours. Flesh and spirit are doubled as self and other, but recognized as one, just as the twins 
mirror each other in their images and their language. 117 The gratifying paradox of these 
doublings shows the extent of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy through knowledge and wonder. 
Incarnate in the characters, who in the end finally share the audience’s knowledge, the 
exhilaration of wonder is mutual across the porous boundary between players and audience, 
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who in their own doubling reflect beyond themselves to something more transcendent.118 But 
this doubling is obviously not dualist. Good and bad, spiritual and material are not gnostically 
polarized. The chain that binds is the great chain of being. The world may be broken, but it 
can be repaired, and is worth repairing, and by creative generation people may contribute to 
its restoration. 
 After the Comedy of Errors, Bishop skips to the end of Shakespeare’s dramatic career 
with readings of Pericles and The Winter’s Tale. A few of Bishop’s points on Pericles are 
constructive to the larger thesis. In V.i Pericles is confronted by the natural sign of Marina’s 
family resemblance, which allows him to vent his suffering. Despite what Pericles thinks is 
true, her ‘miraculous’ presence provides a reassurance whereby he can see and say what is 
actually true though he does not know he knows it.119 Shakespeare’s metaphoric tension—
between self, world, and language—allows the possibility that the correspondence between 
these might be true, however unlikely or difficult to achieve. In this first post-tragic play, the 
miracle is that the metaphor comes to be precisely true. Marina’s needlework and songs (once 
again lines and lines, cords and chords, remade by ocean) exemplify this precise 
correspondence of her matching material images to knowledge. This is done in confrontation 
with those who threaten her, remaking the apparently-inevitable tragic outcome. By metaphor 
the world is delivered to itself in a more desirable form.120 Metaphor may identify an image’s 
unchanging value without making it static. Through narrative (David Brown and Scott Crider 
would say ‘myth’) comes a way of telling a story that makes the past intelligible for the sake 
of what may yet become true. The power of such narrative is thus uncertain, even unsafe, but 
the destabilizing dynamic of wonder is this salubrious disruption of self and world.121 
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 Bishop suggests that Marina is an image of Shakespeare’s poetic inheritance and how 
he transformed it. Between the medieval and modern conceptions of what poetry is, at the 
historical midpoint of Western culture’s continually-vexed reflection on the Incarnation 
(troped as a miraculous conjunction of the natural and the verbal), Shakespeare pushes the 
envelope of subjection to natural processes, ‘deliberately using that liminality as a source of 
intensely figurative energy.’122 Bishop calls this a ‘miraculous yet non-transcendent’ poetic 
labour in play form.123 Shakespeare may have been reticent in Pericles to represent 
transcendence, but he has at least pushed his poetics of incarnation far enough that Pericles 
hears the music of the spheres. 
— 
 Shakespeare creates a hybrid plot where narrative begets life. The story breaks the 
inevitability of time and death into disorder, which in a comedic turn of love is able to resolve 
not into death, but into a greater life than what was lost. Eros is the tension between fateful 
inevitability and dissolution into chaos that derives meaning from disorder. Bishop’s point is 
that what can be said about The Comedy of Errors can also be said about The Winter’s Tale. 
The latter however is much more tragic in the first three acts. Bishop connects the central 
theme of The Winter’s Tale to its working-out of the title in Mamillius’ ‘A sad tale’s best for 
winter’ (II.i.25). Both Mamillius’ tale and his playing are a child’s models of what takes 
place in the drama writ large: 
Change, ambivalence, the presence of contrary states of being or feeling in 
developmental dialectic with one another: how are these to be accommodated, 
processed, and represented by and to the ongoing self that mediates them? … 
Shakespeare’s play will also be understood as a tale told to mediate a complex 
ambivalence, to respond to a developmental pressure by acting on it 
symbolically through the control and disposition of the energies of 
narrative.124 
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These complexities multiply in the middle of the play. Leontes’ tragic theatricizing of 
uncertainty and blame is juxtaposed with the theatricizing of Cleomenes and Dion as they 
present the oracle’s certain knowledge.125 By their recounting at the beginning of Act III, the 
revelation of the oracle is wondrous affair. Were we to experience the absolute nature of their 
account directly, the removal of any allowance for scepticism would abolish the theatrical 
conceit itself. The oracle’s unusual clarity is an anti-theatrical revelation whose meaning is 
independent of context.126 But because we, like Leontes, only experience the content of the 
oracle and not its revelation, we are not affected through direct apprehension and therefore 
knowledge is delayed. Subsequent to the tragic consequences of Act III, Paulina’s theatre of 
remorse is a stasis of abjection that cannot move the gods to compassion (III.ii.210-14) or 
find its own resolution. Leontes seeks to pay the price of his transgressions, not transcend 
them. He, just as much as Hermione if not more so, is ossified in the tableau of penitence. 
Despite his repentance, for sixteen years Leontes retains a heart of stone. Without the 
presence of Hermione with whom he is one flesh, and further lacking progeny who are his 
flesh and blood, a tragic conclusion has been forestalled but not prevented.127 
 The Winter’s Tale resists resolution through self-fashioning. Leontes’ attempt to do so 
is disastrous. Not until Prospero do we see such a capability, and he too comes to realize the 
limitations of such perceived autonomy. Paulina may have projected some final work that is 
hers to accomplish, but she too is dependent, waiting for the circumstantial resolution of the 
oracle. The mere-theatrical reading of The Winter’s Tale insists on Hermione living 
reclusively until the last act, and that her transformation from stone to life is performed in 
every respect. The question of her death however could be seen as almost entirely contingent: 
Hermione is the object of petrification, and her change is predicated on Leontes redemption 
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as the subject. He himself is petrified in a self-fashioned remorse wherein he too can only 
wait for salvation. 
 Bishop follows Jonathan Bate in identifying Perdita with Proserpina as the figure who 
counteracts the terrible dark king.128 Like Scott Crider identifying that Orpheus sings of 
Pygmalion as a correction of his own error, here is a second Ovidian myth wherein the moral 
of the story is learned, except Perdita learns the lesson before it is too late. This daughter of 
perdition is the one who returns to the moment of death and undoes it. Perdita self-identifies 
with Proserpina (IV.iv.116-17: ‘O Proserpina, / For the flow’rs now, that, frighted, thou let’st 
fall’), but Bishop recognizes Shakespeare has remade her as the maiden who learned 
Proserpina’s lesson before being ruined: Perdita imaginatively controls any challenge to her 
sexual purity, and by the retention of integrity is the agent that dissolves the theatrical 
falsehoods with which she is affronted from the moment she first appears.129 Perdita is 
empowered to herself ‘play’ the role for which she is dressed (IV.iv.133-35: ‘Methinks I play 
as I have seen them do / In Whitsun pastorals. Sure this robe of mine / Does change my 
disposition.’), in the process winning Florizel to eros but also to virtue. She does so by 
creating a fiction in response to the changing motion of desire (hence the unity of the tale and 
the play).130 Leontes’ fiction of control led to destruction. Perdita’s fiction is decorous and 
genitive.131 Perdita is cast out to the remote desert of Bohemia, which turns out to be a 
pastoral plenitude of fiction and theatrical play.132 As Bishop explains, ‘From this point of 
view the infamous Bohemian ‘sea-coast’ is neither a blunder nor a thumbing of the nose, but 
an insistence on the transgressive prerogative of the imagination in answering the needs of 
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survival.’133 Sicilia remains too much like Denmark: a prison where the girl with the flowers 
would have gone mad. 
 Shakespeare was daring in his metamorphoses of fictions. Where Ovid’s accounts are 
changes of bodily shapes, Shakespeare is remaking stories, but not merely as narratives 
adapted into other narratives. He is, like Perdita, learning how the necessities of the stories 
have become outmoded, and he is recreating them into new ways of telling. One attribute of 
his remaking is to elevate the role of the audience.134 Theatricality is enfolded into fictions 
that are remade in script, and then remade in performance. At least in The Winter’s Tale and 
The Tempest, these performed fictions are themselves relinquished in the climax of 
performance. Shakespeare’s romantic theatre lets go of its matter and its art ‘towards some 
more direct recognition which will have no need of shadows, even if the latter have been the 
very media by which the imagination has arrived where it is.’135 Bishop contends 
Shakespeare’s greatest dramatic risk is bringing all the pressure of The Winter’s Tale to bear 
on such a concentrated conclusion.136 The necessity of risking excess is also part of the point. 
Had the scene failed, or appeared to fail, it would have more critics than the long strange 
conclusion of Cymbeline. Consensus is that the conclusion of The Winter’s Tale works, but 
we do not (arguably cannot) fully comprehend why. Approaching the scene with too much 
credulity or too much scepticism will be disastrous: 
 It is in just such a ‘between’ as this that the peculiar and overwhelming 
effect of the scene develops: within the ambit of powerful transactions 
between words now and their counterparts then, between the statue and the 
living body (of both actor and character), between the present fiction and its 
pressing analogues, between stage and audience. The risk the critic runs is that 
of the characters – Leontes or Hermione in particular – of negotiating the 
transition between impression and expression, between silence and speech, 
between stone and flesh, improperly. The scene is one of general trial and to 
venture onto its ground is dangerous. Paulina knows this very well, and how 
failure to negotiate this exchange may rebound disastrously on all. Hence her 
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protestations, her stern protocols and caveats, which must be ours too in 
approaching the articulation of our wonder at what the scene stirs in us.137 
 At this point it is worth reiterating that Bishop’s project is ostensibly secular. His 
interest is a theory of wonder grounded in Aristotelian poetics. The raft of interest in 
Shakespeare’s religion that focuses on The Winter’s Tale suggests that it has the highest 
degree of significance to questions on the subject, but as recognized this interest is 
disenchanted. Possibly Bishop’s secular perspective has more in common with what 
Christians have historically been able to identify as the practice of faith. Most of what the 
turn to religion in Shakespeare has identified as religion with respect to Shakespeare falls 
apart if we add the possibility that Shakespeare took Christianity seriously and may have 
even tried to foster it with a degree of sincerity. If we add the same premise to Bishop’s 
reading, the play becomes an exercise of supernatural faith—especially because it teeters on 
the knife-edge between credulity and scepticism. Faith seeking understanding is burdened by 
this betweenness. Bishop describes V.iii as the unsaying of the spell, the gradual undoing of 
what has proceeded it.138 Conjuring and exorcising these ghosts with so many spectators is 
dangerous and could more easily fail into tragedy than succeed into romance.139 
 Bishop carefully covers so much theory that it is difficult to find fault. Yet, for 
scholarship that climaxes with the climax of The Winter’s Tale, the reading of that scene is 
contracted. Bishop suggests Paulina’s incantation to awaken Hermione has a tone of entreaty 
and prayer, as if ‘to suggest that it is in the end up to the statue to approach them rather than 
to be summoned.’140 These lines are the crux of the play’s turbulent energy of wonder, 
crystallizing together exultation, power, fear, and vulnerability.141 Yet still the play hooks 
into the liminal space between knowledge and emotion the experience of wonder that is 
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reflective on its subject and itself as a medium.142 It is as if Shakespeare had pushed Romeo 
and Juliet much further beyond all reasonable constraints of age, betrayal, separation, and 
death, yet the play resulted in the ending Friar Lawrence conceived. 
 Rather than resolve and clarify all questions after the final reconciliation, the play 
ends hastily at Leontes’ bidding. The play having been made and then remade, it is then 
unmade, and the theatre itself is in turn given up to wonder and to faith amidst uncertainty. 
Time—in the play a Father Time who is part muse, part chorus—suggests with his glass that 
time both flows and turns.143 Yet the flowing back of time, which will awaken stone, fill up a 
grave, and redeem from death by life, is still incomplete. The wonder which pulls so 
affectively at the hearts of audiences also creates an awareness of the fine balance of the 
temporal in the imaginative.144 The genius of Shakespeare’s turn here is that we see time 
flowing back far enough for great evils to be undone, but not the complete restoration or 
redemption of all things. The play cannot be resolved. The actors who put the play on must 
struggle to interpret and perform a script that inevitably resists. Every performance inevitably 
unmakes itself. As Bishop elaborates: 
 The ancient metaphor of the human being as an actor and life as a stage 
here touches a new elaboration: the making and unmaking, the composition 
and decomposition of the self in its fictions becomes a process of continual 
dialectical pulsion and response, like the actor making his performance – not 
in slavish obedience to the script, but in interpretive and immediate tension 
with it.145 
 In the end, the audience is wrapped into an ecstatic agony of interpretation so that the 
enchantment of the play climaxes in the witness of a resurrection too good to be believed. 
Then, in the ensuing anticipation of a greater revelation of clarity, we are painfully denied the 
fullness of all things. The theatrical interpretation must settle for any greater enchantment 
being in the mere appearance of a greater enchantment. If this is true it is ultimately a form of 
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disenchantment. Alternately, the reward for the awakening of faith is the possibility of some 
greater re-enchantment. 
2.4 SPIRITUAL ALCHEMY 
 C. S. Lewis wrote that, unlike medieval magic which was mostly an unexplained 
underpinning for romance, Elizabethan magic was the widely-accepted practice of science, 
medicine, and entertainment that might be found on any street corner. Perhaps they were 
desperate, perhaps they were superstitious, but, ‘Shakespeare’s audience believed (and the 
burden of proof lies on those who say Shakespeare disbelieved) that magicians not very 
unlike Prospero might exist.’146 Lewis identifies disregard for this perspective as the cause of 
strange readings of The Tempest, which is neither fantasy nor allegory. This disregard 
persists, and we would do best to think of alchemy as closer to science and science fiction. 
Albert Poisson suggested that alchemy is more complex than scholastic philosophy.147 
Approaching such a vast subject is difficult from a twenty-first century perspective. The 
sixteenth century was one of transition for the theory and practice of magic. We see in 
Shakespeare’s characterization of Paulina and Prospero a reticence to explicitly label their 
magical powers. Intentionally obscure and prone to corruption through witchcraft and 
confidence trickery, alchemy’s idealism was nevertheless profound in imaginative and 
spiritual influence. The scientific revolution would seek to supersede as much as it could of 
its origins in Neo-Platonism, occult theory, and alchemical experiments, but this would not be 
                                                
146 Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 8. See also Peggy Muñoz Simonds, ‘Alchemical Structure of The Tempest’, Comparative Drama 31.4 
(Winter 1997/1998): 538: Audiences not only believed in such magic but were capable of understanding it 
better than we today generally understand physics and chemistry.  
147 Albert Poisson, Théories & Symboles des Alchimistes (1891), referenced in Gareth Roberts, The Mirror of 
Alchemy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 7. 
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accomplished at least until Newton, and Shakespeare’s creative career was near the midpoint 
of this long transition.148 
 Through a survey of scholarship on spiritual alchemy and readings of Shakespeare, 
this final section will demonstrate that Shakespeare was keenly aware of alchemical theory, 
and that he deployed this source material for enchanting purposes. Alchemy was captivating 
then for the same reason it could be captivating to Carl Jung and can be captivating today—it 
works symbolically and imaginatively.149 Despite the burden of misinterpretation, alchemy is 
a material and spiritual construct, is sympathetic with immanent re-enchantment, and works 
as a combination of scientific, spiritual, and poetic searches for truth and virtue. It was a form 
of inquiry with a moral code inspiring enough that the church, the royal court, and the 
university could take it seriously. Critics who pigeon-hole alchemy as superstition or fraud 
are condemning lesser forms of an idealistic endeavour to redeem nature through art. Noble-
minded alchemists resisted the Promethean urge to aggrandize themselves by stealing 
spiritual fire.150 This was a transgression Shakespeare ultimately recognized and resisted, first 
by insisting in The Winter’s Tale on faith preceding understanding, then showing in The 
Tempest that the sacerdotal impetus to transmute spiritual realities into material expressions 
is, even if potent, not the culmination of all things. There is spiritual power above works ex 
opere operato, and it seems to be activated by humility, grace, and prayer. Refusing to play 
God, we must also not waver in working to heal division and restore harmony to the created 
order. 
Shakespeare’s Alchemical Sources 
                                                
148 Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton’s Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). Alchemy thrived through the Copernican Revolution, and as late as 
Newton and Boyle the experimental pursuit of transmutation seemed scientifically plausible.  
149 And according to Jung subconsciously, as alchemical symbols are universal archetypes. See Carl Jung, 
Psychology and Alchemy, Collected Works of C. G. Jung 12, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), 183-84, 223. 
150 This moral lesson has longstanding relatability. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Michael Crichton’s 
Jurassic Park embrace science while warning of the dangers of playing God. These are also examples of 
science fiction that resemble fantasy, but in their heyday seemed all too possible. 
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 Attempts to reconcile alchemy with biblical and natural theology have been ongoing 
since at least the middle ages (with admittedly varying degrees of success). Few attempts 
satisfy current critical standards, yet by reviving the early modern mind-set it is possible to 
see creative theology at play. The requisite critical work on alchemy is well-established. In 
the twentieth century Titus Burckhardt, Mircea Eliade, and Frances Yates were among those 
who demonstrated alchemy’s ideological sophistication and overturned the position that 
alchemy was superstition later overcome by actual science.151 In 1980, Charles Nicholl made 
the retrospective claim in The Chemical Theatre that the prevailing notion of alchemy was of 
twinned parts primitive science and impossible magic. Where bad science left off, bad art 
(occult or theatrical) took over, and the alchemist was the dreamer bridging the divide.152 
René Descartes may not have intended the complete divergence of natural law and divine 
inspiration, but the predominance of thinkers followed that secularizing, disenchanting 
trajectory. Nicholl’s published diagnosis is largely true now decades later, and the prejudice 
inflects on critical attitudes towards Shakespeare’s ideas of religion: Either Shakespeare was 
too sceptical to take all the bad science and hocus pocus seriously (and it becomes theatrical 
artifice), or he was himself too fuddled by fantastic superstition and cannot be taken seriously 
except as a reflection of the ignorance and gullibility of his age. 
 The late-modern prejudice against alchemy, if theoretically dead, remains propped up 
by historians of science, un-credentialed spiritualists who like to self-publish, and the fantasy 
entertainment industry. There has however continued a steady counter-current of scholarship 
on alchemical idealism including its relationship to Shakespeare. Both historically and 
critically, between the corruptions of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus and Jonson’s Doctor Subtle, 
there remains the possible re-enchanting idealism of Paulina and Prospero. A critical 
                                                
151 See also Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London: Penguin, 1973), e. g. 321: ‘Most of the 
leading alchemists accordingly thought of themselves as pursuing an exacting spiritual discipline, rather than 
a crude quest for gold. The transmutation of metals was secondary to the main aim, which was the spiritual 
transformation of the adept.’ 
152 Charles Nicholl, The Chemical Theatre, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 1. 
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corrective has long been in process. Stanton Linden has identified Francis Bacon’s 
unprejudiced scrutiny of alchemy’s physical and metaphysical foundations while retaining a 
practical interest in it.153 Though Bacon thought of alchemy, astrology, and natural magic as 
too beholden to imagination and belief, he also advocated their rehabilitation through 
methodological integrity.154 Malcolm Guite’s identification of the problems that ensued from 
the bifurcation of reason and imagination has already been related in the previous chapter, but 
it is worth adding in light of a theory of wonder that Bacon was not entirely dismissive of 
magic, seeing it as ‘the science which applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the 
production of wonderful operations; and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives, 
displays the wonderful works of nature.’155 Publications continue to appear, such as Bruce 
Janacek’s Alchemical Belief: Occultism in the Religious Culture of Early Modern England 
and Margaret Healy’s Shakespeare, Alchemy and the Creative Imagination.156 Nicholl’s 
Chemical Theatre is the benchmark for studies of Shakespeare and alchemy, building off the 
work of Frances Yates to clarify alchemical texts as Shakespeare would have received them. 
Nicholl identifies three central alchemical texts published in English the last decade of the 
sixteenth century: The Mirror of Alchimy, The Compound of Alchymy, and the Monas 
Hieroglyphica. 
 The Mirror of Alchimy (1597) introduces the basic tenets of the alchemical opus: 
casting corruption off from matter, eliminating dualities that divide nature, and infusing 
supernatural properties of harmony and purity. The scientific tenets are Aristotelian: elements 
are a duality of matter and form; the qualities of cold/hot and moist/dry combine to make the 
four primary elements earth (cold-dry), water (cold-wet), fire (hot-dry), and air (hot-wet). All 
                                                
153 Stanton Linden, ‘Francis Bacon and Alchemy: The Reformation of Vulcan’, in Journal of the History of 
Ideas 35.4 (1974): 549. 
154 Ibid., 549, 557. 
155 Francis Bacon, Works IV, 366-67, emphasis added, cited in Linden, 549. 
156 Though the last is unsatisfying in its reliance on wooden alchemical theory that proves little. See Aaron 
Kitch, review of Shakespeare, Alchemy and the Creative Imagination by Margaret Healy, Renaissance 
Quarterly 111.3, E319-22. 
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substances are formed from combinations of these. Elements could therefore conceivably 
transform into other elements by altering their qualities. A chemical agent capable of 
producing this result was known as the Elixir or Stone, hence the ideal of alchemy was to 
isolate this elixir and wield it to advance the process of transmutation.157 While the 
transmutation of lead into gold was the temptation of such material proficiency (exoteric 
alchemy), the idealist was interested in philosophical gold—the restoration of matter to its 
uncorrupted, undivided harmony of qualities. If attained, this projection could not just 
transmute metals but restore human physical and spiritual health to their uncorrupted forms 
(esoteric alchemy). Alchemists thus sought to understand Nature’s impulse to return to its 
ideal created form, and through art to speed up or complete the process inhibited by 
corruption.158 
 The prescribed chemical process of material transformation was a cycle of dissolution 
and coagulation. The principle materials were Mercury and Sulfur, representing essential 
properties and principles in a tensed dual relationship. Alchemical Mercury was argent vive 
(‘quick silver’), the aspects of matter that were moist, vaporous, volatile, spiritual, and 
female. Alchemical Sulfur represented the aspects of matter that were solid, combustible, 
fixed, bodily, and masculine.159 In the magnum opus, a solid would be sublimated into 
vapour, then condensed into a purified solid. The cycle would add a variation then repeat. By 
this process, body and spirit would lose their oppositions and be harmonized in one balance 
of form and matter. Besides the principal materials, the two essentials for this process were a 
forge and an alembic vessel that could sustain the process of transformation.160 
 George Ripley’s The Compound of Alchymy (1591) represents a more advanced 
prescription for the alchemical process in poetic form. The following points are relevant: The 
                                                
157 Nicholl, 25-26. 
158 Ibid., 27. 
159 Ibid., 32. Per Linden, 556, Francis Bacon concurred that ‘sulphur and mercury are the primordial principles 
which give rise to all matter’. 
160 Nicholl, 30. 
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stage of putrefaction was known as the ‘Chemical Wedding’, symbolized by the death of king 
and queen (Sulfur and Mercury) in coitus. This nigredo (black) stage of putrefaction is the 
lowest point of matter’s dissolution and the turning point of the opus.161 If successful, the 
next stage of congelation yields the first form of the philosopher’s stone—the White Stone—
indicating the completion of the most important part of the work called the albedo (white) 
stage. The final rubedo (red) stage transmutes the White Stone into the Red Stone, which is 
the final restoration of undifferentiated matter.162 The overall process is congruent with The 
Mirror of Alchimy as the alchemist kills matter and resurrects it to new life. Opposites are 
liberated, clarified, and married back together: 
The blackness of putrefaction is followed by the whiteness of rebirth, when 
the fled spirit returns to quicken the stricken matter to new life. … The shape 
of the work is thus circular, a going-out and coming-back: the Mercurial spirit 
is released in order to return and redeem, matter is brought to nothing in order 
to become new matter.163 
 The Mirror of Alchimy and The Compound of Alchymy were retrospectives on 
traditional alchemy. John Dee’s Monas Hieroglyphica was republished in 1591. Dee was a 
charismatic figure, representative of alchemy’s revitalized identity in the late sixteenth 
century. While alchemy had been practiced for centuries with varying degrees of integrity 
and public support, Dee moved with celebrity status in the highest circles of the court and the 
intelligentsia both in England and on the continent. A Renaissance man in the truest sense, he 
was preeminent in the fields of mathematics, geography, navigation, invention, astrology, and 
astronomy. Because of his principled approach to the unity of all forms of knowledge, Dee 
was a lifelong devotee to magic and alchemy. This is who C. S. Lewis describes as 
prototypical of the Elizabethan ideal. Dee typified a new emphasis in alchemy on spiritual 
interaction. He had a sustained interest in channeling celestial influences into matter, and 
identified the Mercurial spirit as the intermediary for imbuing matter with living spiritual 
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presence.164 The similarity of Prospero to Dee is great enough to infer a deliberate imitation 
on Shakespeare’s part with Ariel as his Mercurial spirit.165 
 Scholarship on alchemy in the romances does exist. Lyndy Abraham has drawn out 
the alchemical emblems in Pericles, including an instance of the rex marinus—a king 
redeemed when he is saved from drowning—that precedes the one in The Tempest.166 Charles 
Nicholl identifies not only the aborted alchemical movement of King Lear, but also offers 
alchemical exposition of the cave scene in Cymbeline, a play with a plot resolution that is 
either absurd or miraculous.167 Although the alchemical thread in The Winter’s Tale has been 
identified, this aspect of such a perplexing play remains in need of study.168 While 
Shakespeare’s exposure to alchemical texts can be taken for granted, and his deployment of 
alchemical language and images is unmistakable, his creative use cannot be tied to a 
particular source or method. The host of symbols and their endless variegation of significance 
must have appealed to him even as they led to a proliferation of meanings. I have heavily 
relied on Abraham’s A Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, which is the best current critical 
resource for negotiating an art sufficiently complex to encompass everything in the cosmos. 
Scholarship on Alchemy and Shakespeare’s Romances 
 Studies have identified alchemy in The Tempest. Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden 
Vaughan recognize some alchemical elements in their notes and identify the title of the play 
is itself an alchemical term for the process of transmuting base metal into gold, suggesting 
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Prospero’s project is an attempt to transform the corrupt characters.169 One extended attempt 
to read The Tempest as alchemical is Peggy Muñoz Simonds’ ‘“My Charms Crack Not”: The 
Alchemical Structure of The Tempest’. She reads the play as a theatrical exercise in 
alchemical transmutation, and credits Prospero with achieving a golden age of restored 
political and social order within the play.170 The plot is usually considered original to 
Shakespeare, but Muñoz Simonds contends alchemy is the shaping pattern for the narrative 
itself by identifying nine alchemical stages in the play.171 However, she does not offer a 
rationale or unified source for the nine stages she identifies out of a plenitude of possibilities 
and variations. She does not tie her nine identified alchemical stages to a recognizable 
progression of the play, instead moving back and forth between scenes and characters, and 
for a progression of stages this is unsatisfying. Muñoz Simonds sees Prospero’s promise to 
abjure his ‘rough magic’ as an established rhetorical gesture by which to deflect accusations 
of necromancy, dispel his own vain illusions, and make a pretense of giving up exoteric 
alchemy.172 Despite his success, at the end Prospero is morose, and Shakespeare refuses to 
condemn or vindicate him.173 
 Muñoz Simonds reads The Tempest as a theatrical exercise in transmutation entirely 
within the context of the play. What such a reading lacks is consideration of the theatre as 
itself alchemical and its affects contingent on performance. Sceptics of Prospero’s magic 
have pointed to street magicians and theatrical artifice as models by which to suppose 
Prospero is merely an illusionist.174 John Dee’s reputation as a conjurer itself began while at 
Cambridge, where his productions of stage spectacles were impressive enough to be 
                                                
169 Mason Vaughan and Vaughan, 63-64; Abraham, Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, s.v. ‘cloud’. 
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supposed magical.175 In performance Prospero’s magic is illusion through theatrical art, but 
dismissal of art as mere illusion denigrates the power of performance for art (e.g. wonder 
through rhetoric and poetry) and overlooks the latent significance of the theatre as itself 
alchemical. Alchemical works were themselves sometimes called ‘theatres’, and the work 
was considered theatrical in nature with the different stages sometimes referred to as 
scenes.176 Alchemists even viewed their alembic ‘as a theatre in which the miniature creation 
of the Stone imitated the creation of the greater world in microcosm.’177 The alembic was 
known by many names, including ‘globe’.178 Frances Yates, goes into meticulous detail in her 
identification of the Globe as a model of a memory theatre.179 While the connection of 
memory theatre to rhetoric is straightforward, a secondary revelation is that the Globe also 
had hallmarks of alchemy and the alchemical process. The theatre itself embodied an 
alchemical space of performed experiment and transformation. Waxing even more esoteric, 
Mircea Eliade suggests the origin of alchemy is the ancient conception of the Earth-Mother 
giving forth living matter whose own life was complex and dramatic, and ‘it is the mystical 
drama of the God—his passion, death and resurrection—which is projected on to matter in 
order to transmute it.’180 The religious rituals of miners and artisans would contribute to the 
development of larger rituals including ancient theatre, which would in turn through classical 
influences contribute to the development of medieval and early modern theatre. Tracing such 
a development would be its own extensive endeavour, but for present purposes it is sufficient 
to suggest the relationship between alchemy and theatre could be profound, active, and self-
conscious. When Shakespeare turns to mystical and theatricizing confluences at the ends of 
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The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest, they incorporate the audience into the final wondrous 
revelations in expectation of transformation. 
The Grave Matter of Shakespeare’s Alchemy 
 Shakespeare rarely names alchemy in his plays. He could rely on audiences having a 
high degree of familiarity with alchemical language—as could Jonson for the complexity of 
inside knowledge displayed in The Alchemist. But where Jonson wrote theatrical satire to 
amuse and to dissolve, Shakespeare’s alchemical purpose could be higher and subtler. 
Drawing on the language and imagery of alchemy, the re-enchanting impetus in such 
instances is towards restoration. In tragedies that include alchemical symbolism, the aborted 
alchemical opus corresponds to the tragic movement of the conclusion. Alchemical comedies 
run towards wondrous reconciliations and golden conclusions.  
 One further study adds immediate complexity to Shakespeare’s use of alchemical 
language. Language of the grave is present in all of Shakespeare’s major works except Love’s 
Labour’s Lost, The Merry Wives of Windsor, and Troilus and Cressida. Alchemically, the 
grave is: 
The alchemists’ vessel during the nigredo, when the matter of the stone, the 
united sulphur (male) and argent vive (female) undergoes death, dissolution, 
and putrefaction. … The emblem of the lovers and the tomb occurs as a three-
dimensional tableau in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. … In alchemy the 
souls of the dead bodies, sometimes depicted as one hermaphrodite body, are 
released and fly to the top of the alembic, leaving the blackened, putrefied 
bodies to be washed and purified so that they become the white foliated earth 
of the albedo. This earth (or cleansed body) is then pure enough to reunite 
with the soul (or united soul/spirit), and from this union the philosopher’s 
stone is born. Thus the vessel which is the tomb of death is also the womb of 
new life, of generation….181 
Shakespeare clearly makes use of this symbolism. As one of Shakespeare’s most sympathetic 
priests of nature, Friar Lawrence’s powers are considerable. He broaches the duality of womb 
and tomb in his introductory speech: 
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The earth that’s nature’s mother is her tomb; 
What is her burying grave, that is her womb; 
And from her womb children of divers kind 
We sucking on her natural bosom find… (II.iii.9-12) 
 
John Milton no doubt had alchemy and these lines in mind when he composed Paradise Lost 
II.911-13: ‘The womb of nature, and perhaps her grave, / Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, 
nor fire, / But all these in their pregnant causes mixed.’182 Friar Lawrence concocts by his 
knowledge Juliet’s sleeping potion, the efficacy of which is seldom if ever scrutinized by 
sceptics of magic. The apothecary is a counterpoint to Friar Lawrence: He is an aspiring 
alchemist based on what is in his shop,183 but a bad one because he is in penury. He can 
produce a draught of death, but not death and life again. 
 Further examples strengthen the conclusion. Foreshadowing the play’s end and 
expanding the alchemical imagery, the grave is associated with marriage184 by both Juliet and 
her mother: 
 Juliet Go ask his name.—If he be married, 
My grave is like to be my wedding-bed. (I.v.134-35) 
 
 Lady Capulet Ay, sir, but she will none, she [gives] you thanks. 
I would the fool were married to her grave! (III.v.139-40) 
 
Mercutio is a mercurial agent in the play, and his famous pun to Romeo has alchemical 
entendre: ‘Ask for me tomorrow, and you shall find me a grave man’ (III.i.95-98). Romeo 
and Juliet is one of Shakespeare’s most hopeful tragedies, with Friar Lawrence the physical 
and spiritual healer ultimately able to perform not only the reconciliation of the Capulets and 
the Montagues, but also—nearly—a marriage triumphant over dissolution and death. Verona 
has to settle for a glooming peace and the erection of a golden statue. 
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 The imagery of the grave was not original to Romeo and Juliet. In the very early 
Richard III,185 the Duchess of York says: 
O ill-dispersing wind of misery! 
O my accursed womb, the bed of death! 
A cockatrice hast thou hatch’d to the world, 
Whose unavoided eye is murtherous. (IV.i.52-55) 
 
The cockatrice, or basilisk, is a monster but also ‘a symbol of the alchemical elixir which 
could transmute base metal into gold.’186 It is the same womb-grave association of life and 
death. Richmond (afterwards Henry VII) gives the valediction of Richard III: 
Inter their bodies as become their births. 
Proclaim a pardon to the soldiers fled 
That in submission will return to us, 
And then as we have ta’en the sacrament, 
We will unite the White Rose and the Red. 
Smile heaven upon this fair conjunction, 
That long have frown’d upon their enmity! 
What traitor hears me, and says not amen? 
England hath long been mad and scarr’d herself: 
The brother blindly shed the brother’s blood, 
The father rashly slaughter’d his own son, 
The son, compell’d, been butcher to the sire. 
All this divided York and Lancaster, 
Divided in their dire division, 
O now let Richmond and Elizabeth, 
The true succeeders of each royal house, 
By God’s fair ordinance conjoin together! 
And let their heirs (God, if thy will be so) 
Enrich the time to come with smooth-fac’d peace, 
With smiling plenty, and fair prosperous days! 
Abate the edge of traitors, gracious Lord, 
That would reduce these bloody days again, 
And make poor England weep in streams of blood! 
Let them not live to taste this land’s increase 
That would with treason wound this fair land’s peace! 
Now civil wounds are stopp’d, peace lives again; 
That she may long live here, God say amen! (V.v.25-41) 
 
The bodies of the dead are buried with the double meaning that it ‘become their births’. The 
sacrament will facilitate the ending of division through union of the White Rose of York 
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(Elizabeth) and the Red Rose of Lancaster (Richmond/Henry VII).187 Heaven will smile upon 
this fair conjunction.188 The union will be fruitful if blessed. Divine peace and prosperity will 
reign. Shakespeare’s talent for found symbolism was on display early with the wedding of the 
red king to the white queen ending the War of the Roses. Death is the threshold of life, and 
Shakespeare returns repeatedly to it, including in every one of the romances. 
 Alchemical readings could be continuously added. Alchemy is key to The Winter’s 
Tale and The Tempest and will be revisited in the following chapters. Cumulatively, 
Shakespeare’s England had in alchemical lore an old tradition invigorated by idealism and 
celebrity.189 The same alchemical engine powered three credible expressions: the ancient 
esoteric tradition of mysteriously perfecting matter, the Elizabethan mystagogue intent on 
spiritual perfection, and the physician seeking the power to heal the body.190 There were 
countless variations of what alchemy was or would become, and there were corrupt usurpers 
just as there always have been. Present-day scholars often struggle to reconcile their criticism 
with such idealism. Despite the weight of best criticism, it becomes a stumbling block that 
Shakespeare could be taken seriously in taking alchemy thus. Sceptical criticism results in 
readings that become, as Lewis foretold, strange.191 Poetically, Charles Williams describes 
Ariel’s music as so powerful it is one step removed from the transmutation of the spiritual 
into the material: ‘A little more, and all our human world would undergo that almost 
terrifying alchemy, our joys would be pearls, our griefs coral.’192 
Conclusion 
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 To return briefly to the study of affect at the beginning of this chapter, in the 
Afterword to The Renaissance of Emotion Peter Holbrook writes, ‘Shakespeare often presents 
not just highly emotive human experiences but a world with all the qualities of mind and 
feeling – a mindful, ensouled world that feels with humanity.’193 If materialism is correct, 
Holbrook asks, what remains of human agency and free will? Undermining human autonomy 
is itself a devaluing of humanity.194 Holbrook reads Coriolanus as a picture of freedom. 
Coriolanus is evidently subject to a choleric humour up until his mother comes to him. In 
response to her plea he emotionally breaks down as he holds his mother silently by the hand. 
He abandons his plan to destroy Rome in response to ‘words, an appeal to mind, imagination, 
and feeling, not a random physiological event’.195 When Coriolanus sees his family in the last 
act it causes him to give up his aspiration to live as if inhuman: ‘I melt, and am not / Of 
stronger earth than others’ (V.iii.28-29). This is a moment of salvation not only for Rome but 
for Coriolanus as well in that ‘paradoxically, this moment of self-mastery presents itself as 
one of self-dissolution, a fatal “melting” of the self, a flowing into and with others.’196 The 
self affectively linked with others and the world itself is also suggested in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, where Holbrook suggests: 
We see a world quickened with life and desire – reality is not a series of 
stable, separable entities but, rather, a whole, or continuum of mobile and 
plastic moments of togetherness or interaction. … In this vision everything 
reaches out to and involves everything else. Nothing is absolutely alone, 
including we humans: everything is folded within a complex whole. …this is 
to apprehend the world as instinct with feeling and value – not as a mere 
blank, a meaningless material space of cause and effect – and to look forward 
to ways of apprehending the world that we are perhaps beginning to recover 
today.197 
The only thing left unsaid is that this idealism has been called spiritual alchemy since before 
Shakespeare took the subject into his venerable hands. Having turned from materialism to 
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affect, to rhetoric, to wonder, we have turned finally to a re-enchanting harmony of matter 
and spirit that ennobles creation, liberates humanity, and facilitates our participation in the 
redemption of all things. 
 
 131 
CHAPTER 3: ‘BE STONE NO MORE’ – READINGS IN THE WINTER’S TALE 
Introduction 
 The Winter’s Tale is the performance of a miracle. It is a story where reason and 
imagination are both tested. The story is an experiment that succeeds, but we are mystified as 
to how and why. At stake is re-enchantment through the awakening of faith. 
 C. S. Lewis, close to the time of his conversion, wrote that The Winter’s Tale ‘is able 
to give us an image of the whole idea of resurrection’.1 How far is it possible to extend a 
spiritually re-enchanting reading of this play? Shakespeare refused to be transparent or 
coercive about the spiritual significance of The Winter’s Tale. He also succeeded in setting 
the spiritual hooks so deeply in our reason and imagination that this is a play we cannot 
ignore. If we hear this play with the clear eyes and full hearts of awakened faith, how are we 
enlightened and edified? 
 In light of all that has gone before, this chapter turns to primary reading of The 
Winter’s Tale as the triumph of grace over grave—the triumph of life over death. There is, of 
course, no such thing as merely reading Shakespeare. His art is the product of a mind in 
which all things were continually present. In his work at large we see movement in rhetoric, 
mythopoesis, wonder, and alchemy right up to the threshold of the supernatural. While 
Pericles and Cymbeline begin the thematic reversal of the tragedies, The Winter’s Tale 
exceeds all precedent. Also to an unprecedented degree, the audience of the play has no 
special knowledge about what occurs and is wrapped into the enchantment of the conclusion. 
I have endeavoured to narrow my focus to mythopoesis and spiritual alchemy as wondrous 
directives for a spiritual reading of The Winter’s Tale. We are offered the healing of reason 
and imagination: spiritual re-enchantment for a disenchanted age. 
                                                
1 C. S. Lewis to Arthur Greeves, 5 September 1931, in The Collected Letters of C. S. Lewis, vol. 1, ed. Walter 
Hooper (New York: Harper-Collins, 2004), 968. 
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 As a transition towards primary reading, I propose three interpretive questions integral 
to The Winter’s Tale, then begin to address them with examples from Shakespeare’s 
mythopoesis and alchemical creativity. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to reading 
and interpreting the play as it unfolds dramatically in Shakespeare’s penultimate re-
enchantment of nature and spirit through art. I draw attention to Shakespeare’s incorporation 
of wonder, myth, and alchemy. Acts I and II must be read briefly in the context of the 
identified themes and the final three acts. 
 In Act III, the second scene is Hermione’s trial and death. Paulina assumes direction 
of Leontes’ penance. The third scene is the dissolution of tragedy and the introduction of 
wonder as Hermione appears to Antigonus, Perdita is left in Bohemia, and the Shepherd is 
blessed. 
 In Act IV, Time the Chorus inverts the natural course of decay, and the play’s 
trajectory reverses towards re-enchantment. We see this inversion in Autolycus, who despite 
his ill repute is an integral Mercurial character on whom the resolution of the play depends. 
The re-enchantment continues in the pastoral comedy of the extended fourth scene, which 
within its delightfulness retains thematic continuity on the relationship between art and nature 
as well as the mythical presence of the supernatural.  
 In Act V, the first scene is where Hermione is made rhetorically present through 
memory, then in name, then in spirit, then through direct address. Leontes’ penance ends in 
his willingness to accept truth beyond reason’s ability to comprehend it. The second scene is 
where wondrous things are heard and believed though they are not seen, raising the 
audience’s faculty to imagine things greater still when the final mystery is revealed. The third 
scene is the resurrection of Hermione. I propose a way to read Paulina’s incantation as the 
reanimation of Hermione’s body with her spirit through a corporate miracle of faith. 
— 
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 Related to the host of interpretive issues inherent in The Winter’s Tale, here are the 
interpretive questions I think a critical reading must engage (though most do so 
inadequately): What is the role of the oracle? What is Paulina expecting in the final 
resolution? What is Hermione’s identity as a statue? 
 What is the role of the oracle? Sceptics who refuse to entertain the possibility of 
Hermione’s resurrection need to be consistent. In addition to dismissing any miraculous 
conclusion, as well as dismissing the apparition of Hermione’s vexed spirit to Antigonus, 
sceptics need to disenchant the oracle. The oracle is unusually transparent in its revelation—
lacking any ambiguity we would expect considering the medium—leaving no margin for self-
fulfillment. Leontes’ first great act of faith is to believe the oracle he initially rejected, then to 
yield to its driving force for a decade and a half. Faith in the oracle is precisely rewarded by 
the accuracy of the resolution. For the disenchanted, this wager of faith must overcome such 
odds as to beggar the suspension of disbelief. The internal logic of the play must be 
respected, and if readers are going to accept some supernatural interjections but dismiss 
others they need a coherent rationale for doing so. 
 What is Paulina expecting in the final resolution? Whether the resolution is theatrical 
or mythical, we assume Paulina knows what will happen. Perhaps she does. If Paulina and 
Hermione have hatched a plot to cloister the latter until the time of Perdita’s return, their 
wager is predicated on the oracle as divine revelation and belief that they can sustain the ruse 
indefinitely without being discovered. The burden to credulity is great. Paulina also offers to 
make an oath that Hermione is dead: 
I say she’s dead; I’ll swear’t. If word nor oath 
Prevail not, go and see. If you can bring 
Tincture or lustre in her lip, her eye, 
Heat outwardly or breath within, I’ll serve you 
As I would do the gods.  (III.ii.203-07) 
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Thirty lines later, Leontes asks to be taken to the bodies of his wife and son. We do not see 
what happens, but he is convinced of their deaths. These have to be accounted for given that 
Paulina’s persuasion and spiritual authority over Leontes are predicated on her integrity. How 
can Paulina lie to Leontes and retain her integrity? How could Hermione be dead, yet Paulina 
hold out for herself and Leontes a hopeful resolution? If Hermione has died, there must be 
some way of considering that Paulina knows Hermione’s resurrection to be possible, or even 
expected under the right circumstances. 
 What is Hermione’s identity as a statue? Properly considered, this is the most vexing 
question. Robert Greene’s Pandosto is a recognized source for The Winter’s Tale, but this is 
not a question that can be resolved by appealing to this source. In Greene’s romance, Bellaria 
does die accused of adultery, and Pandosto takes his own life at the end.2 The inference is 
that because Shakespeare lets Leontes live he must have done the same for Hermione. This 
would be as blatant as Shakespeare’s other inversions of Pandosto, such as making the 
jealous king ruler of Sicilia instead of Bohemia, casting the child ashore so she ends up in 
Bohemia rather than casting her adrift so she ends up in Sicilia, etc. Such consistent 
inversions without variation would be less creative rather than more. If The Winter’s Tale 
directly mirrored Pandosto in all major aspects, audiences would, after the initial narrative 
shock at the play’s premiere that Hermione is alive at the end, begin to think theatrically 
about how to interpret the play. But this is tantamount to the reward of art being in seeing 
through its artifice, and poetic faith would give way to the willing suspension of belief.  
Shakespeare flagged the inadequacy of such one-to-one correspondence with the absurdity of 
giving Bohemia a coastline. He is not bound to spare the queen from death, and we should 
expect from such a playwright some kind of profound inversion of the source material. 
Current opinion prevails one way or another that Hermione could not be resurrected, and so 
                                                
2 Robert Greene, Pandosto, or, The Historie of Dorastus and Fawnia (New Rochelle, NY: The Elston Press, 
1902). 
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she could not have died. Shakespeare does not preclude this interpretation, but it raises as 
many problems as the alternative. 
 Antigonus exits bearing the unnamed child at the end of Act II, 150 lines too late to 
hear the oracle that associates her with ‘that which is lost’. Antigonus indirectly recounts how 
her spirit tells him to leave the child in Bohemia and call her Perdita. The direct explanation 
of the connection of her name to the oracle is Hermione’s intercession from beyond the 
grave. The statue would have to be just a statue, or Hermione’s body petrified by the 
departure of her spirit. Mythically both are viable. 
 Hermione’s statue has been ‘in the keeping of Paulina—a piece many years in doing 
and now newly perform’d by that rare Italian master, Julio Romano’ (V.ii.95-97). Romano is 
a scandalous figure,3 and it is unclear if he is supposed to be painting the old statue or making 
a new one. Once again we only hear about this without direct knowledge. The disenchanted 
reading assumes he and his work are entirely misdirection. The enchanted reading infers that 
he is misdirection so Paulina is not accused of sorcery, or that his art is complicit with 
Paulina’s efforts to revivify Hermione. 
 If Hermione has died, it is harder to explain the Second Gentleman’s claim in 
V.ii.104-07 that Paulina visits the ‘remov’d house’ two to three times daily. The disenchanted 
explanation would be that she is caring for the live Hermione. The mythical explanation 
would be that she has some Pygmalion-like endeavour to bring a stone Hermione to life. We 
do not know if the removed house is the ‘chapel’ Leontes says he will visit daily (III.ii.238-
39), the ‘gallery’ as he calls it at V.iii.10, or these are all one and the same. 
 The advanced age of the statue is the greatest narrative wrinkle. If Hermione did not 
die, how did she visit Antigonus? If she died, how is she resurrected sixteen years later 
having aged correspondingly? Most critics think her aging conclusively resolves the matter. 
                                                
3 John Pitcher, ed., The Winter’s Tale by William Shakespeare (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 
2010), 46: ‘…the sculptor is said to be Giulio Romano, an Italian artist associated with Rome, papal politics, 
and pornography.’ 
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Scott Crider does not make much of Hermione’s wrinkles, suggesting they are a reminder to 
Leontes of the time of flourishing lost because of his error,4 and also the element of the 
ridiculous that comes in from the Pygmalion narrative.5 Ovid’s accounts of after-death 
experience do not suggest any significant interlude of time, and Shakespeare has greatly 
extended the interval of delay.6 For an enchanted reading the answer must be in the 
relationship between body and soul beyond death. 
 Hermione’s own explanation is less satisfying that it initially seems. She tells Perdita 
in V.iii.125-28, ‘for thou shalt hear that I, / Knowing by Paulina that the oracle / gave hope 
thou wast in being, have preserv’d / Myself to see the issue.’ The explanation is cryptic, and 
the ‘thou shalt hear’ may warn against hearsay. Could Hermione have been preserved 
spiritually in anticipation of bodily resurrection at the fulfillment of the oracle? Scoffers must 
acknowledge that this would not be the first miracle. After the oracle itself and Hermione’s 
appearance to Antigonus, this would be a third miracle, and a third miracle is much harder to 
deny even if it is the greatest. 
— 
 In the previous chapter I appealed to Scott Crider’s reading of 1 Corinthians 13 as 
integral to The Winter’s Tale, but it bears reiterating: the exercise of faith pertains to this life, 
not merely waiting for the next. The 1560 Geneva Bible marginalia describes faith as the gift 
of doing miracles, not merely bearing witness. Miracles are supernatural transformations that 
exceed natural capacity in response to human agency. The central miracle is resurrection. 
                                                
4 Crider, 159. 
5 Ibid., 169. 
6 An unlikely source is Platonic myth about the separation and reunification of body and soul. Ben Jonson 
owned at least one Latin translation of Plato’s works during the time that he and Shakespeare were friends. The 
Phaedrus is a myth of the reincarnation of the soul into a new body. Republic X includes the myth of Er as a 
man who leaves his body, experiences the afterlife, and returns transformed. Various scholars have tried to 
account for Shakespeare’s familiarity with Plato, but their analyses range from tenuous to flimsy. Renaissance 
Neo-Platonism is a more likely prospect, but this is best considered in the context of alchemy. See Anna 
Baldwin and Sarah Hutton, eds., Platonism and the English Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 118; Kenneth Haynes, English Literature and Ancient Languages (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
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Christ’s resurrection was possible because resurrection is possible. If The Winter’s Tale is a 
supernatural story, and we cannot reasonably reject that it is, then in light of careful reading a 
miraculous resurrection is at least as plausible as the alternative. The contrary critical 
perspective comes down to ‘But it’s just a play and there aren’t really miracles.’ The Winter’s 
Tale is gracious also to those whose faith slumbers, to those whose minds are not yet 
transfigured so together. 
 Cora Fox has written that, ‘In dialogue with humoral conceptions of the body, 
Ovidianism registers the interdependence of body and self, but it also reveals the way the self 
can outlive the body, even as it aestheticizes and attaches cultural value to the body as the site 
of metamorphosis.’7 Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than Shakespeare’s mythopoesis 
of Hermione as a Ceres figure. At IV.iii.116 Perdita self-identifies with Proserpina. Scott 
Crider suggests, ‘If Perdita is a Proserpina, then Hermione is also a Ceres, awaiting her dead 
daughter.’8 Crider does not expand on the significance of the association with Ceres, but his 
own method may be adopted to do so.  
 The narrative frame is that, in Metamorphoses V, Minerva is visiting the Heliconian 
Muses. When Minerva asks about the presence of nine magpies, Calliope repeats for her the 
song she sang when they were challenged to a contest by the nine singing daughters of Pierus 
and Euippe. The challenger sings of the battle of gods and giants, and how Typhoeus 
harassed the gods all the way to Egypt where they hid in the form of animals. In response 
Calliope (the muse of epic poetry and the mother of Orpheus) sings the Ceres-Proserpina 
myth: Typhoeus, having been defeated, was buried under Sicily. Dis, coming back from 
confirming that Typhoeus’ shakings and eruptions will not split the earth and let light into 
hell, is struck by Cupid’s arrow and abducts Proserpina. Sicily is specially cursed by Ceres 
                                                
7 Cora Fox, Ovid and the Politics of Emotion in Elizabethan England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 8. 
8 Crider, 168 n.16. 
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for its injustice to her as the mother of the lost daughter. Jove returns the daughter to the 
mother for half the year, and the land returns from barrenness to seasonal fruitfulness. 
 In Arthur Golding’s translation, when Arethusa tells Ceres the fate of her daughter, 
the reaction is, ‘Hir mother stoode as starke as stone, when she these newes did heare’.9 
While the mother being struck to stone upon hearing of the loss of the child is deeply 
resonant with The Winter’s Tale, Golding’s first line is a straightforward rendering of 
Ovid’s.10 Golding’s next line is more striking: ‘And long she was like one that in another 
worlde had beene.’11 This is much more an interpolation of Ovid’s ‘attonitaeque diu similis 
fuit’, and could just as easily serve as a description of Proserpina. Lynn Enterline writes, ‘It is 
left to Shakespeare’s Hermione to return from that “other world” of stone in order to be 
reunited with her Proserpina.’12 But Enterline has no intention of suggesting Hermione 
crosses into the afterlife and back, assuming Hermione’s transformation must be entirely 
metaphorical like Ceres’. This gives less attention than it might to Ovid’s larger reflection on 
selfhood beyond the metamorphosing body and Shakespeare’s transformation of 
Ovid/Golding. 
 Calliope’s song was first sung as a rebuke to blasphemous human vanity. The 
challengers to the Muses are turned into the magpies. As we hear it in Ovid’s frame, the song 
is repeated as the muse of poetry edifying the goddess of wisdom. Hermione is a type of 
Ceres, but here we have another Shakespearean remaking of myth: Perdita, the type of 
Proserpina, crosses back from the outer darkness of Bohemia, which turns out to be rather 
Elysian, into the claustrophobic, hellish stasis of Sicilia. However, her sojourn is earthly, 
                                                
9 Ovid, Ovid’s Metamorphoses: The Arthur Golding Translation 1567, trans. Arthur Golding, ed. John Frederick 
Nims (Philadelphia: Paul Dry, 2000), V.632. The presence of Golding’s translation in Shakespeare’s work is 
well-established, e.g. T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespere’s Small Latine & Lesse Greeke (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1944), 436-451. 
10 Ovid, Metamorphoses I-VIII, trans. Frank Justus Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 
V.509: ‘Mater ad auditas stupuit ceu saxea’. Miller’s translation is similarly close: ‘The mother upon hearing 
these words stood as if turned to stone’. 
11 Ovid, trans. Golding, V.633. 
12 Lynn Enterline, The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 225. 
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never tripping across the horizon of death. Shakespeare appears to have taken Golding’s 
image of mother-as-stone who has crossed into another world, then inverted the roles with the 
daughter restoring the natural order and interceding for the return of her mother from death. 
The deeply-embedded suggestion is that Hermione has bodily become stone and spiritually 
crossed over into the afterlife. Perdita is the agent of the oracle’s fulfilment and the catalyst 
of her mother’s recovery from death. 
— 
 As a means of thinking about spiritual themes within the romances, spiritual alchemy 
remains underutilized. The alchemist has been identified as the midwife of nature, who by art 
facilitates the supernatural consummation of nature. The entire play could be read as a study 
of the relationship between art and nature. Alchemy is also strongly present. The basic 
alchemical process of corruption, dissolution, purification, and resolution maps onto the 
narrative structure of the play. Shakespeare did not explicitly label the play as alchemical, but 
a plenitude of alchemical language and imagery is undeniable once recognized, and he wields 
his intimate knowledge of this subject deeply and creatively. Alchemy in The Winter’s Tale 
pushes difficult interpretive matters towards an enchanted reading. 
 I have suggested that in order to understand this play it is necessary to address the role 
of the oracle, Paulina’s expectation in the final resolution, and Hermione’s identity as a 
statue. Alchemically, they should be considered in the opposite order. Hermione’s identity as 
a statue is both evident and mysterious in an enchanted reading. As discussed earlier, to be 
revived in a living body she would have to be preserved spiritually in some manner from 
which she can return. Such a return would also result in her body having aged sixteen years. 
The statue would be ambiguously her petrified body or an actual stone statue that is animated. 
Such a relationship between body and spirit must ultimately be mysterious. That I am aware 
of, there is no mythical or alchemical precedent for such a resolution. The veil of death is not 
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transparent. From this mystery a few inferences are possible: First, Shakespeare weights 
human essence not in body but in spirit. If some find this controversial, Shakespeare at least 
has the theological high ground. Second, Shakespeare has pushed the theatrical and spiritual 
envelopes beyond all precedent, and I take it he did so deliberately. He did not want his own 
mysterious experiment criticized as imitation, and, duly considered, he has succeeded. Third, 
faith—at least Christian faith—cannot be reduced to something finally calculated and 
comprehensible. In giving us this greatest theatrical mystery, Shakespeare has succeeded in 
the play itself becoming an exercise of faith. 
 Alchemically, Hermione’s identity is much more transparent. Her name is 
synonymous with mercury, which is the central symbol in alchemy, and ‘Hermes is also the 
name of the divine spirit hidden in the depths of matter’.13 Hermione is also identifiable with 
the philosopher’s stone: ‘It is the figure of light veiled in dark matter, that divine love essence 
which combines divine wisdom and creative power, often identified with Christ as creative 
Logos’.14 In V.iii Hermione is referred to as ‘stone’ five times before her descent at Paulina’s 
final reference in ‘be stone no more’ (99). In the process of alchemical resolution, a white 
stone is attained at the albedo and a red stone at the rubedo. Hermione’s statue is said to be 
stone that is painted. Paulina protests that she may not be touched because the paint is wet, 
but in the descriptions of Hermione she is described as reddening by Leontes’ ‘Would you 
not deem it breath’d? and that those veins did verily bear blood?’ (V.iii.63-64), Polixenes’ 
‘The very life seems warm upon her lip’ (66), and Paulina’s overt ‘The ruddiness upon her lip 
is wet’ (81). The symbolism is evident. 
 In an enchanted reading, the question of Paulina’s expectation in the final resolution 
hinges on Hermione being dead, yet Paulina anticipating she may be resurrected. The 
solution is that Paulina is herself an alchemist, and the conclusion of the play is the 
                                                
13 Abraham, Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, s.v. ‘Mercurius’. 
14 Ibid., s.v. ‘philosopher’s stone’. 
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consummation of her opus alchymicum. Knowing the conditions of the oracle, her secret 
work in her removed house is preparation for the restoration of Hermione when the 
opportunity arrives. In the alchemical projection, ‘the body is made spiritual and the spirit 
made corporeal. ... Metaphysically, the descent of the soul into dense matter is seen as a part 
of the necessary experience which leads to the ascent into full “philosophical” 
consciousness.’15 Paulina performs this work, and Hermione comes back to life. Does she 
expect it to work? This is less clear. In my reading of the final scene, I suggest we see from 
how Paulina speaks that she is distressed. She has anticipated what would be necessary for 
such a resolution and optimally prepared for it. I do not believe she is certain of the outcome. 
Perhaps Paulina’s faith is proven to be the greatest of all, and by her miraculous 
accomplishment she is the most powerful Shakespearean figure except Prospero. 
 The role of the oracle is the hardest to attach to an alchemical reading, but there are 
reasons to entertain this. In III.i when Cleomenes and Dion are discussing the oracle there are 
multiple alchemical signals. Apollo himself is associated with both the hot, dry, active, 
masculine principle of the opus and the gold of the final projection.16 Cleomenes says, ‘The 
climate’s delicate, the air most sweet, / Fertile the isle’ (1-2). Sweet fragrance indicates 
cleansing and the resurgence of life.17 Delphi is not an island, but the foundation from which 
the opus alchymicum grew was identified by some alchemists as an island, and that it is 
fertile is also suggestive.18 Dion predicts the results of the prophecy will be rare (13, 20) and 
the issue gracious (22). From their testimony we should expect an ideal resolution from the 
oracle’s proclamation, and it does turn out to be precisely accurate. 
 The identity of the chapel (or removed house, or gallery) returns to the subject of the 
grave as tomb and womb introduced in the last chapter. The Winter’s Tale adds complexity to 
                                                
15 Ibid., s.v. ‘distillation and sublimation’. 
16 Ibid., s.v. ‘Apollo’. 
17 Ibid., s.v. ‘fragrance’. 
18 Ibid., s.v. ‘philosophical tree’. 
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this established image. Once noticed, the grave is a prominent referent in the play. At I.ii.173, 
Leontes, having grown suspicious of Hermione in her efforts to persuade Polixenes to stay, 
says he will walk with Mamillius and ‘leave you to your graver steps’. A few lines later he 
says to Mamillius, ‘Thy mother plays, and I / Play too, but so disgrac’d a part, whose issue / 
Will hiss me to my grave’ (187-89). At II.i.155-57, Antigonus says that if Hermione is 
unfaithful, ‘We need no grave to bury honesty, / There’s not a grain of it the face to sweeten / 
Of the whole dungy earth.’ At III.i.4-6, upon return from the oracle Dion says he will report 
the ‘celestial habits / …and the reverence / Of the grave wearers.’ At III.ii.53-54, Hermione 
ends her not-guilty plea rebuking her nearest of kin who ‘Cry fie upon my grave’. 
 Most importantly, the conclusion of Act III is Leontes’ speech of repentance: 
       Thou didst speak well 
When most the truth; which I receive much better 
Than to be pitied of thee. Prithee bring me 
To the dead bodies of my queen and son. 
One grave shall be for both; upon them shall 
the causes of their death appear (unto 
Our shame perpetual). Once a day I’ll visit 
The chapel where they lie, and tears shed there 
Shall be my recreation. So long as nature 
Will bear up with this exercise, so long 
I daily vow to use it. Come, and lead me 
To these sorrows.   (232-43) 
 
We are led to believe Leontes will see Hermione and Mamillius dead, will have them interred 
in the same grave, and will visit the chapel daily. Narratively it is difficult to conceive how 
Paulina could so quickly contrive a plot to falsify Hermione’s death, gain Hermione’s 
acquiescence to the conspiracy, and hide it from Leontes for so long. 
 As previously considered, the grave is synonymous with the alchemical vessel. We 
should not infer on Leontes’ part any alchemical intention, however his ‘tears shed there / 
Shall be my recreation’ has unwitting significance. He speaks of ‘recreation’ as spiritual 
consolation, but re-creation is also implied. Alchemically, tears are ‘the mercurial waters 
which cleanse the blackened, dead matter of the Stone lying at the bottom of the alembic. ... 
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The tears are an expression of sorrow at the death of the Hermetic Bird...or the 
hermaphroditic body of the lovers (sulphur and argent vive), after they are united in the 
chemical wedding.’19 The chemical wedding is also a central image of the opus alchymicum 
as the reconciliation of opposites and the cycle of dissolution and coagulation of the matter of 
the philosopher’s stone in the alembic. The chemical wedding may also be represented as the 
conjunction of mother and son. The creation of the philosopher’s stone always involves some 
deathly sacrifice.20 When the play returns to Sicilia in Act V, we should recall the mental 
image of the king weeping at the grave which bears his dead queen and child. We are later 
given the impression Paulina has the keeping of the same crypt, and we know that she is 
doing something mysterious. 
  Hermione’s statue ends up in Paulina’s keeping but the details are not explained. At 
the beginning of V.iii, Leontes does not see the statue in the gallery because it has been set 
apart. Something is new or he is not familiar with this space. The statue’s alcove is not 
described, and, as I discuss in my reading of V.iii below, clear stage directions are not part of 
any early edition of the script. Staging this scene is one of the great challenges for any 
theatrical producer. This is because the theatricality of the scene is highly self-reflective. 
Further, the last scene makes itself into an alchemical experiment, expanding the alembic to 
incorporate the whole theatre. Whereas alchemists thought of the alembic as a microcosmic 
theatre in which they recreated the greater natural order, Shakespeare inverts this, turning the 
dramatic theatre into an alchemical chamber of transformation. The theatre becomes the 
reflective vessel which purifies, bringing the incorporated elements to their ideal resolution. 
The conclusion is an experiment and a mystery. We judge it successful even if we do not 
fully understand. This is because we too have been subjected to the artistry of the master. 
READINGS 
                                                
19 Ibid., s.v. ‘tears’. 
20 Ibid., s.v. ‘chemical wedding’. 
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 In light of the preceding introductory considerations, the remainder of my attention to 
The Winter’s Tale takes the place in the context of the play as it unfolds. No scene can be 
examined as thoroughly as it merits. Beyond what has already been suggested about the first 
acts, there are a few more points integral to the mythical and alchemical reading of the play’s 
enchanted reading. 
 Act I is Hermione’s intercession on Leontes’ behalf to Polixenes that he remain in 
Sicilia. Her effusive persuasion triggers Leontes’ mysterious tremor cordis, resulting in his 
suspicion he has been cuckolded by Polixenes, and Hermione’s child is his bastard. Leontes’ 
‘infection of my brains / And hard’ning of my brows’ (I.ii.145-46) has been much diagnosed 
as some form of illness or psychosis. All such diagnoses involve a degree of speculation. 
Leontes’ motive is uncertain and destructive. Alchemically there may be a clue in his name, 
as the lion can represent the raw ore and unclean matter that must be purified in the opus 
alchymicum.21 By his title as king he is associated with sulphur—the corrosive hot, dry, 
active, male principle of the opus, and Leontes is all of these to an excessive degree.22 The act 
ends with Camillo being tasked to poison Polixenes, but instead these two escape to 
Bohemia. 
 In Act II Hermione is accused by Leontes and imprisoned against her own protest and 
the objections of the court. Leontes dispatches to Apollo’s temple at Delphos to give rest to 
the minds of others. Under duress, Hermione delivers a healthy daughter early. Paulina takes 
the child to confront Leontes. In the third scene we learn Mamillius has taken ill, which 
Leontes blames on the dishonor to his mother. Leontes’ passionate jealousy is further 
inflamed by Paulina’s insubordination despite her protest of being his loyal servant, 
physician,23 and obedient counselor (54-55), and he accuses her of witchcraft and heresy. 
                                                
21 Ibid., s.v. ‘green lion’. 
22 Ibid., s.v. ‘king’. 
23 The conflation of the Pauline and the Hermetic is reminiscent of Acts 14:12, where Paul is mistaken for 
Hermes at Lystra: ‘And they called Barnabas, Jupiter, and Paul, Mercurius, because he was the chief speaker.’ 
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Paulina departs leaving with the king her unbridled condemnation and the child. Leontes 
relents from killing the child (which he only ever refers to as ‘bastard’) on Antigonus’ oath to 
execute justice by taking her to a remote and desert land beyond the kingdom and exposing 
her so that her fate is left to chance. The return of the messengers from the oracle is 
announced, and Leontes declares that Hermione shall have a public trial also in the name of 
justice. 
ACT III 
 Act III, Scene ii follows Cleomenes’ and Dion’s paean to the oracle in the short first 
scene, and opens with Leontes reiterating that he will not be tyrannous in rendering a just 
verdict by due process. Hermione enters accompanied by Paulina. Curiously, they never 
exchange words on stage until the last scene of the play. III.ii is the first scene where 
Hermione and Paulina are seen together on stage. Paulina is not introduced until II.ii when 
she comes to the jail. Paulina takes the baby from Emilia with the Jailer’s consent, never 
interacting with Hermione who is sequestered off stage. For two figures alike in character, 
and supposed by the disenchanted interpretation to be co-conspirators, they are notably 
separate in action and speech. 
 Hermione is accused of treason, adultery, and conspiring to kill the king. She protests 
her fidelity and honor, rejects Leontes’ injustice, and defers to the oracle and Apollo as her 
judge. The oracle reads, ‘Hermione is chaste, Polixenes blameless, Camillo a true subject, 
Leontes a jealous tyrant, his innocent babe truly begotten, and the King shall live without an 
heir, if that which is lost be not found’ (132-36). Leontes declares the oracle a falsehood and 
                                                                                                                                                  
The Douay Rheims, the Geneva Bible, and the Authorized Version all follow the Vulgate alteration of the 
Greek Ἑρµῆν (Hermes): ‘et vocabant Barnabam Iovem, Paulum vero Mercurium, quoniam ipse erat dux 
verbi.’ The names are so interchangeable it is not worth pondering again Shakespeare’s less Greek. Paul is 
confused with Hermes because he does all the talking, but there is more to St Luke’s account. St Paul was 
first venerated because he healed a man crippled from birth whom he perceived had faith to be healed (14:9). 
Paul was identified as an adept in the Mercurial art of medicine before that of speech. The roles of physician 
and rhetor are combined ideally in the identity of the alchemist. 
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begins to proceed when he is interrupted by word that Mamillius has died. Immediately it is 
taken as a sign: 
 Leontes Apollo’s angry, and the heavens themselves 
Do strike at my injustice. [Hermione swoons.] How now 
there? 
 Paulina The news is mortal to the Queen. Look down 
And see what death is doing. (146-49) 
 
The stage direction ‘Hermione swoons’ is an interpolation. The First Folio contains no 
direction, and any suggestion here is subsequent to its introduction by Nicholas Rowe for his 
1708 edition of the Complete Works.24 It would be unfair to predicate centuries of 
misunderstanding Hermione’s death entirely on Rowe’s interpolation. The play has always 
been liable to tensed theatrical and mythical interpretations. But III.ii becomes more 
ambiguous when we are not told what to think is happening. We only know that something 
has happened to Hermione from the responses. Paulina says the news is mortal. ‘And see 
what death is doing’, instead of referring to the death of Mamillius as the cause of Hermione 
swooning, could also immediately refer to death taking her. 
 Leontes bids that Hermione be removed and (presumably to Paulina), ‘Beseech you 
tenderly apply to her / Some remedies for life’ (152-53). Rowe interpolates Paulina’s exit 
with other Ladies bearing Hermione; this makes the most sense if Paulina is his physician. 
Leontes begs Apollo’s pardon and concedes every part of the oracle. Paulina returns within 
twenty lines of her departure, apparently not having heard Leontes’ repentance. Her anger at 
Leontes is again unbridled, and she rages at him before saying that the Queen is dead, then 
offering to swear it. Oaths matter in this play (Leontes binds Antigonus’ mission and the 
veracity of the oracle with oaths). It is worth noting that Paulina does not actually swear, only 
says that she will. The disenchanted interpretation must assume that Paulina is prepared to 
swear falsehood, which is difficult to believe. She is precluded from swearing by Leontes’ 
                                                
24 Riverside Shakespeare, xix, 1653; Pitcher, 230 n.144, 456. 
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submission to her, his vow of penitence, and his being led to see the bodies. Paulina, having 
retained her credibility as the only one besides Hermione who refused to give Leontes tender 
counsel, exits the scene leading the king in every sense of the word. 
— 
 T. G. Bishop identified in The Comedy of Errors how the linear narrative of time 
cannot be opposed in the classical and lawful chain of order towards death. This linear order 
is dissolved into the natural order of ocean and the Pauline, which means it is not dissolved 
into chaos but prepared for ultimate resolution into higher order and life. This motif is 
alchemical and one of Shakespeare’s favourites. Any play featuring shipwreck or tempest and 
ensuing disorder should be with consideration of this, including Twelfth Night, Othello, King 
Lear, Pericles, Cymbeline, and most of all The Tempest. The Winter’s Tale is not frequently 
thought of as a play of storm and shipwreck, but it has both in Act III, Scene iii. Antigonus, 
having laid Perdita in Bohemia, barely has time to make his valediction to the child: ‘The day 
frowns more and more; thou’rt like to have / A lullaby too rough. I never saw / The heavens 
so dim by day’ (54-56). His ‘Exit pursued by a bear’ is simultaneously pitiful and hilarious, 
as in that moment the play turns right-side up from tragic nadir to comedic beginning. 
 Wonder is mentioned eight times in The Winter’s Tale, but not until III.iii at the 
midpoint of the play, when the Shepherd finds Perdita with ‘What have we here? Mercy on’s, 
a barne? A very pretty barne! A boy, or a child, I wonder? A pretty one, a very pretty one: 
sure some scape’ (69-72). Perdita is the fulcrum of wonder through which the play turns from 
tragedy to comedy. Even Antigonus’ macabre end and the destruction of the ship and sailors 
is recounted by the Clown in humorous fashion. It remains for the Shepherd to wax 
philosophical as he tells the Clown, ‘Now bless thyself: thou met’st with things dying, I with 
things new-born’ (113-14). Alchemically we are led to expect the change of fortunes, as it 
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turns out that Perdita is laden with gold. In taking Perdita in, the Shepherd instantly prospers, 
and exits planning to do good deeds in response. 
ACT IV 
 Time is integral to both The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest, though in different ways. 
The Tempest observes unity of time between the play’s narrative and performance. In The 
Winter’s Tale, Time is the Chorus, who in Act IV, Scene i turns his glass and reverses the 
progression of things back towards re-enchantment. Shakespeare’s Time is recognizably 
iconic with his wings and his hourglass as the force who ‘makes and unfolds error’ (2), 
overthrows law (8), and plants and overwhelms custom (9). Yet unlike Robert Greene, whose 
romance had the full title Pandosto: The Triumph of Time, but whose treatment of time is 
prosaic, Shakespeare did not leave this convention untouched. John Pitcher indicates that 
with the turning of his glass, Time prompts the audience that they will see the social order 
turned upside down.25 This too is inadequate. 
 ‘Time the devourer of things’ (‘tempus edax rerum’) was a popular aphorism coined 
by Ovid. The context is illuminating: 
       And Helen when she saw her aged wrincles in 
A glasse, wept also: musing in herself what men had seene,  
That by two noble princes sonnes she twice had ravisht beene. 
Thou tyme, the eater up of things, and age of spyghtfull teene, 
Destroy all things. And when that long continuance hath them bit, 
You leisurely by lingring death consume them every whit. 
And theis that wee call Elements doo never stand at stay. 
The enterchaunging course of them I will before yee lay. 
Give heede therto. This endlesse world conteynes therin I say 
Fowre substances of which all things are gendred. 
… 
     yit every thing is made 
Of themsame fowre, and into them at length ageine doo fade. 
… 
        No kind of thing keepes ay his shape and hew. 
For nature loving ever chaunge repayres one shape anew 
Uppon another. Neyther dooth there perrish aught (trust mee) 
In all the world, but altring takes new shape. For that which wee 
                                                
25 Pitcher, 77. 
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Doo terme by name of being borne, is for to gin to bee 
Another thing than that it was: and likewise for to dye, 
To cease to bee the thing it was. And though that varyably 
Things passe perchaunce from place to place: yit all from whence they came 
Returning, do unperrisshed continew still the same. 
But as for in one shape, bee sure that nothing long can last. 
Even so the ages of the world from gold to Iron past.26 
 
Hermione is not Helen (though in antiquity she is daughter to Helen by Menelaus), the glass 
here is a mirror not an hourglass, and Shakespeare’s Time is not the devourer. But the 
wrinkled queen, the glass, and the intervention of time have bearing in The Winter’s Tale. 
This is elucidated by the Metamorphoses, but also by Sonnet 16. Clustered near Sonnet 16 
are others that have resonance with The Winter’s Tale. Sonnet 19 line 1 is ‘Devouring Time, 
blunt thou the lion’s paws’—as true a commentary as exists on Leontes’ sixteen years of 
penance. Lines 9-10 of the same sonnet bid Time, ‘O, carve not with thy hours my love’s fair 
brow, / Nor draw no lines there with thine antique pen’. Sonnet 22 begins: 
My glass shall not persuade me I am old, 
So long as youth and thou are of one date, 
But when in thee time’s furrows I behold 
Then look I death my days should expiate. 
 
The glass of Sonnet 22 is most apparently a mirror, with a secondary suggestion of an 
hourglass. Shakespeare has considered this association more than once. Wrinkles also appear 
multiple times to suggest the inevitable signs of age. 
 For an enchanted reading of The Winter’s Tale, and but that it predates the play, 
Sonnet 16 could serve almost without comment as the transition between Acts I-III and IV-V: 
But wherefore do not you a mightier way 
Make war upon this bloody tyrant Time? 
And fortify yourself in your decay 
With means more blessed than my barren rhyme? 
Now stand you on the top of happy hours, 
And many maiden gardens, yet unset, 
With virtuous wish would bear your living flowers, 
Much liker than your painted counterfeit: 
So should the lines of life that life repair 
                                                
26 Ovid, trans. Golding, XV.255-64, 268-69, 276-86, emphasis added. 
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Which this time’s pencil, or my pupil pen, 
Neither in inward worth nor outward fair 
Can make you live yourself in eyes of men. 
   To give away yourself keeps yourself still, 
   And you must live drawn by your own sweet skill. 
 
The tyranny and decay of I-III must be opposed by means more blessed than barren rhyme. 
Lines 5-7 are indicative of Perdita in IV.iv. Lines 8-12 suggest the painted counterfeit statue. 
The ‘lines of life’, especially in proximity to Sonnets 19 and 22, suggest lines of poetry and 
wrinkle lines—both of which must be overcome to live in the eyes of men. The sweet skill 
required for living is mysterious in the end.  
 In the Metamorphoses, the meditation on Helen is part of a discourse given by Numa 
Pompilius, an exile of tyranny who was enlightened by Nature and his mind’s eye. In the 
context of metamorphosis, Helen aging as time devours her is part of the transitory nature of 
all things. Everything transitions into and out of the four primal substances. Nothing keeps its 
shape permanently because nature loves change, but nothing perishes either, being reborn 
even as the ages of the world transition from gold to iron. Numa’s Aristotelian physics of 
transformation and decay is not positively alchemical, but the same elements and processes 
are where alchemy focused its studies for the reversal of the material process. 
 When Shakespeare’s Time turns his glass there are a plurality of significations. Time 
is not merely suggesting what follows will be jumbled upside down. The flow of time will 
not be irrevocably forward from gold to iron, but turned right-side up and reversed towards 
re-enchantment. Having been dissolved into its baser elements, the matter of the projection 
begins to resolve through art into its finer form. The final projection is not just one of matter 
which may decay, but also of spirit which is eternal. Spiritual restoration instills material 
restoration. Chronologically the glass is a sand timer. Alchemically the glass is an alembic. 
Poetically the glass is a mirror. This returns to the mirror as the glass surface through which 
to apprehend greater images beyond, in which to comprehend what is reflected, and at which 
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itself we may wonder. Time the Chorus self-consciously draws this threefold reflection into a 
theatricizing of poetic faith: 
      I witness to 
The times that brought them in; so shall I do 
To th’ freshest things now reigning, and make stale 
The glistering of this present, as my tale 
Now seems to it. Your patience this allowing, 
I turn my glass, and give my scene such growing 
As you had slept between. Leontes leaving— 
Th’ effects of his fond jealousies so grieving 
That he shuts up himself—imagine me, 
Gentle spectators, that I now may be 
In fair Bohemia, and remember well, 
I mentioned a son o’ th’ King’s, which Florizel 
I now name to you; and with speed so pace 
To speak of Perdita, now grown in grace 
Equal with wond’ring.  (11-25) 
 
— 
 The second scene in Act IV is the brief establishing scene of Polixenes and Camillo 
conspiring to catch Florizel with Perdita. The third scene is the introduction of Autolycus. 
This rogue could easily be overlooked as an integral alchemical figure. In name, Autolycus 
has been identified as ‘Lone Wolf’,27 which is fitting enough, but here Shakespeare’s less 
Greek comes into play: αυτος λευκος (autos leukos) would be ‘whiteness itself’. ‘Rouge’ is 
only two inverted letters different than ‘rogue’. In the second couplet of Autolycus’ 
introductory song, we have an affirmation of this alchemical reddening of the white, as well 
as a pun on the title of the play: ‘Why, then comes in the sweet o’ the year, / For the red 
blood reigns in the winter’s pale’ (3-4). Autolycus self-identifies as ‘litter’d under Mercury’ 
(25). This is genuine to Metamorphoses, but there is something more. Like his father he is ‘of 
crafty nature, well-versed in cunning wiles. For he could make white of black and black of 
white, a worthy heir of his father’s art.’28 Autolycus in The Winter’s Tale is the quack 
                                                
27 Pitcher, 142 n.24. 
28 Ovid, Metamorphoses IX-XV, trans. Frank Justus Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 
XI.313-15. In addition to inheriting a part of his father’s identity that would come to be associated with 
alchemy, Autolycus was the twin birth of Philammon, whose father was Apollo. Mercury and Apollo had 
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alchemist, looking to turn tunes, tricks, and trifles into coin. Like Face in Jonson’s The 
Alchemist, Autolycus is a trickster and a thief who is integral to the play’s narrative 
resolution, and escapes in the end without punishment or profit. Unlike Jonson, whose 
presented alchemy is all confidence larceny, Shakespeare makes his quack recognizable as an 
alchemical red herring. This signals the presence of an ideal alchemist (Paulina), and an 
idealism beyond the mere reconciliation of narrative. 
— 
 Too little can be said about Act IV, Scene iv. In the Shakespearean canon, only the 
final scene of Love’s Labour’s Lost is longer. If the lines are uncut, and the songs and dances 
are given their due, this scene alone can take an hour to perform. Certainly it incorporates 
topsy-turvy elements of pastoral comedy and carnival that make such scenes so amusing and 
popular. However, between the rustic pageantry, the badly-disguised antics of the nobility, 
and the prolonged hilarity of innumerable plot twists, there is a continuity of re-enchantment 
through art and nature. 
 Perdita, the princess who thinks she is a shepherdess, is adorned as a goddess for the 
festival of sheep-shearing. Through her pretending to be what she thinks she is not, her true 
nature becomes evident. When Polixenes and Camillo arrive, pretending to be what they are 
not, Perdita gives them flowers and the following exchange occurs wherein the relationship 
between art and nature is made explicit: 
 Perdita    Sir, the year growing ancient, 
Not yet on summer’s death, nor on the birth 
Of trembling winter, the fairest flow’rs o’ th’ season 
Are our carnations and streak’d gillyvors 
(Which some call Nature’s bastards). Of that kind 
Our rustic garden’s barren, and I care not 
To get slips of them. 
 Polixenes    Wherefore, gentle maiden, 
Do you neglect them? 
                                                                                                                                                  
assaulted Chione on the same day, and the sons were born twin to different fathers.28 Apollo and Mercury are 
the deities that preside over The Winter’s Tale. 
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 Perdita    For I have heard it said, 
There is an art which in their piedness shares 
With great creating Nature. 
 Polixenes     Say there be; 
Yet Nature is made better by no mean 
But Nature makes that mean; so over that art 
Which you say adds to Nature, is an art 
That Nature makes. You see, sweet maid, we marry 
A gentler scion to the wildest stock, 
And make conceive a bark of baser kind 
By bud of nobler race. This is an art 
Which does mend Nature—change it rather; but 
The art itself is Nature.  (79-97) 
 
Thought and image interweave deeply here. Perdita has no gillyvors (white carnations 
streaked with red), which she seems to resist calling ‘Nature’s bastards’. They are not 
illegitimate but the superior product of an art shared with ‘great creating Nature’, and she is 
reticent to ply this art. Polixenes picks up on the insinuation of conceiving greater out of 
lesser. He speaks of art as husbandry and objects to debasing gentler stock with wilder. 
Subsequently, it is evident Polixenes judges on appearances and changes thereof (which he 
only thinks he understands). Perdita intuits—in accord with her character—that appearances 
are accidental and transformation is a matter of essence. 
 Perdita invokes Proserpina at line 116. According to Ovid, Proserpina was gathering 
violets and white lilies.29 Shakespeare lets us hear of these flowers in lines 120 and 126, but 
Perdita adds: 
No, like a bank, for love to lie and play on; 
Not like a corse; or if—not to be buried, 
But quick and in mine arms. Come take your flow’rs. 
Methinks I play as I have seen them do 
In Whitsun pastorals. Sure this robe of mine… (130-134) 
 
As Bishop has suggested, Perdita as the figure of Proserpina has learned the lesson of that 
tale and moved away from death in love to love in life. In her self-conscious performative 
adornment, she also alludes consciously to Pentecost, and by extension to the giving of the 
                                                
29 Ovid, trans. Miller, V.392. 
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Holy Spirit. François Laroque recognizes the scene’s rites of rural English festivals, games, 
dances, and plays that mark the commencement of spring, and he locates the significance of 
these in the context of the Pentecost rebirth rites of passage.30 As an alternate solemnity to 
Easter for baptism, Whitsunday was a time not only of wearing white for baptism, but for 
wearing new clothing.31 Perdita’s ‘unusual weeds’ do not merely mark her function as queen 
of the feast. She is adorned as one making her debut, but also as one reborn. About this scene 
Laroque concludes: 
 The pastoral festival thus serves here as a long-drawn-out transition 
between the world of tragedy and the final reconciliation. Its effect is rather 
like that of the light of dawn dissipating the darkness and, as the sun climbs to 
its zenith, the play is split in two. Yet the shadows are not completely chased 
away, for beneath all the talk of hospitality there runs a covert thread of 
violence and death. Magical though it seems, the festivity does not provide a 
complete cure for evil. Nature, however strongly reaffirmed, cannot do 
without the helping hand of art (Hermione’s patience and Paulina’s cunning) if 
the hope that flowered timidly during the festival is to take firm root in this 
wasteland, ravaged by jealousy and tyranny.32 
 Polixenes is the reminder in this scene of jealousy and tyranny. He, like Leontes, 
presumes to see what he wants to see, and fails to recognize the truth about those who are 
before him. His threats to delegitimize Florizel and execute Perdita—whom he derides as 
‘witchcraft’ (423) and ‘enchantment’ (434)—are only less cruel than Leontes’ wrath in 
consequence, not intention. 
 Once again it is Camillo who saves the victims from the jealous king. Their plot 
hatched, they make Autolycus their ‘instrument’ (624). As thief, messenger, and master of 
disguise, Autolycus serves them doubly so, providing a cover for their escape, but also 
alerting the Shepherd to the details of how he may vindicate Perdita with the emblems of her 
noble birth. The ideal resolution of the final act is facilitated by the rogue to the ultimate 
benefit of nearly everyone except himself. 
                                                
30 François Laroque, Shakespeare’s Festive World: Elizabethan Seasonal Entertainment and the Professional 
Stage, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 218-19. 
31 Ibid., 137. 
32 Ibid., 221. 
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ACT V 
 The first and second scenes of The Winter’s Tale’s fifth act are often passed over in 
the rush to interpret the irresistible climactic scene. These scenes importantly add to the 
building of narrative and thematic suspense. They also reload the affective cues of wonder 
and enchantment introduced in the Bohemian pastoral but now transferred to Sicilia, and it is 
a mistake to overlook them. The first scene is the longest in Act V; other establishing scenes 
are much shorter, and in addition to resetting the Sicilian context it is also a scene of delayed 
suspense. Some of the most pointed considerations of the final scene are diminished by 
neglect of what leads up to it. 
 The opening dialogue begins with Cleomenes assuring Leontes he has ‘done enough, 
and have performed / A saint-like sorrow’ (1-2). Leontes has ‘paid down / More penitence 
than done trespass’ (3-4). There is also an echo of the Pater Noster with ‘heavens’ (5), ‘evil’ 
(5), and ‘forgive’ (6) in addition to ‘trespass’. In his effort to exonerate Leontes, Cleomenes 
has deferred to the language of a Catholic piety perhaps rote or trivializing. Leontes has paid 
more than he owes and should do as the heavens have done, forget his evil, and forgive 
himself. That Cleomenes should be the one to say this, and Dion to affirm it in line 25, 
suggests continuity since they were the bearers of the oracle. Leontes resists. Rather than 
forget his evil and forgive himself, he will ‘remember / Her and her virtues’ (6-7) and think 
of wrongs that destroyed issue and heir. 
 The exhortation to forget and forgive begins several references to remembrance. In 
this respectably-long scene of 233 lines, memory or remembering are spoken of by Leontes 
(6, 50), Dion (25), Paulina (67), and Florizel (219). Four out of five are in the first third of the 
scene—all of these except the second in direct reference to Hermione.33 Leontes objects that 
                                                
33 William Engel, ‘Kinetic Emblems and Memory Images in The Winter’s Tale, in Late Shakespeare, 1608-
1613, ed. Andrew J. Power and Rory Loughnane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 78. 
Engel’s focus is an interpretive key to the play’s concern with the exercise of spiritual redemption. He looks 
to the Art of Memory and images ‘which can condense whole histories into compact narrative niches’, but he 
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while Hermione and her virtues are remembered he cannot forget his wrong (6), a chief 
consequence of which is that the kingdom is heirless through the death of Mamillius and the 
casting out of Perdita. 
 Paulina affirms Leontes in his assertion of his fault, stating hyperbolically that he 
could not parallel Hermione if he ‘wedded all the world’ (13), or ‘from the all that are, took 
something good / To make a perfect woman’ (14-15). Whatever restorations have been made 
or anticipated, the air of tragedy still hangs over Sicilia. There is, however, a significant 
implied pun on re-membering. The perfect woman, Paulina says, Leontes might re-member 
to take as a wife. This would not equal the Hermione of past memory, but it anticipates 
Hermione’s reanimation. It also makes Hermione present through the act of remembering. 
 Shakespeare’s cognizant use of classical rhetoric and liturgical theology is worth 
considering on this point. Anamnesis is remembering someone in a way that makes them 
present. As Gregory Dix writes, ‘But in the scriptures both of the Old and New Testament, 
anamnesis and the cognate verb have the sense of “re-calling” or “re-presenting” before God 
an event in the past, so that it becomes here and now operative by its effects.’34 Given the 
continuity between The Winter’s Tale and 1 Corinthians, there is a eucharistic impulse in the 
connotations of ‘this do ye in remembrance of me.’ Through rhetorical anamnesis, Hermione 
is made present by words and memory before the final scene. She is present in spirit. This 
presence begins the escalating presence of Hermione throughout the fifth act. In the second 
scene we will hear of and accept her physical presence in the form of a realistic statue. In the 
last scene spirit and body come together in her real presence. 
 Paulina speaks severely in remembering Hermione but does not name her, only 
making indirect references such as ‘she you kill’d’ (15). Cleomenes would have Paulina 
                                                                                                                                                  
overlooks V.i in this respect. Engel’s identification of Hermione as the key image of the play is sound, but in 
drawing in memory arts, Spanish visual arts, and the Phaedrus, Engle overlooks anamnesis as more 
proximate rhetorical and liturgical constructs. 
34 Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 161. 
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speak ‘a thousand things that would / Have done the time more benefit, and grac’d / Your 
kindness better’ (21-23). Paulina infers Cleomenes would have Leontes remarry. Dion 
suggests she lacks pity for the state, the perpetuity of the sovereign’s name, and his ‘present 
comfort’ (32). Paulina reiterates the lack of a worthy replacement for Hermione (34-35). Her 
tone may rise, but it is evident she is the lone voice of femininity and reason. Further, she is 
fulfilling the role agreed upon—and reaffirmed in this scene—between her and Leontes. She 
emphasizes the ultimate conditions of the oracle as the only means for possible restoration. 
No heir shall be found until the lost child is found (40), though this prospect be ‘as monstrous 
to our human reason / As my Antigonus to break his grave, / And come again to me’ (41-43). 
Antigonus will do no such thing, but the signal is mixed. The monstrosity to human reason of 
the lost child recovered is as great as the monstrosity of one dead returning from the grave to 
the spouse. From the perspective of the characters in V.i, there is no indication the oracle is 
about to be fulfilled. Paulina’s expectation of how the oracle will be fulfilled remains 
unspecified, and her role has no doubt been one of hardship and perseverance. But we as well 
as Leontes are being prepared to accept a monstrosity to reason. 
 Hermione is first mentioned by name when Leontes again makes her present through 
memory: ‘Good Paulina, / Who hast the memory of Hermione, / I know, in honor’ (49-51). In 
the exchange that follows we are given a horrific image that is paradoxically a foreshadowing 
of the beatific restoration yet to come. 
 Leontes       Thou speak’st truth: 
No more such wives, therefore no wife. One worse, 
And better us’d, would make her sainted spirit 
Again possess her corpse, and on this stage 
(Where we offenders now appear) soul-vex’d, 
And begin, ‘Why to me—?’ 
 Paulina              Had she such power, 
She had just cause. 
 Leontes          She had, and would incense me 
To murther her I married. 
 Paulina          I should so: 
Were I the ghost that walk’d, I’ld bid you mark 
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Her eye, and tell me for what dull part in’t 
You chose her; then I’ld shriek, that even your ears 
Should rift to hear me, and the words that follow’d 
Should be ‘Remember mine.’ (55-67) 
 
At line 60 Paulina interjects—something she does to a noticeable degree in keeping the 
rhetorical movement under her control—to remark with subjunctive uncertainty that if 
Hermione had the power to return as a sainted spirit and possess her corpse, she would have 
just cause to haunt Leontes for taking another wife. Being conditioned to Hermione’s 
presence in memory, those present are now conditioned for her presence in spirit. Sarah 
Beckwith suggests Hermione is being stage conjured.35 The ‘sainted spirit’ possessing a 
corpse (which Paulina calls a ‘ghost’) is a haunting image. Leontes comments that she would 
drive him to murder any new wife. There is both a recollection and inversion of Hamlet, with 
the king/father being unfaithful to the memory of the queen who was unjustly killed. King 
Hamlet’s ‘remember me’36 is echoed by Paulina’s ‘Were I the ghost that walked…the words 
that follow’d / Should be “Remember mine”’ (63, 66-67). ‘Remember mine’ is the third time 
Hermione is made present in memory, and this one is reminiscent of life that remains 
unsettled after death, not before. 
 There are further ambiguities. The First Folio places the closing parenthesis in line 59 
after ‘appear’; later editions place it after ‘now’ or remove the parentheses. Either way 58-60 
are grammatically confusing, but ‘soul-vex’d’ refers to ‘sainted spirit’ despite being closer to 
‘we offenders’. ‘This stage’ is probably a dais on the theatrical stage, but it is also theatrically 
self-conscious.37 So, the prospect of a reanimated corpse appearing on stage encloses the 
theatrical audience in the experience of such an enchantment. 
 The conclusion of the first scene’s opening exchange is the oath Paulina gets Leontes 
to swear: that he will only remarry with her assent, that Paulina will choose the queen, and 
                                                
35 Beckwith, 127. 
36 Hamlet, I.v.91. 
37 Pitcher, 315 n.58. 
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the bride will be ‘As like Hermione as is her picture’ (74), and ‘when your first queen’s again 
in breath’ (84). Scott Crider suggests V.i is a scene in which to read hope. The oath which 
Paulina extracts would require the marital virtue of maintaining a vow (something at which 
Leontes previously failed), and it would require such a vow despite the apparent impossibility 
fulfilment. Paulina prepares Leontes for faith by persuading him to hope for the impossible.38 
As far as Leontes knows, he has committed himself indefinitely to an act of hope. 
 It is narratively convenient that as soon as Leontes’ oath is made, the Servant enters 
with word of the arrival of Florizel and his princess. Leontes discerns at once the irregularity 
of this visitation. His inquiry about Florizel’s train (92) is perhaps a hope for the presence of 
Camillo. Two parts of the oracle were that Polixenes is blameless and Camillo a true subject. 
The remaining condition of the oracle would be the return of the lost princess, but except 
perhaps for an inkling Antigonus would have tried to take the child to Bohemia, there is no 
reason to expect her return from there. If Leontes considers Florizel’s arrival auspicious, he is 
reserved in response. Pressed about the princess, the Servant emphasizes she is ‘the most 
peerless piece of earth, I think, / That e’er the sun shone bright on’ (94-95). Paulina, reacting 
perhaps to Leontes, perhaps to the Servant, speaks forcefully: 
                 O Hermione, 
As every present time doth boast itself 
Above a better gone, so must thy grave 
Give way to what’s seen now! (95-98) 
 
Paulina appears to be more jealous of their attention than anxious for the fulfillment of the 
oracle. The reference to the grave giving way to the princess sounds more like jealousy for 
Hermione’s memory than anxiety about the fulfillment of the oracle. After this Paulina 
chastises the servant for forgetting he previously lavished such praise on Hermione. This is 
Paulina’s second reference in this scene to a grave giving way to life, but her tone errs 
                                                
38 Crider, 157. 
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towards pathos. On the other hand, now, in addition to being present in memory, present in 
name, and present in spirit, Hermione is spoken to as present.  
 In V.iii Hermione is identifiable with a statue of cult worship, but she is the second 
identified in this respect, not the first. The Servant praises the princess a third and fourth 
time: 
 Servant The other, when she has obtain’d your eye, 
Will have your tongue too. This is a creature, 
Would she begin a sect, might quench the zeal 
Of all professors else, make proselytes 
Of who we but bid follow. 
 Paulina     How? not women? 
 Servant Women will love her, that she is a woman 
More worth than any man; men, that she is  
The rarest of all women.  (105-12) 
 
This is the cult of the princess, the Servant performing his own minor enchantment on the 
court so that their anticipation of Perdita’s arrival may rise closer to that of the play’s 
audience. When Perdita arrives she proves to be almost entirely an object of admiration and 
discussion. Her one speech is barely three lines. 
 Leontes sends all but Paulina to escort the new arrivals, and the two of them have a 
private exchange. Between the end of Act III and the first two scenes of Act V we are only 
given vignettes of the relationship between Leontes and Paulina, but circumstantially their 
relationship is longer than any of the marriages depicted or arranged. Paulina’s shepherding 
of Leontes’ penitence has been remarkably intimate but also pious. Leontes remarks on the 
strangeness of the unannounced arrival. Paulina reminds him that Mamillius ‘Jewel of 
children’ (116) would have paired with Florizel whose age is within a month of the dead 
Sicilian prince. Leontes’ response is that speaking of Mamillius repeats the experience of his 
death. Commentators have often remarked that however wondrous the resolution of The 
Winter’s Tale may be, it is incomplete because Mamillius is not restored. Yet this tragic relief 
is preempted in V.i rather than brought to bear in the wonder of the second scene or the 
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enchantment of the final scene. Leontes tells Paulina that when Florizel reminds him of 
Mamillius, her chastisements will ‘Unfurnish me of reason’ (123). Leontes may not realize it, 
but this is the completion of Paulina’s ethical rhetoric. Reason, the absence of which allowed 
him to accept that which did not seem not true, will finally again in its absence allow him to 
accept that which can not seem true. It is the finishing touch of Paulina’s long preparation in 
him. 
 Into this context come Florizel and Perdita. Leontes is struck by Florizel’s 
unmistakable ‘print’ likeness to his father (125). Having told Paulina that Florizel would 
remind him of Mamillius and unfurnish him of reason, he instead acknowledges Polixenes’ 
likeness at that age (127) and is sympathetically reminded more of deeds wildly performed in 
youth (129-30). He confirms the Servant’s praise of Perdita and gives the couple mutual 
praise: 
And you fair princess—goddess! O! alas, 
I lost a couple, that ‘twixt heaven and earth 
Might thus have stood, begetting wonder, as 
You, gracious couple, do…’ (131-34) 
 
Leontes draws attention to the present couple ‘begetting wonder’. They do so from, according 
to Leontes, the interstice of heaven and earth. If Leontes has a premonition this is the 
fulfillment of the oracle, he projects the conjunction of wonder and grace onto the new but 
familiar image before him. In a comedy we might see this played out as the happy ending. 
This would be Leontes’ best imagining of the fulfilment of the oracle. 
 This idyllic moment is broken first by Florizel’s lie about their circumstances. The 
prince is given away by the youthful lie that Perdita is Libyan. The joke is on Florizel, but 
Leontes indulges the conceit and marks their presence as fortunate: ‘The blessed gods / Purge 
all infection from our air whilest you / Do climate here!’ 168-70. A second interruption 
destabilizes this invoked serenity when Polixenes’ arrival is announced. Florizel and Perdita 
are exposed as unmarried and she as a shepherdess. Florizel asks Leontes to be his advocate, 
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and the peace is almost broken again when Leontes briefly fancies asking for Perdita as his 
own wife. His attraction is a function of her resemblance to Hermione—‘I thought of her, / 
Even in these looks I made’ (227-28)—and the fact that he is reformed but not perfect. 
Perdita is the noble and pure copy of her mother, and the closest substitute Leontes might 
expect to the fulfilment of the oracle. Some critics infer from Pandosto an incestuous desire 
on Leontes’ part, but any such attraction is fleeting and his affection overall paternal. Leontes 
is chastened by Paulina, and the scene ends with him agreeing to advocate for Florizel. 
 This intensely creative scene re-establishes the Sicilian context as one of penitence 
and waiting for restoration. The movement is subtly alchemical and predominantly rhetorical, 
with Hermione being made increasingly present in memory, then in name, then in spirit, then 
as spoken to. Throughout, Leontes and all those who hear are prepared to accept something 
beyond their reason. The plot and character elements of a comic resolution are set in place. 
All the while the suspense continues to build. The disenchanted reading accounts for all of 
these as clever rhetorical artifice by which we are fooled into an illusion of faith at the end. 
However before the conclusion there is the intervening second scene, where rhetorical 
persuasion gives way to the movement of wonder. 
— 
 Scene ii is an indirect recounting of the penultimate reconciliation. It is also the final 
scene for the pastoral characters. Autolycus is the transitional figure, mediating one last time 
between royal and rustic. The events of V.ii are the stuff of traditional comedy’s final scene: 
True identities are revealed, families are reconciled, and the wedding is set. However, 
because of the second-hand account, we experience none of this directly, and all of it in prose 
instead of poetry. Shakespeare’s ability to write such a scene was never in question. This 
scene exists as the final ebb before the crash of V.iii. We are forced to experience this 
resolution indirectly. Just as in V.i the language and imagery of unbelievable things has been 
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queued in memory, in V.ii the happy ending is related in such a way that we are drawn into 
its wonder indirectly. This is the only scene where wonder is named more than once. Besides 
references to amazement and admiration, wonder is mentioned three times, yet we do not see 
what is wondrous. The tale should be believed as it is told rather than believed because it is 
seen. Wonder is not an end but an instrument towards a greater end. These are wonders to 
which we assent but do not experience. When V.iii escalates the possibilities of what is 
portrayed, imagination is already active to apprehend a level elevated above what is 
experienced. 
 Autolycus exhorts the 1st Gentleman to recount the reconciliation. The 1st Gentleman 
assumes from him the role of interlocutor, and we see by the twentieth line that the story has 
begun to eclipse the rogue: 
I make a broken delivery of the business; but the changes I 
perceiv’d in the King and Camillo were very notes of 
admiration. They seem’d almost, with staring on one 
another, to tear the cases of their eyes. There was speech in 
their dumbness, language in their very gesture; they look’d 
as they had heard of a world ransom’d, or one destroy’d. A 
notable passion of wonder appear’d in them; but the wisest 
beholder, that knew no more but seeing, could not say if th’ 
importance were joy or sorrow; but in the extremity of the 
one, it must needs be.   (9-19) 
 
Shakespeare again prolongs the suspense. The 1st Gentleman saw the reconciliation of 
Leontes and Camillo, which was itself an occasion of ‘admiration’ (11). Gesture is described 
as speech (13-14). There was a ‘passion of wonder’ (16) that defied the wisest onlooker to 
say if it was joy or sorrow. Those who saw the reconciliation knew what it was by its 
appearance if not its essence. Seeing is believing. Or so we hear. This continues an escalation 
of apprehension from auditory to visual to something greater. 
 The 2nd Gentleman confirms the oracle is fulfilled and the whole kingdom is 
celebrating. Indeed, ‘Such a deal of wonder is broken out within this hour that ballad-makers 
cannot express it’ (23-25). It may seem ironic that we hear this, but the recounting in V.ii is 
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strictly prose. The 3rd Gentleman, who is Paulina’s steward, enters and answers the 
interlocutions of the 1st Gentleman, escalating the account to the tokens of recognition and 
the comic reconciliation we would expect of a comedy. However, beyond the comic 
resolution, the 3rd Gentleman is also he who recounts how those from Bohemia hear of 
Hermione’s death (85). The account of Hermione’s death that the 3rd Gentleman relates was 
told for Perdita’s sake, but Polixenes and Camillo likewise had no prior knowledge of 
Hermione’s and Perdita’s fates. 
 The 3rd Gentleman says that in response to her mother’s death Perdita ‘did (with an 
‘Alas!’), I would fain say, bleed tears; for I am sure my heart wept blood’ (88-89). This is 
possibly melodramatic recounting, but Perdita’s tears at least hearken to the cult imagery of 
weeping statues, and she has already been identified as the object of cult worship. 
Alchemically, ‘The tears symbolize the mercurial waters of grace which seemingly drown the 
body but which in reality wash away the impurities and make it ready to receive the 
enlivening soul’.39 The 3rd Gentleman’s following remark ‘Who was most marble there 
chang’d color’ (89-90), anticipates V.iii as well as representing the alchemical transmutation 
from white to red. 
 The 3rd Gentleman’s final revelation is the statue of the Princess’ mother, ‘which is in 
the keeping of Paulina—a piece many years in doing and now newly perform’d by that rare 
Italian master, Julio Romano, who, had he himself eternity and could put breath into his 
work, would beguile Nature of her custom, so perfectly he is her ape’ (95-100). Anyone 
familiar with The Winter’s Tale is so aware of the statue it is easy to forget that narratively 
this is the surprising moment of its revelation. Immediately its identity is complicated by 
Julio Romano’s new performance and his ability to perfectly ape Nature. The questions 
surrounding the truth about the statue and this artist’s function have been considered. The 3rd 
                                                
39 Abraham, Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, s.v. ‘tears’. 
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Gentlemen, even as Paulina’s steward, does not know or does not reveal anything of 
significance. The expectation is the revelation of a perfect likeness. The 2nd Gentleman 
reveals Paulina has been visiting her ‘great matter’ (104) multiple times a day ever since the 
death of Hermione. The gentlemen exit so they may add to the rejoicing, witness the birth of 
new grace, and augment their knowledge. 
 Autolycus is briefly left to reflect. As a Mercurial figure he rises and falls between 
royal and rustic company. His identity is necessary to the story but also transitory. He can 
avoid the curse of a damning fault, but lacks the constitution to rise to a permanent higher 
station. Likewise he may deserve punishment, but he will not get it. He adapts to the profits 
and the strokes of his vocation. Autolycus’ ruse works far enough for him to mingle with 
gentlemen for the retelling, but then fall back in with the rustics whose baseness he also 
shares. The Shepherd and the Clown may have gentle heirs (127), but their place is not in the 
court, and if they are present in the final scene it is anonymously. Perdita has been returned to 
her blood family, and they that preserved her fortunes until the fullness of time return to their 
station materially enriched but not spiritually elevated. They promise through false oaths to 
be Autolycus’ good masters. Perhaps, unwittingly, they keep Autolycus from further 
miscreance. Once again that which is greater is beyond our apprehension, and we are left 
with lesser minds to comprehend. The Clown has the last word, including a final reference to 
wonder: ‘If I do not wonder how thou dar’st venture to be drunk, not being a tall fellow, trust 
me not’ (170-72). We are meant to believe that even wonder will become ridiculous in light 
of what is to follow. 
— 
 G. Wilson Knight suggests Hermione’s resurrection is so effective in performance 
because, under intense dramatic pressure, the revelation is gradual so it is experienced 
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imaginatively rather than conceived intellectually before it is complete.40 All the rhetoric, all 
the wonder, all the myth, and all the alchemy of The Winter’s Tale bear down on the 
revelation in this final scene. When Paulina requires the awakening of faith, the interlocking 
complexity of this requirement is greater than sceptics have considered. The characters 
surrounding Leontes are included in the exhortation to awakened faith. The audience of the 
performance is also included. 
 The final mystery is revealed but not explained. It is both impossible to read this 
scene too carefully, and impossible no matter how carefully it is read to resolve it into a 
single conclusive perspective. A tensed ambiguity of meaning—that in Hamlet perfectly 
encapsulates a bifurcated mind that cannot be resolved—here expresses a single resolution 
that cannot be parsed. Ultimately the resolution is revelation in the wake of faith. The image 
that we mythically apprehend is theatrically dissolved before we can comprehend it. Act IV, 
Scene iv of The Winter’s Tale is five and a half times longer than the final scene. Even in Act 
V, at 155 lines the third scene comes third in length, following a first scene of 233 lines and a 
second scene of 174. 
 We must be cautious about reading too much into counting lines and words, but a 
cursory examination is intriguing. V.iii is 155 lines with 1,285 words. The opening stage 
direction of the First Folio is ‘Enter Leontes, Polixenes, Florizell, Perdita, Camillo, Paulina: 
Hermione (like a Statue:) Lords, &c.’ If Perdita’s Bohemian family is present they are among 
the extras. Neither Florizel nor any of the unnamed extras speak. The allocation of spoken 
parts is striking: 
Character Speeches Lines Words 
Leontes 14 76 541 
Paulina 14 76 536 
Polixenes 5 10 59 
                                                
40 Knight, Crown of Life, 127. 
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Camillo 2 7 48 
Perdita 2 7 44 
Hermione 1 8 57 
 
Line counts are inclusive of partial lines. There are only five changes of speaker that break at 
the end of complete lines.41 Only Camillo’s couplet at 112-13 begins and ends a speech 
without interrupted lines, yet even in this the second line is missing two metrical feet. Even 
without a comprehensive analysis of the play and Shakespeare’s work in general, the evident 
symmetries are remarkable. Because of split lines, Leontes and Paulina cover 152 of 155 
lines in the scene, or 98%. They dominate the speaking with 1,077 of 1,285 words (84%). 
They take all but ten of thirty-eight speeches. The parity of Leontes and Paulina might be 
expected. That they so dominate the scene is more surprising. 
 The meter in this scene falls short of the crystalline poetry glimpsed in Cymbeline and 
consummate in The Tempest. Frequently the meter is overtly troubled, especially, and 
perhaps most surprisingly, in the speech of Paulina. Only her incantation in 94-109 
approaches poetic mastery. Is her verbal hesitance a manifestation of her uncertainty about 
the resolution of the play? In a disenchanted interpretation, if she knows that the revelation of 
Hermione is an inevitable reconciliation, why are not her lines masterful? Consistently, 
Leontes has the superior verse. I have marked some overruns of iambic pentameter with a 
vertical bar (‘|’). 
 The unifying alchemical significance of the grave has previously been identified. It is 
the first thing Leontes mentions in this scene: 
O grave and good Paulina, the great comfort 
That I have had of thee?  (1-2) 
 
                                                
41 Paulina at 30, Camillo at 49, Leontes at 67, Paulina at 74, and Camillo at 112. 
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Line 2 is punctuated in the First Folio with a question mark rather than an exclamation point, 
and the interrogative mood for this scene is apropos. Paulina’s response reestablishes 
comedic unity: debts repaid, families reunited, and sovereignty preserved: 
    What, sovereign sir, 
I did not well, I meant well. All my ser|vices 
You have paid home; but that you have vouchsaf’d, 
With your crown’d brother and these your contract|ed 
Heirs of your kingdoms, my poor house to vis|it, 
It is a surplus of your grace, which nev|er 
My life may last to answer. (2-8) 
 
She is humble about her own role and discreet about any present purpose, suggesting the debt 
of grace is hers, not Leontes’. In response Leontes asks to see the statue and comments on the 
‘gallery’ (10) having ‘much content / in many singularities’ (11-12), but the statue is not 
evident. Gallery suggests an exhibition space for works of art where Hermione’s statue would 
be displayed. Gallery may also suggest the platform on the interior wall of a church or theatre 
which provides extra space for an audience. Leontes’ description of what is in the gallery is 
unspecific. Perhaps he refers to works of art. Perhaps it is an unenlightened description of 
Paulina’s alchemical laboratory and its contents. Just as likely, it is a meta-theatrical 
reference, and Leontes is quipping about the audience having much content and many 
singularities, but there being no statue. The last two senses may be combined. We cannot be 
sure the dramatic space resembles a laboratory. As the scene progress it becomes clear the 
theatre functions as the alembic, and it draws all of its contents into the final resolution. 
 Paulina describes Hermione’s ‘dead likeness’ as excelling anything yet seen or made 
by the hand of man (16-17). She tells them to prepare to see life mocked as well as sleep 
mocks death. In other words, the dead statue mocks the living Hermione. The only actual 
direction at this point is Paulina’s ‘But here it is’ (18) indicating the statue’s location, and an 
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actual revelation with ‘Behold, and say ‘tis well’ (20).42 Even without a stage direction there 
is a definite moment of silence, after which Paulina again speaks: ‘I like your silence, it the 
more shows off / Your wonder; but yet speak.’ This is the play’s final reference to wonder. 
Finally, after Hermione has been made spiritually present in V.i, and after we hear of 
wondrous restorations and the existence of the statue in V.ii, we finally have wonder attached 
to seeing a material Hermione. In performance the resolution of the play hinges on this 
moment of revelation. How effectively can the actor sustain the image of a statue? A film 
adaptation would decide the nature of the statue. In the theatre, we have been prepared for 
Hermione’s living presence in spirit but her bodily presence in stone. For an unfamiliar 
audience, which way would minds be tricked, and for how long? The disenchanted 
presumption ‘Well, of course it’s a living person’ is a post hoc ergo propter hoc dismissal of 
the story’s mythos. When Leontes breaks the silence he reinforces that the statue is stone: 
          Her natural posture! 
Chide me, dear stone, that I may say indeed 
Thou art Hermione; or rather, thou art she 
In thy not chiding; for she was as tender 
As infancy and grace. But yet, Paulina, 
Hermione was not so much wrinkled, nothing 
So aged as this seems.  (23-29) 
 
Leontes is so struck that he speaks directly to the statue, but speaks as though it is not 
Hermione, because despite the likeness it lacks speech. Speech will turn out to be the last 
proof Hermione is living. Only gradually does Leontes notice the irregularity of wrinkles. 
Paulina attributes the wrinkles to ‘our carver’s excellence’ (30) that makes the statue ‘As she 
liv’d now’ (32). Leontes is overwhelmed in response: 
   As now she might have done, 
So much to my good comfort as it is 
Now piercing to my soul. O, thus she stood, 
Even with such life of majesty (warm life, 
                                                
42 Riverside Shakespeare, 1654: Rowe placed the direction ‘[Paulina draws a curtain, and discovers] Hermione 
[standing] like a statue.’ It is an interpolation of the First Folio’s opening direction: ‘Enter…Hermione (like a 
Statue:)’. The revelation by drawing a curtain is not indicated by the text until line 83 when Paulina alludes to 
drawing one closed. 
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As now it coldly stands), when first I woo’d her! 
I am asham’d; does not the stone rebuke me 
For being more stone than it? O royal piece, 
There’s magic in thy majesty, which has 
My evils conjur’d to remembrance, and 
From thy admiring daughter took the spirits, 
Standing like stone with thee. (32-42) 
 
Sarah Beckwith interprets these lines to mean Leontes weeps when presented with the 
statue.43 The text does not directly support this, but in performance it would play well. We 
see Leontes’ soul-piercing contrition and confession when confronted with the person of 
Hermione. Leontes feels himself more stone than the stone itself. Stage conjuring is again 
mentioned, but this time Leontes speaks of the magic in the majesty of the statue conjuring 
his evils to remembrance. His heart of stone has, through the eclipse of reason, been purged. 
Perdita too has apparently had her spirits taken, for she too stands statue-like with her mother. 
 Alchemically, this is the moment when the king, the queen, and the child are joined in 
death to unify the matter of the stone. This is the image of the alchemical wedding.44 Leontes 
embodies alchemical sulphur—the active, hot, dry, male principle of the opus.45 Hermione 
embodies alchemical mercury.46 Hermione is overtly Mercurial in name, but more pointedly 
she is the white queen, the ‘stone attained at the albedo; a symbol of the receptive, cold, 
moist, female principle of the opus.’47 Perdita is the philosophical child: the philosopher’s 
stone when first born from the chemical wedding. The stone can be represented as an orphan 
and as a female child embodying wisdom.48 The grave is the alembic of the alchemical 
transformation—the vessel that is tomb and womb to recreate life from death.49 Including the 
mention of ‘grave’ in the first line, the unmistakable identity of the philosopher’s stone, and 
Leontes’ drawing in of everyone in the gallery, the theatre itself becomes the alembic and 
                                                
43 Beckwith, 140. 
44 Abraham, Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, s.v. ‘chemical wedding’. 
45 Ibid., s.v. ‘sulphur’. 
46 Ibid., s.v. ‘Mercurius’. 
47 Ibid., s.v. ‘queen (white)’. 
48 Ibid., s.v. ‘philosophical child’. 
49 Ibid., s.v. ‘grave’. 
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draws everyone within into the final resolution. From this static image of the chemical 
wedding the movement is from death towards life. 
 The philosophical child first breaks the stillness of this moment and begins the 
continuity towards new life. Perdita says: 
           And give me leave, 
And do not say ‘tis superstition, that 
I kneel, and then implore her blessing. Lady, 
Dear queen, that ended when I but began, 
Give me that hand of yours to kiss. (42-46) 
 
Having been identified in V.i with her own cult of devotion, here Perdita is the literal and 
symbolic pilgrim, and makes an act of obeisance. She implores a blessing from Hermione as 
‘Lady, / Dear queen’ and moves to kiss the blessed mother’s hand. 
 Now Paulina’s objections begin in earnest and she draws out the suspense of the 
reanimation even longer. Here the question of her expectation about the final resolution may 
be asked in earnest. Is this hesitation? Does her own faith in the outcome waver? Is the delay 
necessary for the other characters? She bids them wait: ‘O, patience! / The statue is but newly 
fix’d; the color’s / Not dry’ (46-48). This is the first time Paulina refers to Hermione as a 
statue. Until this point she has let others lead with their impression of the statue’s identity. 
The meter here is almost entirely wrecked. However, the forcefulness of Paulina’s diversion 
is effective. Camillo and Polixenes both tell Leontes to give up his sorrow for joy. These two, 
which next to Hermione have the most against Leontes, are incorporated into this 
reconciliation by their acts of forgiving. Paulina makes as if to conceal the ‘poor image’ (56) 
for Leontes’ sake, saying that the ‘stone’ (58) is hers. When Leontes objects, Paulina tells 
him not to gaze on the statue, or fancy will make him think it moves. 
 Paulina’s warning to disregard movement is itself disregarded, and the final 
alchemical transformation of the rubedo begins. Hermione’s statue reddens as Leontes 
observes to Polixenes, ‘Would you not deem it breath’d and that those veins / Did verily bear 
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blood?’ (64-65). Polixenes sees warm life upon the lip (66). Leontes sees motion in the eye 
(67). Paulina may have suggested motion, but the specific observations are made by the 
kings. Notably, they follow the progression when Pygmalion’s statue comes to life: 
When he returned he sought the image of his maid, and bending over 
the couch he kissed her. She seemed warm to his touch. Again he kissed her, 
and with his hands also he touched her breast. The ivory grew soft to his touch 
and, its hardness vanishing, gave and yielded beneath his fingers… The lover 
stands amazed, rejoices still in doubt, fears he is mistaken, and tries his hopes 
again and yet again with his hand. Yes, it was real flesh! The veins were 
pulsing beneath his testing finger. Then did the Paphian hero pour out copious 
thanks to Venus, and again pressed with his lips real lips at last. The maiden 
felt the kisses, blushed and, lifting her timid eyes up to the light, she saw the 
sky and her lover at the same time.50 
This statue is transformed gradually by the touch of the artist. It is also private. The 
transformation is a cause for wonder, but Pygmalion’s faith is rewarded before he performs 
the statue’s material transformation. Hermione’s transformation is witnessed by those 
present, but she is untouched until she descends. The transformation itself corresponds to the 
progressive increase of belief, and it is accomplished in such a way that the audience 
participates equally in the experience. Paulina as the alchemical midwife of nature has 
ordered the circumstances for transformation, but the miracle itself is a corporate miracle. 
The pattern of Hermione’s vivification corresponds to Ovid’s progression from stone to 
woman: Perdita makes as if to kiss the statue, then there is the movement of breath in the 
breast, then pulse in the veins, then life upon the lips, and then motion in the eye. The pattern 
is one familiar to Paulina as well, for her next warning is against belief that the statue lives 
(69). 
 In response Leontes begs ‘O sweet Paulina, / Make me to think so twenty years 
together! / No settled senses of the world can match / The pleasure of that madness. Let’t 
alone’ (70-73). Leontes is waxing into the madness in which the lunatic, the lover, and the 
poet are of imagination all compact. Having surrendered reason in V.1, here he would 
                                                
50 Ovid, trans. Miller, X.280-84, 287-94. 
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abandon his senses too if by further retreat from comprehension if he might apprehend his 
living wife. Leontes leads this movement towards transfiguration, but the other minds present 
are likewise growing towards something of great constancy. 
 Now at last instead of resisting, Paulina offers to afflict Leontes further, and he 
immediately accepts. He describes his affliction as sweet. The repetition, after calling Paulina 
sweet earlier in line 70, suggests again the sweet fragrance that is the alchemical sign for the 
resurgence of life. Paulina objects ‘The ruddiness upon her lip is wet’ (81), simultaneously 
protesting she is a statue and confirming its redness. When she asks if she should draw the 
curtain, Leontes and Perdita both plead that she continue, to which she responds: 
         Either forbear, 
Quit presently the chapel, or resolve you 
For more amazement. If you can behold it, 
I’ll make the statue move indeed, descend, 
And take you by the hand; but then you’ll think 
(Which I protest against) I am assisted 
By wicked powers.  (85-91) 
 
 This charge is the most extreme in its warning and its claim of supernatural ability. 
Paulina calls the place a chapel, raising again the question of the identity of the place. Is it the 
chapel Leontes declares he will daily visit at the end of Act III, and the grave upon which he 
said many a prayer (140-41)? This is not clarified, but there is no mistaking that now this has 
become a sacred place. The theatre-turned-alembic is now a place of spiritual transformation. 
‘Resolve you / For more amazement’ pushes the wonder of the resolution into the heart of 
Leontes (and by extension all those present). Paulina claims for herself the power to make the 
statue move, descend, and finally touch. She also preempts any accusation of sorcery. 
Leontes bids her go on, anticipating that speech will follow motion as the final demonstration 
of life: 
   What you can make her do, 
I am content to look on; what to speak, 
I am content to hear; for ‘tis as easy 
To make her speak as move. (91-94) 
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 Now comes Paulina’s great and explicit exhortation to awaken faith. In keeping with 
the nature of faith, the requirement is unequivocal, unelaborated, and divisive: 
        It is requir’d 
You do awake your faith. Then, all stand still. 
On; those that think it is unlawful bus|iness 
I am about, let them depart. (94-97) 
 
The common assumption here is that Paulina is speaking to Leontes primarily and the stage 
audience by extension. This is uncertain. In Act V, Leontes’ faith has consistently met or 
preceded every expansion of such a requirement. He already apprehends that Hermione is 
coming back to life. What last vestige of his faith must awaken? Perhaps this exhortation 
collects all those present into the same commitment of faith. Their reactions throughout the 
scene and their faith are known to themselves alone. 
 I submit a third mythical possibility: Paulina is speaking to Hermione. Hermione is, 
after all, the one who awakens. On this reading, the revivification of Hermione’s body from 
death and reanimation with her spirit are not homogenous. As the work of Richard Meek and 
Erin Sullivan demonstrates, Shakespeare’s conception of personhood cannot be adequately 
explained by appealing only to physical humoralism, and Shakespeare’s body-spirit dualism 
needs to be reconsidered as a means of reinterpreting the greatest and most-perplexing 
aspects of plays such as The Winter’s Tale. 
 If Paulina is speaking to Hermione when she says ‘It is requir’d / You do awake your 
faith’, this has further implications. First, Paulina’s work is not complete, nor is the outcome 
certain. Her exhortation that Hermione awaken her faith is also Paulina’s final great act of 
faith. When Paulina says ‘Then, all stand still’, ‘Then’ would signal a change of address to 
those present. We may infer from ‘On’ that those present comply. This is a movement of 
corporate sympathetic enchantment, as every living person present becomes statue-like in 
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their attendance. Leontes speaks for all against the enchantment being broken by telling 
Paulina, ‘Proceed; / No foot shall stir’ (98-99). At last comes the final enchantment: 
   Music! awake her! Strike! [Music.] 
‘Tis time; descend; be Stone no more; approach; 
Strike all that look upon with marvel. Come; 
I’ll fill your Grave up. Stir; nay, come away; 
Bequeath to Death your numbness; for from him 
Dear Life redeems you. You perceive she stirs.51 (98-103) 
    [Hermione comes down.] 
 
 For the first time in this scene, Paulina’s speech comes together metrically. The music 
employed would greatly affect the impact of Paulina words, but there is nothing to go on in 
this instance, and even that this is a cue for music is inferred.52 This inference is reasonable, 
though Pericles has before this play heard the music of the spheres when no one else can.53 
Mythically, music with the power to resurrect is unmistakably Orphic. Orpheus’ song about 
Pygmalion and the transmutation of statue into living woman is equally significant. 
 Bishop points out the imperative nature of Paulina’s incantation: ‘Each seems to 
punch itself into being against a resistance, a resistance registered in the strange sense of 
violence and blockage in the lines, as if Paulina’s call had somehow to bore through or chisel 
away layers of deafness to reach its target ear.’54 He also registers the impression that it is up 
to the statue to approach rather than a mechanistic summoning presuming the response.55 The 
stage direction ‘[Hermione comes down.]’ is Rowe’s,56 based on Paulina’s ‘descend’ at line 
99. This is typically taken to mean that as a statue she is on a dais or pedestal, and at 
Paulina’s cue steps down. Continuing the mythical alternative that Paulina requires Hermione 
to awake her faith, Paulina’s intercession to descend is not spoken to the figure of the statue, 
                                                
51 The capitalizations here of ‘Strike’, ‘Stone’, ‘Grave’, ‘Death’, and ‘Life’ follow the First Folio. 
52 Riverside Shakespeare, 1654: Again the stage direction ‘[Music]’ is interpolated by Rowe. See also Pitcher, 
383-84: Unlike the songs of Act IV, for this scene there is no indication about tune or voice and no 
documentary clues regarding performance.  
53 Pericles, V.i.223-233 
54 Bishop, 166. 
55 Ibid., 167. 
56 Riverside Shakespeare, 1654, n.V.iii.103. 
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rather it is spoken to Hermione’s spirit, bidding that she descend and be reunited body and 
spirit. On such a reading, the imperatives to ‘approach’, ‘Come’, and ‘Stir; nay, come away’ 
make directional sense, as does leaving recognition of movement until ‘You perceive she 
stirs.’ Paulina resumes: 
Start not; her actions shall be holy, as 
You hear my spell is lawful. Do not shun | her 
Until you see her die again, for then 
You kill her double. Nay present your hand. 
When she was young, you woo’d her; now, in age, 
Is she become the suitor?  (104-109) 
 
 If Paulina has just accomplished some miraculous and unprecedented enchantment, 
the remainder of her lines need to be read with a degree of uncertainty about how much she is 
apprehending for the first time versus interpreting for others what she already comprehends. 
Her speech here is directed to those now uncertain what is happening. She avers Hermione is 
holy because the spell heard is a lawful spell. Otherwise she explains little. Leontes shows 
hesitation, for despite his earlier eagerness, he is reticent to finally touch Hermione. When he 
does, he has the sense experience that for Pygmalion was the first indication of new life: ‘O, 
she’s warm! / If this be magic, let it be an art / Lawful as eating’ (109-111). Some scholars 
have supposed a magic art lawful as eating has a eucharistic insinuation of transubstantiation. 
While this is sympathetic it is also speculative. 
 Camillo asks: ‘If she pertain to life let her speak too’ (113). Polixenes makes the 
association with Eurydice by following with: ‘Ay, and make it manifest where she has liv’d, / 
Or how stol’n from the dead’ (114-15). In both there is a note of doubt. Hermione does not 
respond to either request for an explanation, and Paulina continues both to interpret and to 
intercede: 
         That she is living, 
Were it but told you, should be hooted at 
Like an old tale; but it appears she lives, 
Though yet she speak not. Mark a little while. 
Please you to interpose, fair madam, kneel, 
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And pray your mother’s blessing. Turn, good lady, 
Our Perdita is found.  (115-21) 
 
The wonders of V.ii were told and accepted because they were believable. But here the story 
that could not be believed if heard cannot be denied when seen, even without yet having 
Hermione’s direct testimony. By extension the play presents a more persuasive image of the 
whole idea of resurrection in performance than it does in script. The 2013 RSC production of 
The Winter’s Tale played the reanimation as an event surprising and overwhelming to 
Hermione herself, and the effect was truly enchanting. 
 ‘Mark a little while’ indicates Hermione’s recovery is gradual and she needs time. We 
cannot tell what Paulina is thinking, but it seems she is herself trying to understand what is 
happening and respond appropriately. What Hermione herself comprehends could only be 
considered in performance as the role is silent. Paulina’s suggestion to Perdita that she kneel 
and pray her mother’s blessing looks like it is as much for Hermione’s sake as Perdita’s. 
Even to this Hermione is not immediately responsive. She has some memory of Perdita that 
can be invoked but no recognition of what is taking place. Only when Paulina speaks directly 
to her again and reaffirms that the prophecy is fulfilled does Hermione finally speak as the 
last sign of restoration: 
        You gods, look down 
And from your sacred vials pour your graces 
Upon my daughter’s head! Tell me, mine own, 
Where has thou been preserv’d? where liv’d? how found 
Thy father’s court? for thou shalt hear that I, 
Knowing by Paulina that the oracle 
Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserv’d 
Myself to see the issue.  (121-28) 
 
Hermione’s benediction is mysterious. This is her only speech after her resurrection. She 
invokes the gods first, then speaks only to Perdita. In the First Folio ‘vials’ is ‘viols’, 
suggesting the continuation of heavenly music in the scene. ‘Vials’ was Alexander Pope’s 
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interpolation.57 Audibly the variation is practically indistinguishable and the strength of both 
meanings suggests intentional doubling. This speech too would play strongly with weeping. 
Since Perdita is kneeling, the graces pouring on her head may be her mother’s tears. For those 
listening, they hear speech, but Hermione has blessing and questions for Perdita, not answers 
to their inquiries. 
 Line 125 presents a difficulty beginning with ‘for thou shalt hear that I…’. If 
Hermione has been slowly recovering her faculties, here she does seem suddenly cognizant 
and aware of what has happened all along. The meaning though is not clear. Already Paulina 
has warned against the unbelievability of what shall be heard but not seen. Perhaps Hermione 
also warns against hearsay. A paraphrase of what Hermione seems to say is, ‘You are going 
to hear that Paulina told me the oracle gave hope you were still alive, so I have remained 
alive to see the fulfillment of your return.’ John Pitcher speculates that Shakespeare may have 
forgotten that Hermione heard the oracle,58 but this precisely overlooks the condition that 
negates the certainty of what we are going to hear. Hermione did hear the oracle, therefore we 
cannot deduce that she must have remained alive. If Hermione has come back to life, it is 
admittedly difficult to see how she would piece together so quickly her memory of the oracle 
and what she sees after her reanimation, then create her own rhetorical response. If Hermione 
intends further clarification, she is prevented by Paulina’s interruption that there will be time 
later to trouble joys with such relations. The mystery remains ultimately mysterious. Paulina, 
her work done, turns to sadness. It remains for Leontes to console her: 
         O, peace, Paulina! 
Thou shouldst a husband take by my consent, 
As I by thine a wife: this is a match, 
And made between ‘s by vows. Thou hast found mine, 
But how, is to be question’d; for I saw her 
 (As I thought) dead; and have (in vain) said many 
A prayer upon her grave.  (135-41) 
                                                
57 Riverside Shakespeare, 1654. 
58 Pitcher, 345. 
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Leontes too professes confusion about how this matter has been resolved, seeming also to 
lean backwards from faith towards a more natural explanation that Hermione has been 
‘found’. Having been persuaded by the most reliable sense of sight that Hermione was dead, 
his many prayers upon her grave have apparently been in vain. 
 Having made a match between Camillo and Paulina, Leontes catches Hermione 
looking at Polixenes and asks their pardons. He then explains to Hermione who Florizel is 
and that he is troth-plight to Perdita. His concluding request is that Good Paulina once more 
lead them away so everyone may ask and answer every question. From such comprehension 
we are at the last precluded. 
Conclusion 
 Sceptics will never see this play as mythically enchanting. Part of Shakespeare’s 
generosity is that he is neither dogmatic nor coercive about anything, let alone religion. In 
light of all the criticisms and interpretations presented, the door for an enchanted reading is 
wedged ever so slightly more open, and that is all that is needed to continue a balancing of 
consideration with respect to the mythical and religious possibilities of this play without 
sinking to outdated, disproven, or simply bad models of interpreting religion. We do not need 
Shakespeare to be a closet Catholic, or a card carrying Protestant, or a systematic theologian, 
or even overtly a creedal Christian, to see that he is interested in matters of the heart that have 
earthly and eternal significance. Ethically and affectively Shakespeare points us towards 
orthodoxy if we trust our native sentiments and condition our minds to the religious 
possibilities. 
 The reanimation of Hermione’s body with her spirit through Paulina’s alchemical art 
is an original reading to the best of my knowledge. It is not conclusive, because the play 
resists any precise resolution of the theatrical and mythical threads through which it is woven. 
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However I think it is a coherent reading. In light of the ongoing fascination with religion in 
this play, and in light of critical work that has pushed established constructs of interpretation 
to their limits, I have endeavoured to open a possibility for this as a play where transcendence 
breaks through. Through faith, the artist may apprehend transcendence and make art that is 
transformative. Through faith, we may begin to comprehend this art and be transformed. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROSPERO’S FIRE, PROSPERO’S FREEDOM – READINGS IN THE TEMPEST 
Introduction 
 The Tempest is the performance of an all-powerful enchanter who, instead of coercing 
a natural conclusion that is within his power, abjures his rough magic for a supernatural 
reconciliation that is free and gracious. Much of this reading of The Tempest follows an 
enchanted reading of The Winter’s Tale as the performance of an uncertain miracle that 
succeeds through corporate faith. 
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare (1811-1812) are the historical 
midpoint between Shakespeare’s writing of The Tempest and present consideration of it. 
Coleridge’s perspective is likewise a helpful midpoint. As himself a poet and a preeminent 
theorist of faith and imagination, Coleridge had manifest respect for Shakespeare.1 His 
interpretive principles situated between art and criticism offer an ideal starting position. 
According to Coleridge, Shakespeare’s characters are ideals of reason and imagination: 
They have the union of reason perceiving and judgment recording actual facts, 
and the imagination diffusing over all a magic glory, and while it records the 
past, [it] projects in a wonderful degree to the future, and makes us feel, 
however slightly, and see, however dimly, that state of being in which there is 
neither past nor future, but which is permanent, and is the energy of nature.2 
 The Tempest is a paradigmatic example of a play constructed according to a rule of 
imagination.3 This play cannot be judged either with detached reason or surrender to 
delusion. The play must be heard from the perspective of wonder, which is typified by 
Miranda.4 Ariel has the character of air: reason divested of moral character, and intellectual 
delight abstracted from purpose.5 His imagination is not human. He is incapable of having or 
                                                
1 Coleridge, Coleridge on Shakespeare, 45-50, 104. 
2 Ibid., 105. 
3 Ibid., 106. Though Coleridge is aware that Shakespeare had been criticized for ignoring the classical rules of 
dramatic unity (57), he does not draw attention to The Tempest as Shakespeare’s only play that observes these 
rules. As such, we should appreciate the play more rather than less for its construction according to a rule of 
imagination. 
4 Coleridge, Coleridge on Shakespeare, 108. 
5 Ibid., 111. 
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receiving sympathy. Caliban has the character of earth: he is brutish but has more than animal 
instincts. He has understanding but not moral reason. He has a human imagination that draws 
highly poetic images from nature.6 Caliban attracts our sympathy whether or not he himself is 
capable of any. According to Coleridge, wonder, like Miranda, is raised between these two 
poles. Prospero is the internal agent of the play’s enchantment. Hence, in the play’s 
protracted state of wonder, between abstracted reason (Ariel) and sympathetic nature 
(Caliban), under the presidency of enchantment (Prospero) poetic faith arises.7 
 The keys to approaching The Tempest’s religious significance have a great deal in 
common with those for understanding The Winter’s Tale, and Pericles and Cymbeline before 
it. However, alchemy is more overt in Prospero’s so-potent art than in any preceding play. 
Dramatically, there is a great surprise when the play climaxes in the third act with the 
betrothal of Ferdinand and Miranda.8 This is also the alchemical climax, and in the 
confluence of dramatic and alchemical modes we see the consummation of Prospero’s 
intended purpose. Yet, what follows is the relinquishment of Prospero’s control that is the 
subject of so much scrutiny and the challenge to reading the play’s ending. Whereas The 
Winter’s Tale turns from tragedy to comedy between Acts III and IV, then moves past 
comedy to enchantment in V.iii, The Tempest nearly moves past comedy with the betrothal of 
Ferdinand and Miranda and the repentance of Alonso by end of the third act. The subplot 
conspiracy of Stephano, Trinculo, and Caliban interrupts the spiritual harmony of Prospero’s 
masque, but this disenchantment leads only to the greater re-enchantment that ensues. 
 
 
                                                
6 Ibid., 113. 
7 Ibid., 111. 
8 Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan, Introduction and notes for The Tempest, by William 
Shakespeare, ed. Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 
2011, 15 n.1. 
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CHARACTERS AND THEMES 
 The characters in The Tempest are more imaginatively distinct than any other 
Shakespearean ensemble. For this reason it is helpful to consider interpretive themes within 
the context of the principal characters. Caliban is a creature of earth. Ariel is a spirit of air. 
Miranda is the quintessence of wonder. Prospero is the dramaturgical and alchemical 
enchanter whose supernatural agency begets redemption for all who will receive it. 
Caliban and Earth 
 Caliban’s identity is deliberately mixed. Postcolonial criticism identifies Caliban as 
the noble savage whose kingdom is usurped, but this ignores the rule of imaginative 
enchantment according to which the play is constructed. According to the play’s imaginative 
construct, Caliban’s mother is an African witch, and his father is a pagan Patagonian devil.9 
He is spiritually corrupt and only about half human. This is what makes him a monster, but a 
sympathetic monster.  
 Caliban’s non-human identity is sufficiently confusing that he is inconsistently 
described. Prospero describes him as dog-like: ‘the son that [she] did litter here, / A freckled 
whelp, hag-born’ (I.ii.282-83), as does Trinculo when he refers to Caliban as ‘this puppy-
headed monster’ (II.ii.154). At the beginning of the same scene Trinculo debates with himself 
whether Caliban is a man or a fish (25-36). Stephano and Trinculo emphasize Caliban’s 
deformity by calling him ‘moon-calf’ (106, 111, 135)—one deformed due to lunar influence 
at birth.10 By the end of the scene Stephano and Trinculo are drunkenly emphatic that he is a 
monster, calling him such more than a dozen times. Feeling himself treated by Prospero with 
undue cruelty, Caliban too-readily allies himself with the first alternative. While he has been 
taken into their confidence, and ostensibly been shown sympathy by them, we also see that 
                                                
9 Virginia Mason Vaughan, ‘Literary Invocations in The Tempest’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Shakespeare’s Last Plays, ed. Catherine M. S. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
40. 
10 Riverside Shakespeare, 1673 n.106. 
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Caliban is too easily gulled by fools, then increasingly bullied and taken advantage of in III.ii 
and IV.i. His drunken initiation and misdirected worship of the inebriated conspirators is 
funny, but it is humour that on reflection engenders sympathy for his hardship and 
foolishness. Our sympathy increases the more we realize that the drunken hilarity of 
Stephano and Trinculo hides their cruel and usurpatious natures. 
 Prospero enslaves Caliban and treats him harshly, addressing him as ‘poisonous’ 
(I.ii.319), ‘lying’ (344), ‘Filth’ (346), etc. This is often seen as unjust. On the other hand, 
whereas everyone else sees Caliban as a monster or villain, only Prospero recognizes him as 
human at all and able to be redeemed. At the end he takes responsibility for Caliban, seeing 
in the creature the depths of his own depravity: ‘this thing of darkness I / Acknowledge mine’ 
(V.i.275-75). Caliban is capable of being educated, as evidenced by his being taught to speak. 
He is also resistant to education, as evidenced by his inclination to use this ability to curse. 
Caliban’s speech is deeply poetic, suggesting the elegance and profundity that even the basest 
nature is capable of under the right formation. Coleridge says Caliban has understanding but 
not moral reason. By the end though, because of Prospero’s harsh pedagogy not in spite of it, 
even Caliban acknowledges the folly of his ignorance and rebellion, promising to ‘be wise 
hereafter / And seek for grace’ (295-96). We do not know Caliban’s ultimate fate, but it is as 
likely as anything that when the Italians depart he remains as the king of his island, and 
perhaps because of Prospero’s education, this time he will be able to rule it. 
Ariel and Air 
 Ariel’s agency in The Tempest is second only to Prospero’s. He is not human (V.i.20), 
and as a spirit he has been empowered through Prospero’s art. As with Caliban, only 
Prospero truly understands Ariel, reminding him that in service to Sycorax ‘thou wast a spirit 
too delicate / To act her earthy and abhorr’d commands’ (I.ii.272-73). Prospero had the 
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power to undo Sycorax’s spell which imprisoned Ariel, and in service to Prospero he grows 
to the apex of his ability. 
 Ariel should not be Christianized, however there are Biblical sources for his character. 
Uriel is an angel who appears in 2 Esdras 4:1, 5:20, and 10:28.11 Ariel’s name may perhaps 
be reminiscent of Uriel, but this is a weak suggestion for supposing him a better angel of 
nature. Christopher Hodgkins recognizes Ariel’s namesake in Isaiah 29: ל ֵ֣איִרֲא is ‘lion of 
God’, and Hodgkins identifies this as an alternative title for the besieged Jerusalem.12 This 
shortchanges the allusion in Isaiah, which merits consideration in greater detail through the 
first eleven verses: 
1Ah [Ariel], [Ariel] of the citie that David dwelt in: adde yere unto yere: let 
them kil lambes. 
2But I wil bring [Ariel] into distres, and there shalbe heavines & sorow, and it 
shalbe unto me like an [Ariel]. 
3And I wil besege thee as a circle, & fight against thee on a mount, & wil cast 
up ramparts against thee. 
4So shalt thou be humbled, & shalt speake out of the grounde, and thy speache 
shalbe as out of the dust: thy voyce also shalbe out of the grounde like him 
that hathe a spirit of divination, and thy talking shal whisper out of the dust. 
5Moreover, the multitude of thy strangers shalbe like smale dust, and the 
multitude of strong men shalbe as chaffe that passeth away, and it shalbe in 
a moment, even suddenly. 
6Thou shalt be visited of the Lord of hostes with thundre, and shaking, and a 
great noyse, a whirlwinde, and a tempest, and a flame of devouring fyre. 
7And the multitude of the nacions that fight against [Ariel], shalbe as a dreame 
of vision by night: even all they that make the warre against it, and strong 
holds against it, and laye sege unto it. 
8And it shalbe like as an hungrie man dreameth, and beholde, he eateth: and 
when he awaketh, his soule is emptie: or like as a thirstie man dreameth, and 
lo, he is drinking, and when he awaketh, beholde, he is fainte, and his soule 
longeth: so shal the multitude of all nacions be that fight against mount Zion. 
9Stay your selves, and wonder: they are blinde, & make you blinde: they are 
dronken, but not with wine: they stagger, but not by strong drinke. 
10For the Lord hathe covered you with a spirit of slomber, and hathe shut up 
your eyes: the Prophetes, and your chief Seers hathe he covered. 
                                                
11 Harkness, 49: Uriel was also named as one of the angels with whom John Dee claimed to converse. See also 
Milton, Paradise Lost, 332 n.371-72, 503 n.403: Milton names a fallen angel Ariel at Paradise Lost VI.371, 
but Merritt Hughes indicates in his notes how Milton’s homage is to gnostic and pagan sources besides 
Shakespeare. 
12 Hodgkins, 158. 
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11And the vision of them all is become unto you, as the wordes of a boke that 
is sealed up, which they deliver to one that an read, saying, Read this, I pray 
thee. Then shal he say, I can not: for it is sealed. 
The first obvious correlation to Ariel is in verse 6, where the description could actually be 
describing the tempest of Act I. Second, the Geneva text translates the first verse ‘Ah, altar, 
altar…’, and repeats this usage for verses 2 and 7, but the marginal comment clarifies the 
gloss: ‘The Ebrewe worde Ariel signifieth the lyon of God, and signifieth the altar, because 
the altar semed to devoure the sacrifice that was offred to God’. Sarah Beckwith reads a 
eucharistic suggestion from the banquet in III.iii.13 Whether or not this is intended, Ariel 
furnishing the feast before clapping his wings upon the table to make it disappear suggests 
Shakespeare’s familiarity with the Geneva commentary. 
 There are further echoes of Isaiah 29:4, 7, and 8 in Caliban’s famous description of 
the island to Stephano and Trinculo: 
Be not afeard, the isle is full of noises, 
Sounds, and sweet airs, that give delight and hurt not. 
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments 
Will hum about mine ears; and sometime voices, 
That if I then had wak’d after long sleep, 
Will make me sleep again, and then in dreaming, 
The clouds methought would open, and show riches 
Ready to drop upon me, that when I wak’d 
I cried to dream again.  (III.ii.135-43) 
 
The political strife, the drunken conspirators, and even Prospero’s sealing up of his book are 
also suggested in Isaiah 29. The conflation of Jerusalem as the temple city and the altar, 
which ultimately stand for God’s apocalyptic judgement on the whole world, is enticing as a 
corresponding image for the world, the theatre, and the stage. 
 Ariel’s poetry and songs are the apex of Shakespeare’s poetic enchantment. Charles 
Williams has suggested Ariel’s music is so transcendent that if it were any more powerful 
material transformation would result from the performance. These airs are the spiritual power 
                                                
13 Beckwith, Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness, 151. 
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of poetry that Prospero has bridled for the direction of men’s bodies and spirits, which plays 
out in his enchantment of the characters in The Tempest and of the audience in performance. 
If this enchantment is not always recognized, it is because the poetic burden of The Tempest 
is that it can be too burningly transparent to even see. 
 Only Prospero can see Ariel in his natural state and, so far as the text indicates, even 
knows of his existence. All of Ariel’s spoken exchanges are with Prospero alone. There is no 
evidence that Prospero has made his familiar spirit known even to Miranda. The Riverside 
Shakespeare suggests that when Ariel is introduced he wears a costume that by convention 
signals the audience can see him but other characters cannot.14 Prospero tells Ariel ‘be 
subject / To no sight but thine and mine, invisible / To every eyeball else’ (I.ii.301-303), but 
this is as much for the sake of the audience understanding Ariel as it is for directing Ariel 
specifically not to be seen as a water nymph. Whereas in The Winter’s Tale the identity of 
Paulina’s art is not revealed as part of the play’s enchanted resolution, in The Tempest the 
audience has direct and exclusive insight into Prospero’s art and its agency. Ariel is the 
affective agent that connects us as the audience to what is going on behind the scenes of 
Prospero’s dramaturgy. We see everything unfolding as Prospero directs, right up until his 
scenery collapses at the truncation of the wedding masque. Ariel is the agent of enchantment 
who works on us like he works on all the characters in the play. That we know he is doing it 
adds a layer of awareness, but this does not diminish the power of the affect. 
Miranda and Wonder 
 As Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Charles Williams have identified, Miranda is the 
embodiment of wonder, unadulterated and uncorrupted, such that we have a difficulty 
apprehending her.15 As Williams would say, her character is too dense and pure—like 
                                                
14 Riverside Shakespeare, 1666 n.374. 
15 Coleridge, Coleridge on Shakespeare, 108. Coleridge says that Miranda is Shakespeare’s favourite character, 
but regrettably does not elaborate. 
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crystal—for us to readily apprehend her value. She is the focal point of enchantment, as Ariel 
is the medium and agent of enchantment. Miranda has been raised on a strange isle between 
Prospero as a father and Caliban as a servant. She has retained her purity, and a great deal of 
innocence, and it must be to Prospero’s credit that she has had the opportunity to do so. 
 Miranda’s name affirms that she is the embodiment of wonder. In their first exchange 
Prospero addresses her twice in close succession by name (I.ii.48, 53). Ferdinand, before he 
knows her name, addresses her as the goddess upon whom the music of the island attends and 
concludes his prayer: ‘My prime request, / Which I do last pronounce, is (O you wonder!) / If 
you be maid, or no?’ (426-28). She replies, ‘No wonder, sir, / But certainly a maid’ (428-29). 
Shakespeare’s Latin is good enough to interpolate not only the adjectival form ‘wondrous’ 
but also the non-finite, future passive gerundive that takes the same construction. Miranda is 
‘she who is to be wondered at.’ This is born out in Ferdinand’s pun when he learns her name: 
‘Admir’d Miranda, / Indeed the top of admiration! worth / What’s dearest to the world!’ 
(III.i.37-39). She is the focal point of wonder for the entire play. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, Bishop’s Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder gives 
negligible consideration to wonder in The Tempest. Miranda as the embodiment of wonder 
would suggest it is as integral as for any other play if not more so. Bishop writes by way of 
his own conclusion: 
Shakespeare’s evocations of wonder…are profoundly transactional, delicate, 
and full of difficult turbulences. His plays insist on a much deeper negotiation 
between the subject and his or her experience, so that wonder becomes a space 
of much more radical flux. Shakespearean practice of wonder is not the 
hierarchic and settled epiphany of Jonson’s masques, and is underpinned by 
little aesthetic theory articulated anywhere in the period. It is rather the 
dramaturgy of a deep psychology of metaphor that has its roots in Ovid and its 
later counterparts in certain aspects of Blake, in Wagner, and in Freud.16 
Bishop identifies in Shakespeare’s theatre of wonder what could now be called an affective 
model of signification—one that foregrounds the role of the audience in the co-constitution of 
                                                
16 Bishop, 176-77. 
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meaning, for a holistic, embodied experience of dramatic affect. It works metaphorically and 
psychologically, in relation to the text as well as cognitive and cultural models of 
interpretation. But this co-constitution of meaning cannot be reduced to calculation or given 
over to rootless emotion. The audience plays an integral role in the embodiment of 
experiential meaning, and itself affects the performance while also receiving the affect of 
dramaturgical enchantment. 
 Bishop describes this phenomenon as ‘intellect and emotion…in intimate contact with 
one another in such a way that unexpected results can emerge’.17 Wonder is not coercive or 
instrumental, but reveals unexpected thoughts and feelings. This is theatre taking the place of 
liturgical experience, being common, aesthetic, purgative, and conciliatory: 
Where the masque embraced an ideal pictorialism with clean lineaments, 
Shakespeare’s practice is much more implicative, collusional, and messy. Its 
aim is not rebuke, instruction, and redress, but interrogation and, perhaps, 
recompense. In this aim, the complex calculus between emotional and 
intellectual response that is characteristic of the theatre of wonder becomes a 
keen and powerful ally.18 
Between the classical idealisms of rhetoric and myth, combined with the liturgical aesthetic 
still haunting the English Reformation, Shakespeare initiated an ostensibly secular theatrical 
experience that has provoked religious reflection ever since. Religious doctrine was not his 
burden. Rather, he sympathized with the need for experiences of spiritual enchantment. 
 However, just as The Winter’s Tale makes wonder the penultimate theatrical 
experience of the play’s greater enactment of faith, so too in this play wonder is essential 
theatrically, but not the play’s greatest enchantment. In light of this it is further surprising that 
faith is not also explicitly elevated in The Tempest. Unlike The Winter’s Tale, where faith 
becomes the overt movement of the climax, in this play faith is mentioned twice. In response 
to Miranda’s lament that Alonso has died in the shipwreck, Ferdinand replies, ‘Yes, faith, and 
all his lords’ (I.ii.438). When the banquet is spread mysteriously before the party of Milanese 
                                                
17 Ibid., 177. 
18 Ibid. 
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and Neapolitan lords, and they doubt whether they should partake, Gonzalo says reassuringly, 
‘Faith, sir, you need not fear’ (III.iii.43). In both cases ‘faith’ is reduced to a minor oath. 
 Coleridge suggested that poetic faith arises from the play’s protracted state of wonder, 
which is raised between reason and nature under the enchantment of sympathetic magic. This 
may be said of most of the play, but in the last act these are disbanded, leaving the question 
of what is left of wonder and therefore poetic faith. In terms of theological virtues, the most 
obvious possibility is love. 
Prospero and Alchemy 
 Prospero should be not excluded from the company of Shakespeare’s greatest 
characters. In name alone Prospero is immediately associated with fortune and felicity. Yet 
he is not a stage conjurer or Willy Wonka; his past inadequacies and proximity to corruption 
are evident. As the play begins, Prospero confronts his own past shortcomings as well as 
those who took advantage and did harm to the polity it was his duty to protect. More 
personally, his enemies subjected his daughter to the hardships of exile and marooning. He 
was a character of sufficient power that he could subdue the isle to his rule. Shakespeare has 
leavened The Tempest with just enough doubt and imperfection that Prospero must be read 
carefully in his faults as well as his virtues. Still, these faults do not justify the interpretations 
of Prospero as an illusionist or sorcerer. 
 It is impossible to separate Prospero’s character from his identity as a magician. As 
historical opinions have varied about the sanctity of identifiable magic, there have been 
corresponding tendencies to identify Prospero’s magic as sanctified, infernal, or theatrical 
subterfuge. Largely through Prospero’s initial exchange with Miranda, Coleridge identifies 
him as a sympathetic magician and as the internal agent of the play’s enchantment. Virginia 
Mason Vaughan and Alden Vaughan represent the general stream of criticism that now 
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identifies, as C. S. Lewis did,19 that Prospero’s magic is that channeled through Marsilio 
Ficino and John Dee, with the play itself proposing an esoteric alchemical corrective to 
Jonson’s disenchantment in The Alchemist.20 However, advancing the identity of Prospero’s 
magic to recognizable forms of Renaissance Hermetic arts and occult philosophies does not 
immediately resolve the problem. Mason Vaughan and Vaughan conclude: ‘Aside from the 
temptation to use his magic for vengeance, study of the occult had distracted Prospero from 
his princely duties twelve years earlier; if he is to return to Milan and resume his ducal 
powers, he must abandon it.’21 
 John Mebane, writing about The Tempest, recognizes the extent to which Shakespeare 
draws eclectically on sources of inspiration for Prospero’s magic, adapting them creatively 
for his unique artistic vision.22 Some of the things which Prospero does are those Marsilio 
Ficino contended that ‘the perfected magus, as an agent of God, can perform: a human soul 
dedicated to God may be granted the power to “command the elements, rouse the winds, 
gather the clouds together in rain,” cure diseases, and perform other miraculous feats which 
may suit God’s purposes.’23 In the context of the various idealistic strains of Hermetic and 
occult philosophy, Mebane writes: 
Alchemy, in particular, is an attempt to purify the fallen world by bringing 
earthly creatures into more perfect unity with their governing Ideas, and 
Shakespeare may well have been aware of the alchemical meaning of the term 
tempest: it is a boiling process which removes impurities from base metal and 
facilitates its transmutation into gold. Because the human Mens is a part of the 
series of minds which constitutes the order of Providence, the magus gains 
intimate knowledge of God’s providential purposes and consequently becomes 
an agent of the divine Creator. Through assent to Providence the magus could 
then liberate himself from the control of Fortune, gaining the true freedom 
which comes from aligning oneself with the will of god. The magus possesses 
the power to manipulate stellar influences and to contribute to the course of 
earthly events, but the power of the benevolent magician consists solely of the 
                                                
19 Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, 8. 
20 Mason Vaughan and Vaughan, 62-64. 
21 Ibid., 66. 
22 John S. Mebane, Renaissance Magic and the Return of the Golden Age (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1989), 179. 
23 Ibid., 180. 
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ability to help fulfill providence, never to thwart it: Ariel’s assertion that he 
and his fellows are ‘ministers of Fate’ (III.iii.61) is literally true. An evil 
magician, such as Faustus or Sycorax, might obtain rudimentary powers, but 
never anything approaching Prospero’s. In fact, many Renaissance occultists 
agreed with orthodox theologians that an evil magician’s powers are almost 
entirely illusory.24 
The way to read Shakespeare’s alchemy is creatively and symbolically in the context of his 
own artistic vision. Some of this symbolism is consistent with conventional expressions, but 
ultimately Shakespeare’s greater imaginative purpose determines how these things should be 
interpreted. 
 Mebane points out that The Tempest cannot be read as a revenge play. Prospero’s 
magic is not an escape from life but preparation for it through contemplation, book learning, 
and dramaturgy. Whatever his past negligences, Prospero has corrected these, and if revenge 
was his intention, he could have had it at any time from the beginning of the first scene. His 
motive for retribution only diminishes as the play goes on. His aim is to bring his enemies to 
repentance in greater service to humankind, and it is through his magic that he stages the 
restoration of political order and familial peace to both Milan and Naples. He is severe at the 
beginning to the usurpers and conspirators because corruption must be dealt with severely if 
it is to be turned towards spiritual rebirth.25 Sorcery could have no such power or ideal for 
Satan casting out Satan. 
 Prospero is further buffered from accusations of necromancy by the counter-example 
of Sycorax. Sycorax is a ‘foul witch’ and a ‘damn’d witch’ (I.ii.258, 263). Her magic was 
black and destructive. Like the apothecary in Romeo and Juliet, Sycorax could wield the 
power of death but not life. In a fit of rage she imprisoned Ariel in a pine tree, but she could 
not undo this torment (291). Prospero can tear a pine tree out by the roots (V.i.47-48). It was 
                                                
24 Ibid., 181-82. For a more overtly theological reading of The Tempest as a story of God’s providence, see 
Timothy J. Gorringe, ‘Raising a Tempest: Brookian Theatre as an Analogy for Providence’, in Theatrical 
Theology: Explorations in Performing the Faith, ed. Wesley Vander Lugt and Trevor Hart (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2014). 
25 Mebane, 182-83. 
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Prospero’s art that had the power to liberate Ariel from Sycorax’s curse (291-93). Further, 
part of Prospero’s threat to Ariel is that if he does not conform, Prospero will split an oak and 
imprison him there. The oak implies the ability to split Jove’s tree with the god’s own 
lightning—a power Prospero later explicitly claims (V.i.44-46). Having been the medium of 
Jove’s lightning on behalf of Prospero in the play’s first scene (I.ii.201-205), Ariel knows the 
extent of this power. At the very end Prospero describes Sycorax to those assembled as ‘a 
witch, and one so strong / That could control the moon, make flows and ebbs, / And deal in 
her command without her power’ (V.i.269-71). This is the greatest claim about the strength 
of her power. This too, however, Prospero has preemptively trumped. At the beginning of the 
same scene, in his incantation he declares power to control the sun as well as make the land 
move (41-47). Caliban himself confirms that Prospero’s art is of sufficient power to control 
Setebos and make him subject (I.ii.372-74). Perhaps nothing is more telling of Sycorax’s 
diminution than that, having been unable to resist exile from Argier, she withered and died, 
defeated by age and frailty rather than a contest with political or spiritual power. Prospero 
suffered the same exile, but he was able to recover and increase his enchantment to the point 
that when the circumstances aligned, the island, the air, and the sea itself became his theatre 
of operation. Sycorax was not enlightened, misunderstood, and unjustly persecuted. Like the 
daughters of men in Genesis 6:4 who bore monsters to demons, Sycorax was a witch who 
bore the seed of a devil. Her sorcery made her dangerous and abhorrent. 
 Prospero’s power is recognizably alchemical. He rules the elements through the 
learning of his books and secret studies (I.ii.77). He rules his servants of earth and air through 
understanding and directive will. Caliban fits tidily into elemental alchemy as the base matter 
for regeneration. To Coleridge’s description of Ariel as reason without moral character, 
abstract intellectual delight, and non-human, non-sympathetic imagination, we should add 
alchemical Mercury. Prospero the alchemist rules nature, and Ariel is the agent for his 
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alchemical opus. Whereas Ariel was too delicate for Sycorax’s earthy demands, Prospero 
empowers the relationship of air and fire, and in his service Ariel ignites.26 In addition to 
being ‘aerial’, Ariel’s name also matches the last three syllables of ‘Mercurial’. As the 
universal agent of transmutation, his alchemical identity is as complex and varied as any 
aspect of the opus: 
Mercurius or Hermes is also the name of the divine spirit hidden in the depths 
of matter, the light of nature, the anima mundi, the very spirit of life which 
must be released in order to make the philosopher’s stone. …Mercurius [can 
be] seen as an aerial spirit or soul symbolized by clouds or fume, indicating 
that the alchemists were aware of the psychic nature of their transformative 
substance. … Mercurius is present everywhere and at all times during the opus. 
… Mercurius is not only the prima materia…which is sought at the beginning 
of the work, but also the ultima materia (the philosopher’s stone), the goal of 
his own transformation. Mercurius is not only the matter of the work but 
stands also for all the processes to which the materia is subjected. He is 
simultaneously the matter of the work, the process of the work, and the agent 
by which all this is effected. … Metaphysically, Mercurius carries that divine 
love essence which kills falsehood and illusion and allows truth to arise.27 
Ariel can be understood as all of these things. Many of them are self-evident in his Mercurial 
spirit. Ariel is less-evidently the matter and process from beginning to end, but these too are 
plausible if we recognize Ariel as the unique connection between Prospero and the audience 
in the theatre, especially in the context of Isaiah 29’s identity of the altar-temple-world that 
corresponds to stage-theatre-world. 
 We may be tempted to see Ariel as superior to Caliban, but these two characters are 
equally essential as polar opposites all the way down to their elemental natures. Caliban, as 
earth which is cold and dry, has the exact opposite characteristics of Ariel, who as air is hot 
and moist. Caliban has gravitas; Ariel is flighty. 
 The elements of fire and water also fit into this elemental scheme of The Tempest. The 
character most closely associated with water is Sycorax, who had the power to control the 
tides. Caliban inherits his coldness from his mother as well as perhaps his fishier attributes. 
                                                
26 Ovid, trans. Golding, XV.271-72: Again there is resonance with Numa Pompilius’ teaching: ‘The aire eeke 
purged cleere / From grossenesse, spyreth up aloft, and there becommeth fyre.’ 
27 Abraham, Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, s.v. ‘Mercurius’. 
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Sycorax’s strength was closest to the ocean’s power of death and dissolution, but long before 
the beginning of the play she has succumbed to her own proclivity. Rather than Sycorax, the 
ocean itself which surrounds the island is the presence of elemental water. When the play 
begins, order is tempestuously dissolved in ocean so that a greater resolution may begin. As 
Bishop has pointed out, this motif goes back at least as far as The Comedy of Errors. 
 Prospero’s sympathetic magic of enchantment is elemental fire, which is hot and dry. 
Thus, Prospero’s ability to relate to and rule Caliban and Ariel is because he shares both of 
their stronger properties of dry and hot. Fire’s purifying and unifying force is set opposite the 
dissolving strength of the ocean. In his final incantation, Prospero explicitly claims the power 
of fire, and power over air, water, and earth: 
  [I have] call’d forth the mutinous winds, 
And ‘twixt the green sea and the azur’d vault 
Set roaring war; to the dread rattling thunder 
Have I given fire, and rifted Jove’s stout oak 
With his own bolt; the strong-bas’d promontory 
Have I made shake…  (V.i.42-47) 
 
On the island which is set between the elements, Prospero fires everything in the play 
towards his purposed conclusion. Before the end, however, the relinquishing of his power 
follows this same elemental scheme: 
        But this rough magic 
I here abjure; and when I have requir’d 
Some heavenly music (which even now I do) 
To work mine end upon the senses that 
This airy charm is for, I’ll break my staff, 
Bury it certain fadoms in the earth, 
And deeper than did ever plummet sound 
I’ll drown my book.  (50-57) 
 
The book is dissolved in the ocean to bring full circle Prospero’s opposing power and the 
movement of the first scene. At the end fire is left without opposition, but also without 
connective power to coerce. 
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 Most interpretations focus on the play’s human dynamics and changes in 
relationships. These are important, but Shakespeare represents them elementally to indicate 
their re-ordering through Prospero’s redemptive work. If we make Caliban and Ariel too 
human, we anthropomorphize them and create the wrong kind of sympathies. Prospero, 
flanked by Caliban who is Sulphur and Ariel who is Mercury, is the consummate alchemist 
who wields spiritual fire. He graciously rules death and dissolves insubstantial appearances. 
Through such redeeming work comes the opportunity for the ideal restoration of order 
between all things earthly and spiritual. Miranda may seem left out as the odd fifth character, 
but this is by design. She is the wondrous quintessence raised in the balanced harmony of the 
other four. 
 Read alchemically, the movement of The Tempest is certain and enchanting through 
Act III. In Act IV heaven breaks through to earth at Prospero’s instigation. In Act V Prospero 
relinquishes his power, restores order, offers pardon, then asks for the greatest pardon. Grace 
cannot be imposed on the unwilling. All must be relieved by prayer. These matters are best 
considered in the play’s narrative context. 
READINGS 
 Mebane alleges that the dramatic climax of The Tempest is in III.iii when Alonso 
repents and makes it possible for Prospero to liberate Milan from Naples and resume his 
dukedom.28 Mark Rose previously identified that The Tempest is Shakespeare’s most 
conspicuously designed play. Rose counts nine scenes in the play, with the central scene III.i 
triply-framed as the play’s crucial emblematic tableau: ‘the picture of Ferdinand joyfully 
carrying logs, laboring to win Miranda, while Prospero, who has set the task to discipline the 
youth “lest too light winning / Make the prize light” (I.ii.452.53)’29. Rose’s concept is 
correct, and his focus on III.i is correct, though his model disregards the structural 
                                                
28 Mebane, 183. 
29 Mark Rose, Shakespearean Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 173. 
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significance of I.i and V.i/Epilogue. Adjusting Rose’s model to account for the first and last 
scenes, III.i is surrounded by a quadruple frame: 
I.i I.ii II.i II.ii III.i III.ii III.iii IV.i V.i 
 
All 
Dissolution 
Prospero 
Miranda 
Ferdinand 
Alonso 
Sebastian 
Antonio 
Caliban 
Stephano 
Trinculo 
Miranda 
Ferdinand 
[Prospero] 
Caliban 
Stephano 
Trinculo 
Alonso 
Sebastian 
Antonio 
Prospero 
Miranda 
Ferdinand 
All 
Resolution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 4 3 2 1 
 
This simplistic model disregards the presence of important minor characters, the effective 
presence of Prospero and Ariel in every scene, etc., but the structural significance is evident: 
the turning point is the romance of Ferdinand and Miranda in the fifth scene. Rose reads 
Shakespeare’s return to structural unity as correlative to the play’s central theme, which he 
identifies as discipline.30 ‘Discipline’ is narrow as a central theme. Whether or not the story is 
true that Shakespeare wrote his last play according to classical rules of unity just to prove to 
Ben Jonson that he could (and cast Richard Burbage as Prospero shortly after he had been 
cast as Dr. Subtle in The Alchemist), the structural unity of The Tempest is as meticulous as 
its temporal unity. This unity of structure and time corresponds to the thematic unity as 
Mebane describes it: 
On one level Prospero’s art is, quite literally, Hermetic magic; on another...it 
is ‘art’ in the broadest sense of the term, the civilizing power of education and 
moral self-discipline. On yet another, Prospero’s magic is theatrical art, which 
Shakespeare sees as analogous to magic not only in that it creates visions, but 
also in that it strives to effect moral and spiritual reform. One of the most 
fascinating aspects of The Tempest is the manner in which Shakespeare 
correlates all of these dimensions of the play, so that they complement and 
enrich one another.31 
Unity of structure, unity of time, and unity of themes pull together so that for play, players, 
and audience there is a direct correspondence of shared experience. All of these are directed 
by Prospero as the alchemist, and the unity between all things is one reason why The Tempest 
more than any other play points to Shakespeare’s self-conscious agency. Especially by dint of 
                                                
30 Ibid., 174. 
31 Mebane, 179-80. 
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the unity of time, Shakespeare himself performs a theatrical experiment of esoteric alchemy. 
As Mircea Eliade expresses the unity of time and action: ‘One common factor emerges from 
all these tentative probings [of man the maker’s dream to collaborate in the perfecting of 
matter and himself]: in taking upon himself the responsibility of changing Nature, man puts 
himself in the place of Time’.32 
 The alchemical resonance in III.i begins with Ferdinand’s opening soliloquy: 
There be some sports are painful, and their labor 
Delight in them sets off; some kinds of baseness 
Are nobly undergone; and most poor matters 
Point to rich ends. This my mean task 
Would be as heavy to me as odious, but 
The mistress which I serve quickens what’s dead, 
And makes my labors pleasures. (1-7) 
 
Ferdinand may be young and idealistic, but he speaks more truth than perhaps he knows. 
Baseness nobly undergone and poor matters that point to rich ends describe the conjunction 
of material and spiritual alchemy. In context, his reference to quickening what is dead does 
not refer to his father but to his own sadness. He has been revitalized with joy through 
wonder. 
 In the middle of the scene Ferdinand and Miranda exchange professions that the other 
is the dearest thing in the world (39, 55), with Miranda adding innocently, ‘Nor can 
imagination form a shape, / Besides yourself, to like of’ (56-57). Ferdinand presents himself 
as a king, and in response to Miranda’s question ‘Do you love me?’ (67) swears ‘O heaven, O 
earth, bear witness to this sound, / And crown what I profess with kind event / If I speak 
true!’ (68-70). She weeps in response. The stock alchemical images have all been previously 
identified, and Shakespeare lays them together thickly enough so as to be unmistakable. The 
conjunction of heaven and earth crowning a true union of king-to-be and queen-to-be is a 
picture of the alchemical wedding. Miranda weeps, and Prospero, the alchemist of this 
                                                
32 Eliade, 169 
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resolution, reiterates a blessing reminiscent of Hermione’s: ‘Fair encounter / Of two most rare 
affections! Heavens rain grace / On that which breeds between ‘em!’ (74-76). Heaven 
corresponds to the quintessence, or perfection of matter.33 The boiling dissolution of the 
tempest has been commuted to the blessing of tears and heavenly rain. The union is 
spiritually fruitful even as it is promised, and Prospero retires to the business of his book. 
— 
 When next we see these characters in Act IV, Scene i, Prospero first offers blessing 
beyond what Ferdinand might have been led to expect. Miranda is his ‘rich gift’ (8) that will 
exceed all praise. Second, he offers a severe warning against the violation of chastity outside 
of sanctimonious ceremonies and the ministration of full and holy rite (16-17). Many 
commentators find Prospero excessive or distasteful in his strictures, but as Mebane explains: 
It is helpful to recall the emphasis in The Tempest upon marriage as a means 
of guiding natural creative powers into constructive channels: the physical 
dimension of nature becomes fulfilled through institutions which are 
associated with the controlling power of our higher faculties, and the process 
is completed through religious ceremonies which invoke the aid of divine 
grace. Our natural powers are gifts which, if used properly, enable us to 
participate in the process of creative love which defeats time and change; if we 
abuse them they become destructive. Prospero’s repeated admonitions to 
chastity, although they may seem overly zealous or even comical to a modern 
audience, are in accordance with this principle: if Ferdinand keeps his 
procreative desires within the confines of marriage, his union with Miranda 
will be harmonious and fruitful; if not, it will be barren and filled with discord 
(IV.i.13-22). The marriage ceremony itself is a form of divinely inspired art, 
just as Prospero’s masque or Ariel’s music is. It is a means through which 
grace effects a miraculous change in nature.34 
The masque, which Prospero presents through Ariel, is the spiritual imaging forth of the 
earthly union that is being accomplished. Even Prospero is swept up in this celestial harmony 
as the mythical goddesses and nymphs appear to ‘help to celebrate / A contract of true love’ 
(132-33). 
                                                
33 Abraham, Dictionary of Alchemical Imagery, s.v. ‘heaven’. 
34 Mebane, 194-95. 
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 Before the pageant ends Prospero starts suddenly back to reality and the heavenly 
apparition heavily vanishes. The conspiracy of Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo nearly gets 
the better of his idyllic departure, and he is reminded that the troubles of earthly life cannot 
be avoided. This is the lesson he had to learn through error in Milan, and this time he 
remembers in time. Ferdinand says to Miranda, ‘This is strange. Your father’s in some 
passion / That works him strongly’ (143-44), and she responds with equal dismay, ‘Never till 
this day / Saw I him touch’d with anger, so distemper’d’ (144-45). Erin Sullivan has 
identified that in the context of Thomas Wright’s thought the movement to passion or 
distemper can be associated with divine rather than worldly affectivity.35 The interruption of 
the pageant is the heavenly being interrupted by the earthly, and even Prospero is vulnerable 
to being caught between in such a passion. 
 Prospero seems to recover enough to take time between heavenly vision and earthly 
conspiracy to offer his great meta-theatrical reflection. The actors are spirits who melt into 
thin air, and the theatrical trappings of scenery are baseless fabric. It is uncertain whether The 
Tempest was originally performed at The Globe or an indoor theatre like Blackfriars.36 
Regardless, the reference to ‘the great globe itself’ (153) would have reflected theatrically as 
well as cosmically. When Prospero says ‘We are such stuff / As dreams are made on; and our 
little life / Is rounded with a sleep’ (156-58), this is in reference to himself, Ferdinand and 
Miranda as characters. Also, in light of the pageant within the play, it is a reference to 
themselves as the more real people who are present. As Malcolm Guite describes: 
Whereas for Macbeth the actors in the play of life are ‘walking shadows’, 
Prospero’s choice of word is spirits – ‘These our actors, / As I foretold you, 
were all spirits’. They are the natural inhabitants of a realm beyond the one in 
which they have been playing. …they, and the ‘cloud-capped towers’, melt 
from us into something else, or in their melting reveal something else. This 
                                                
35 Sullivan, 34. 
36 Mason Vaughan and Vaughan, 7. 
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sense is carried by the context of Prospero’s speech in the wider plot. These 
lines occur at the beginning of the fourth act, not the end of Act V.37 
The theatrical audience, in seeing this, should realize they are themselves implicated—both 
as even more real, and yet also as insubstantial compared to the greater transcendent reality 
that will round them too as a dream. When Prospero dissolves the pageant he in effect 
dissolves the play as well, and by gesturing to the theatrical conceit dissolves the experience 
of all those present into a dreamlike experience from which they are bidden to awake. This 
collapse of the theatrical conceit makes the barrier between performance and audience 
permeable both ways. Just as in The Winter’s Tale the audience is incorporated into the final 
resolution, in The Tempest not just the audience but the theatre itself and the world which it 
images could be said to crash into the construct of the performance. By confusing the 
interpenetrating layers of appearance, substance, and reality, the audience is, before 
Prospero’s final bid for relief, incorporated into the penetrating reality of the play’s spiritual 
resolution. 
 Act IV, Scene i ends by returning briefly from the sublime to the ridiculous, as 
Caliban’s conspiracy proves itself less competent the more sober it gets. The natural order 
cannot be ignored, it must be corrected. Prospero soon enough recovers, and through his 
magic returns things to the order of his plan. 
— 
 Act V is a source of consternation to readers. Many see in it Prospero’s recantation of 
his dark art, or his slipping into despond, or both. The question of dark art has already been 
put aside. The question of Prospero’s sadness is also predicated to some extent on willful 
interpretation combined with a loss of familiarity with the interpretive possibilities of 
alchemy and enchantment. This is a solemn scene of liberation and reconciliation. 
                                                
37 Guite, 71-72. 
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 Prospero opens the scene with alchemical language and a reaffirmation that his power 
is unimpeded: ‘Now does my project gather to a head: / My charms crack not; my spirits 
obey; and Time / Goes upright with his carriage’ (1-3). Ariel reports that Alonso is repentant, 
Gonzalo united with him in mourning, and the others distracted. In response to Ariel’s near-
pity, Prospero steels himself with ‘nobler reason’ (26) against both furious vengeance and 
weak pity. Upon the report of their repentance, Prospero commands: 
        They being penitent, 
The sole drift of my purpose doth extend 
Not a frown further. Go, release them, Ariel. 
My charms I’ll break, their senses I’ll restore, 
And they shall be themselves. (28-32) 
 
Vengeance was never his intent. By his art he has orchestrated for those who are deceived or 
corrupted the opportunity for correction. As he is waiting, alone except for the theatrical 
audience, Prospero gives the second of his great speeches in which he both affirms the extent 
of his magical power and relinquishes it. Most perplexing are his apparent invocation of 
pagan magic, and his claim to have power over the dead. 
 Prospero, like Paulina, is a grave figure. Ariel’s first words greet Prospero explicitly 
as such: ‘All hail, great master, grave sir, hail!’ (I.ii.189). There are two places in the play 
where the grave has burdened commentators. The first is Prospero’s invocation of Ovid’s 
Medea in the speech that includes: ‘Graves at my command / Have wak’d their sleepers, 
op’d, and let ‘em forth / By my so potent art’ (48-50). Second, Prospero’s penultimate 
thought before the Epilogue is, ‘And thence retire me to Milan, where / Every third thought 
shall be my grave’ (311-12). This is often taken as a sign of despondency, leading to a 
heavier reading of his line in the Epilogue ‘And my ending is despair’ (15). Prospero’s grave 
would overflow with the ink spilt on it. However, in light of the grave as the spiritual and 
alchemical locus of death and rebirth, Prospero’s grave fits into an enchanted reading of The 
Tempest.  
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 When Prospero claims power over graves and their sleepers, this is frequently taken 
as proof of necromancy or mere rhetorical posturing. There is an element of the macabre in 
this speech, but there is also a deeper insinuation of redemption through resurrection. 
Disenchanted critics overlook any account of resurrection as fictionalized, misunderstood, or 
exaggerated by superstition. In early modern culture (and for Shakespeare as well barring 
conclusive evidence to the contrary), resurrection after death was assumed to be real. As 
Scott Crider has pointed out, the central miracle of Christianity was Christ’s resurrection, 
which was possible because resurrection was possible. Resurrection was not precluded from 
the miracles that could be experienced in earthly life, especially on the evidence of scripture. 
In the Old Testament, Elijah raises the son of a widow (1 Kings 17), Elisha raises the son of 
the Shunammite woman (2 Kings 4), and an anonymous man is resurrected by touching the 
bones of Elisha (2 Kings 13). Jesus raises the dead son of the woman of Nain (Luke 7), the 
daughter of Jairus (Luke 8), and Lazarus (John 11). St Peter resurrects Tabitha in Joppa (Acts 
9). St Paul brings Eutychus back to life (Acts 20). At Christ’s own death, ‘the graves did open 
them selves, and many bodies of the Saintes which slept, arose, And came out of the graves 
after his resurrection, and went into the holie Citie, and appeared unto many’ (Matthew 
27:52-53). Per 1 Corinthians 15, resurrection will be for all:  
54So when this corruptible hathe put on incorruption, & this mortal hathe put 
on immortalitie, then shal be broght to passe the saying that is written, Death 
is swallowed up into victorie. 
55O death, where is thy sting! O grave where is thy victorie! 
56The sting of death is sinne : and the strength of sinne is the Law. 
57But thanks be unto God which hathe given us victorie through our Lord 
Jesus Christ. 
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 Scriptural significations are less remarked upon than Prospero’s ostensible imitation 
of Medea. The homage to the Metamorphoses is often taken to indicate Prospero’s black 
magic,38 but this comparison is more illuminative in parallel: 
The Tempest V.i.33-57 Metamorphoses VII.258-77 
                                                          O trustie time of night 
Most faithfull unto privities, O golden starres whose light 
Doth jointly with the Moone succeede the beames that 
blaze by day 
And thou three headed Hecate who knowest best the way 
To compass this our great attempt and art our chiefest stay: 
Ye Charmes and Witchcrafts, and thou Earth which both 
with herbe and weed 
Of mightie working furnishes the Wizardes at their neede: 
Ye elves of hills, brooks, standing lakes, and 
groves, 
And ye that on the sands with printless foot 
Do chase the ebbing Neptune, and do fly him 
When he comes back; you demi-puppets that 
By moonshine do the green sour ringlets make, 
Whereof the ewe not bites; and you whose 
pastime 
Is to make midnight mushrumps, that rejoice 
To hear the solemn curfew: by whose aid 
(Weak masters though ye be) I have bedimm’d 
The noontide sun, call’d forth the mutinous 
winds 
And twixt the green sea and the azur’d vault 
Set roaring war; to the dread rattling thunder 
Have I given fire, and rifted Jove’s stout oak 
With his own bolt; the strong-bas’d promontory 
Have I made shake, and by the spurs pluck’d 
up 
The pine and cedar. Graves at my command 
Have wak’d their sleepers, op’d, and let ‘em 
forth 
By my so potent art. 
Ye Ayres and windes: ye Elves of Hilles, of Brookes, of 
Woods alone, 
Of standing Lakes, and of the Night approche ye 
everychone. 
Through helpe of whome (the crooked bankes much 
wondering at the thing) 
I have compelled streames to run cleane backward to their 
spring. 
By charmes I make the calme Seas rough, and make the 
rough Seas plaine 
And cover all the Skie with Cloudes, and chase them 
thence again. 
By charmes I rayse and lay the windes, and burst the 
Vipers jaw, 
And from the bowels of the Earth both stones and trees doe 
drawe. 
Whole woods and Forestes I remove: I make the 
Mountaines shake, 
And even the Earth it selfe to grone and fearfully to quake. 
I call up dead men from their graves: and the O lightsome 
Moone 
I darken oft, though beaten brasse abate they peril soone 
Our Sorcerie dimmes the Morning faire, and darkes the 
Sun at Noone.39 
                                  But this rough magic 
I here abjure; and when I have requir’d 
Some heavenly music (which even now I do) 
To work mine end upon their senses that 
This airy charm is for, I’ll break my staff, 
Bury it certain fadoms in the earth, 
And deeper than did ever plummet sound 
I’ll drown my book. 
 
 Prospero’s speech shows clear signs of imitation, but this is hardly a copy-paste. 
Prospero’s ‘Graves at my command…’ itself sounds closer to St Matthew than Medea. T. W. 
                                                
38 e.g. Mason Vaughan and Vaughan, 66: ‘…having his protagonist openly speak words that some in his 
audience would recognize from Medea’s speech in Ovid’s Metamorphoses was Shakespeare’s signal that the 
magician’s power is not really benign and must be rejected.’ 
39 Ovid, trans. Golding, emphasis added. 
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Baldin has thoroughly dissected the influences of Ovid’s Latin and Golding’s English, and 
rejects treating Shakespeare’s use as derivative: 
 In Shakspere’s treatment of the Jason-Medea story we have probably 
an accurate illustration of his typical modes of using Ovid. He already knows 
Ovid’s story and for parallel situations turns to it for suggestions on how to 
handle his own story. If the situation demands or suggests it, he can use the 
original Latin, with Golding’s translation to give him further suggestion. But 
for general survey there is no indication that he does more than run through 
Golding’s translation. The train of ideas once started, he uses his memory of 
other passages to produce his artistic effect, and cares not at all whether that 
memory be accurate or not, so the effect be good. Shakspere is not the pedant 
seeking to impress others by his accuracy in unimportant detail, but the artist 
seeking material from which his imagination can evolve some marvellous 
effect—and the effect is all.40 
Further, Medea’s invocation is not transparent sorcery. Jason has plead with her for the 
rejuvenation of his aged father, offering his own youthful vitality in exchange. Medea refuses 
the sacrifice, choosing to give freely of her own art.41 Her magic is sacrificial, for the sake of 
another, and performed out of love. It is the beginning of Medea’s opus to restore the father 
to his son—echoed in The Tempest by the restoration of Alonso to Ferdinand. Medea’s art is 
pagan, though Golding’s ‘Witchcrafts’ and ‘Wizardes’ are in Ovid more benign as ‘artisque 
magorum’ and ‘magos’.42 The Winter’s Tale V.i gives immediate precedent for fearful 
anticipation of a monstrous resurrection that turns out to be benevolent. The controversial 
part of Prospero’s claim is not the nature of resurrection, but that he can command it. All we 
have as evidence is Prospero’s own testimony. In light of the precedent of The Winter’s Tale, 
his recognizable art, and preceding demonstrations of power, we would be justified in giving 
him the benefit of the doubt. 
 The question of ‘Every third thought shall be my grave’ is likewise not inherently 
morbid. In light of the grave as the place from which sleepers awake, and with the suggestion 
of the grave as a pretext for the study of esoteric alchemy, Prospero may be turning from 
                                                
40 Baldwin, 451. 
41 Ovid, trans. Miller, VII.176-77. 
42 Ibid., VII.195, 196. 
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earthly matters to his own preparation for eternity. His ability to control the elements is not in 
question, but by the end he has realized even this is rough magic. We do not know how old 
Prospero is, but given the age of Miranda he is plausibly-close to Shakespeare’s own age. At 
the time Shakespeare wrote The Tempest he had exceeded life expectancy in London. Those 
of good health could live much longer, but nothing could be taken for granted.43 Prospero, 
having completed the work of securing polity and family, confronts his own mortality in 
recognition of the perils to the soul of being prince and magus. To those with antipathy for 
dying unprepared, it sounds more like piety than morbidity to devote a third of one’s 
reflective time to dying well in anticipation of the life to come. 
 To return to the beginning of Act V, it is immediately after claiming supreme magical 
power to wake sleepers from their graves that Prospero, mid line, swears to abjure such 
‘potent art’ as ‘rough magic’. These are difficult to reconcile as real and benign. Part of the 
difficulty is the word ‘abjure’. The OED associates the recantation of heresy with its primary 
definition and includes Prospero’s use as a specific example. However, despite frequent 
ecclesial use the meaning was not exclusively such, and the most general definition is ‘To 
renounce an oath, forswear; to withdraw, retract, recant (a heresy or other opinion or position 
formerly held).’ Prospero’s abjuration has the power of an oath, but it is not an admission of 
heresy. The incantation claims power to employ the ‘elves’ (33), ‘demi-puppets’ (36), and 
‘weak masters’ (41) by whose aid he has ruled the respective elements in their strongest 
forms. The power over graves and their sleepers is also a power to employ spirits in the 
reanimation of their respective material forms, which, in context, does not seem any greater 
feat than ruling nature by its spirits. That such sleepers can awake signals the ultimate reality 
of resurrection. Prospero does not claim the power of the last resurrection, and the precedent 
for any intervening reanimation is more scriptural than pagan. The power that Prospero 
                                                
43 Ackroyd, 4, 111. 
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abjures is over nature and spirits. When he forswears this capacity, he releases both from his 
direct influence. 
 Another way of addressing the problem is to consider when Prospero actually abjures 
his magic. We do not see him bury his staff or drown his book, and there is a regular 
assumption that Prospero retains magical control until he releases Ariel in his last line. Yet 
there is no evidence that Prospero does any magic after he declares he will drown his book. 
The First Folio stage direction after this speech indicates Prospero has made a circle before or 
while speaking. His recantation states that after he requires some heavenly music, ‘(which 
even now I do) / To work mine end upon their senses that / This airy charm is for’ (52-54) he 
will break his staff. The music is immediately set in motion. Then we have the alchemical 
neutralization of air, earth, and water. In performance, the action of breaking the staff could 
be done right then on stage. 
 Ariel continues the course upon which he was already set through to the end of the 
play. There is a secondary question in this reading whether Ariel is in fact free before he is 
pronounced free and does not realize it, or continues to serve willingly. Since Prospero also 
relinquishes his magic robe, which is synonymous with his art (I.ii.25), and Ariel helps to 
attire him in his ducal vesture, it is not unreasonable to infer Ariel’s final acts of service are 
willing. He expresses delight in his activity and a desire to please Prospero beyond necessary 
posturing. Ariel does not know Prospero has forsworn his magical control. The last thing 
Ariel actually says is before he drives Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo in, and it is to ask in 
an aside to Prospero, ‘Was’t well done?’ (240). Prospero’s response is ‘Bravely, my 
diligence. / Thou shalt be free’ (241). 
 In light of the dissolution of the theatrical conceit in Act IV, combined with Prospero 
relinquishing his magical power at the beginning of Act V, nearly all of the fifth act may be 
read as theatrically and magically disenchanted. The play continues, but as the spells wear off 
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everyone regains personal agency. What remains is spiritually-enveloped but un-coerced 
human interaction. In this context Prospero embraces Alonso with welcome (109-10). 
Alonso, as soon as his mind is clear from magical enchantment (115), relinquishes the 
dukedom of Milan and asks Prospero’s pardon (119-20). 
 Prospero speaks privately in an aside to Sebastian and Antonio of their further 
treachery (126-29), evidently hoping they will repent and be reconciled. Sebastian in 
response accuses Prospero of devilry (129). Prospero forgives Antonio’s worst fault and 
reclaims the dukedom that Alonso has freely declared his. Sebastian and Antonio are silent in 
the face of forgiveness. Sebastian later declares at line 177 that the recovery of Ferdinand is 
‘A most high miracle!’ His sincerity is suspect and this is most likely an attempt to ingratiate 
himself with Alonso. The only other words from Sebastian and Antonio are brief derision of 
Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo (263-66), and these too are just as easily read as flattery of 
the dukes against conspirators who have been condemned as such. Their silence when 
forgiven is usually taken as a sign of unrepentance. The truth is we cannot know their hearts, 
and their ends are not revealed. Prospero sticks with his plan, offers forgiveness freely, and 
leaves the rest to Providence. He has realized (perhaps all along) that greater spiritual virtue 
can only be freely practiced and freely received. The greatest hope at the end of The Tempest 
is that love freely and unconditionally given will lead to it being freely received and returned. 
If Prospero did not fully acknowledge this before Ferdinand and Miranda fell in love, their 
romance at the crux of the play may be credited for this final enchantment of spiritual 
freedom. 
 Miranda’s wonder is innate. Even her accusations that Ferdinand is cheating at chess 
are in the register of delight. The most control we ever see Prospero exert over her is to cause 
her to fall asleep at I.ii.86, so that she will not know the pandemonium going on around her. 
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Prospero has protected her, but her nature is wonder, and here in the last scene she says in a 
state of disenchantment: 
                      O wonder! 
How many goodly creatures are there here! 
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world 
That has such people in’t!  (181-84) 
 
This is not naïveté. ‘O wonder!’ is the unadulterated expression of herself just being. The 
singular wonder Miranda sees are creatures that are good and beautiful in a world that has 
been remade brave and new. She directly comprehends the truth that nearly everyone else 
struggles to apprehend. Miranda allows us to hope that we may work towards redemption, so 
that at least our children may be able to retain such wonder. Perhaps this is why Coleridge 
thought that Miranda was Shakespeare’s favourite. 
— 
 Ariel’s release belongs closely with Prospero’s Epilogue. The insubstantial pageant 
having faded, Ariel is no longer a character or a mere theatrical conceit. Prospero’s last 
charge to Ariel is for calm seas and auspicious gales, then he is freed to the elements (317-
19). When he is released, this Mercurial, musical, spirit of air is released not into the narrative 
conceit of the play, but out of the theatre which the narrative has overflown. Ariel, who has 
been the focal contact between Prospero and the audience, remains a spirit at-large of the free 
spiritual re-enchantment which has not ended. Ariel is no longer Prospero’s spirit but ours, if 
we will have him. Prospero ties Ariel and the audience together, which we see in the fullness 
of the Epilogue: the gentle breath that would fill his sails (11) is the same wind that is Ariel’s 
charge. 
 Prospero does not follow the convention of breaking character in his Epilogue to 
apologize for the shortcomings of what has been seen. The Epilogue is Prospero’s prayer, 
ostensibly spoken to the audience. He has no more charms and little strength (1-2). Prospero 
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asks for release, as he has released those who sought to entrap him. The binding spell is now 
the audience’s, and theirs is the power to pardon: 
For the second time the revels have ended and still Prospero, who has forgiven 
and delivered his enemies, survives the dissolution and stands in need of 
deliverance himself. He steps as it were from the Great Globe, from the whole 
theatre of life, to find that he is still himself and still has an audience…. And so 
he appeals to his audience for mercy on the grounds of mercy, both for the 
mercy he has shown and the mercy his auditors might themselves hope for….44 
 When Prospero says his project was to please (13), the assumed audience is the 
theatrical audience. This is the closest Prospero comes to the convention of an epilogue. Here 
also Shakespeare’s dramaturgical spectre hovers most closely. This conflation too allows for 
a plurality of significances. The theatrical and magical enchantments having ended, the 
character audience and the theatrical audience are conflated. Again by extension, the 
audience incorporates the greater reality beyond the spatial confines of the theatre. His 
project to please submits to those who have the power to judge him. Prospero of all people 
knows that however powerful he was, there is a power greater and more sovereign, before 
whom no service is perfect. His acknowledgement is Shakespeare’s acknowledgement. 
 The next to last sentence of the Epilogue is often taken as a sign the play ends on a 
melancholy note, at least for Prospero: 
         Now I want 
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant, 
And my ending is despair, 
Unless I be reliev’d by prayer, 
Which pierces so, that it assaults 
Mercy itself, and frees all faults. (13-18) 
 
If spoken to the audience, this does come across as needy and despondent. Yet, again, the 
greatest audience for such a prayer is not theatrical but spiritual. Having broken open the 
boundary between earth and heaven, Prospero speaks literally when he says his prayer pierces 
                                                
44 Guite, 73. 
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and assaults Mercy itself. We are included into Prospero’s corporate act of penitence, but he 
has at the last turned the secular theatre into a sacred place of supplication. 
 The last couplet is a change of address to those present in the theatre, who by their 
response are freely incorporated into the final loving enchantment of forgiveness: 
   As you from crimes would pardon’d be, 
   Let your indulgence set me free. 
 
Conclusion 
 According to an enchanted reading of The Winter’s Tale, Paulina’s art is uncertain, 
but the conclusion is spiritually certain. The Tempest, in contrast, gives abundant evidence 
that Prospero’s art is certain, but the conclusion is spiritually uncertain. This does not mean 
that we should doubt it, only that spiritual freedom cannot be imposed. When Prospero could 
have enforced by art the visible and human reconciliation of justice, instead he relinquishes 
his power. Not because he was corrupt or in error, but because coercion would only subjugate 
those less powerful than himself, and hearts are not moved towards faith and love by 
coercion, however benevolent. ‘Free’ is the last word. 
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EPILOGUE 
 If this study has succeeded, the result will be further questions for research and 
critical engagement. I have endeavoured to demonstrate the mutual benefit to literary 
criticism and theology of studies that take seriously the probability that William Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries erred on the side of sincere religious belief. Shakespeare is not a 
recognized theologian, but his imagination was capable of apprehending anything of possible 
religious significance, and translating it into dramatic form for audiences’ comprehension and 
sometimes even spiritual edification. The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest alone suggest 
serious creative engagement with matters often relegated to theology: divine providence, a 
cosmic order that includes nature and the supernatural, the problem of evil, bodily 
resurrection, the eternality of the spirit, miracles, faith and reason, man’s creative role in 
redemption, and aesthetics—to name some of them. Shakespeare seems to have trusted his 
audiences to recognize these topics and benefit from engagement with them in the secular 
theatre. Presently there is a disconnect between the predominant ideological mindset of 
Shakespeare’s day and our cultural mindset as we continue to try and understand the enduring 
spiritual significance of Shakespeare’s dramatic art. Shakespeare does not have to be studied 
from a religious perspective, but there is increasing evidence that to the extent scholars are 
interested in the question of Shakespeare and religion, they benefit from treating that religion 
less as an outmoded artifact and more as the embodiment of faith that still awakens many to 
this day. 
 To return to the language of disenchantment and re-enchantment, it is not hard to 
identify a sustained critical trend of disenchantment that has sought to understand 
Shakespeare and religion by disenchanting both. Such studies have cast into relief a great 
number of critical opportunities for which Shakespeare studies are the better. However, 
perhaps in light of Shakespeare’s ongoing resistance to secularizing hypotheses, there is 
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opportunity for theological correctives that carefully recover critical and spiritual re-
enchantment in their methodologies. This study now concluded will, I hope, suggest other 
opportunities for further studies that may apprehend interpretive possibilities not usually 
considered by those who limit their comprehension to reason alone without imagination or 
faith. 
 If ever there was an age when disenchantment led to spiritual turmoil and cultural 
distress, it was Shakespeare’s. It would be historical snobbery to presume we are much better 
or worse off, but certainly there is need for the cultural recovery of the enchanting ideal that 
our world makes sense, our lives have purpose, and we are not helpless in the face of tragic 
circumstances. Those who have closed themselves off to spiritual renewal are nevertheless 
looking for some reassurance that things are better than they comprehend. Shakespeare knew 
such people could not always be found in church. Perhaps he hoped to find them in the 
theatre. 
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